Kingsroad Handelsges M.B.H vs. Raj Grow Impex LLP.

Declare that the Award 4618A dated 28.09.2021 rendered by the Board of Appeal, GAFTA at London be deemed to be a decree of this Hon'ble Court;

Pronounce judgment according to the Award 4618A dated 28.09.2021 rendered by the Board

Attach and cause to be sold movable and immovable assets of the respondent in order to satisfy the award 4618A dated 28.09.2021 rendered by the Board of Appeal, GAFTA at London;

Order the Respondent to pay the Petitioner the costs of this Petition;

Any other or further relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be granted in favour of the Petitioner and justice be done.”

By way of filing this arbitration application, the applicant seeks a declaration that the award dated 28.09.2021, issued by the Board of Appeal, Grain and Feed Trade Association (for short, ‘GAFTA’) in London, England be treated/recognized as a decree of this Court. The applicant further requests that judgment be pronounced in accordance with the aforesaid award, as referred by the Board of Appeal, GAFTA in London and direct the respondent to pay a sum of U 999,382.28 (equivalent to Rs. 7,63,72,794/-) along with interest, as per the award 4618A, from the date of filing the instant arbitration application until its actual realization. Additionally, a prayer has also been made by the applicant for attachment and sale of movable and immovable assets of the respondent in order to satisfy the aforesaid award and further cost of the instant application be imposed on the respondent.

Counsel for the applicant submits that the applicant and the respondent entered into three separate contracts on 03.09.2018 wherein the petitioner agreed to supply a total of 4188.740 MT of Whole Yellow Peas of Russian origin, for the crop year 2018-2019, to the respondent, with Kolkata being designated as the port of destination in the contracts. These contracts were concluded through the broker M/s. Agri Impex India Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai. The petitioner shipped the grains in accordance with the terms of the contract, in 156 containers in bulk under 11 bills of lading from port Novorossiysk, Russia to Kolkata, India through various container transportation services namely Hapag Llyod, Mediterranean Shipping Company and Maersk in November, 2018. Counsel for the applicant further submits that a dispute arose between the parties and after invoking the arbitration clause of the contract agreement, the matter was referred to the GAFTA Arbitration Tribunal, who vide award dated 03.08.2020 passed the following award:- “AWARD

THE TRIBUNAL HEREBY AWARDS THAT Sellers' claim for non-payment for the goods SUCCEEDS.

THE TRIBUNAL HEREBY AWARDS THAT Buyers' counterclaim on damages for losses incurred because of non-contractual withdrawal of documents and thereby the termination of Contract 1, Contract 2 and Contract 3 by Sellers FAILS.

THE TRIBUNAL FURTHER AWARDS THAT Buyers shall pay to Sellers: 7.3. 1. Interest amount for delayed payments for the goods delivered under Contract 1, Contract 2 and

THE TRIBUNAL FURTHER AWARDS THAT GAFTA's administrative costs and the fees and expenses of the Tribunal, as per attached schedule shall be payable by Buyers.

THE TRIBUNAL FUTHER AWARDS THAT Buyers' counterclaim for costs, fees and expenses of the arbitration together with interest thereon until payment, FAILS.

Any non-member fee should be borne by the non- member party.

We hereby reserve juri iction to ourselves to make any further award or awards on any and all remaining issues between the Parties, including any administrative or other formalities in relation to the preparation and signing of this award.”

Counsel submits that aggrieved by the award passed by the GAFTA Arbitration Tribunal, the respondent preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, by way of filing Appeal No.4618A. However, the said appeal was rejected by the Appellate Tribunal vide award dated 28.09.2021 and the amount so awarded by the GAFTA Arbitration Tribunal was further enhanced by passing the following award:- “11. AWARD

WE REJECT Buyers' request that we set aside Awards 17-848 and 17-848A.

2 WE DO HEREBY FIND that Buyers are in breach and shall pay forthwith to Sellers sums as follows: (a) the difference between the contract prices and the resale price of US$50/mt, totalling US$128,900.50, together with interest at 4% per annum thereon, compounded three-monthly, from 19 July 2019 to the date of payment; (b) the under-invoiced balance of US$49,138.62, together with interest at 4% per annum thereon, compounded three-monthly, from 10 January 2019 to the date of payment; (c) interest on the late payments as set out in paragraphs 10.22 and 10.23 above in the sums of US$1,558.95 and US$19,289.07, together with interest at 4% per annum thereon, compounded three-monthly, from 19 July 2019 to the date of payment. (d) the additional cost of 14 days free time, of US$9,200.00, together with interest at 4% per annum thereon, compounded three-monthly, from 27 February 2019 to the date of payment; (e) the storage and handling expenses of Phonex (US$ 114,868.64) were combined with the Maersk container demurrage in a total of US$140,132.63, as agreed between Sellers and the New Buyer, together with interest at 4% per annum thereon, compounded three- monthly, from 11 January 2021 to the date of payment; (f) container demurrage of US$514,366.03, comprised of: -Hapag Lloyd: US$156,750.00 and US$74,100, together with interest at 4% per annum thereon, compounded three-monthly, from 27 June 2019 and 9 August 2019 respectively to the date of payment; -MSC:

3 Buyers' counterclaim FAILS.

4 Each party shall bear its own legal and/or trade representation costs.

5 We hereby reserve juri iction unto ourselves to make any further award or awards on any issues arising in respect of any administrative or other formalities in relation to the preparation and signing of this award.”

Counsel submits that the judgments passed by both the Arbitral Tribunal as well as the Appellate Tribunal have not been assailed by the respondent before any competent forum of law and, therefore, the same has attained finality. Counsel submits that under the provisions of Chapter I of Part II of the Act of 1996,

Per contra, counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent opposed the submissions made by counsel for the applicant and submitted that the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is contrary to the Indian Public Policy. Counsel submits that several objections relating to payment and default under Clause 12-H and Clause 21 of the Contract Agreement were raised before the Arbitral Tribunal as well as before the Appellate Tribunal. However, these objections were not entertained and overturned by both the Tribunals. Counsel submits that the petitioner was supposed to make the payment of lending charges in India for the port used by the shipping company but inspite of the above, the petitioner directly paid the aforesaid charges to the shipping company outside of India which has seriously caused losses in terms of GST charges, etc. to the respondent and the Government of India. The

Heard and considered the submissions made at the bar and perused the material available on record.

This Court observes that following the execution of the aforementioned contract in question between the petitioner and the respondent, some dispute arose between them, whereupon the matter was referred for arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause contained in the contract in question. The Arbitral Tribunal (GAFTA) thereafter passed its final award on 03.08.2020 in favour of the applicant, directing the respondent to pay the awarded amount to the applicant. Subsequently, the Appellate Tribunal, vide its amended award dated 28.09.2021, upheld the original award and further enhanced the amount awarded under the award dated 03.08.2020. 9. This Court further observes that the present application has been preferred by the petitioner for the enforcement of the Foreign Award in question, while the respondent’s objection under Section 48 of the Act of 1996, is that the Foreign Award cannot be enforced as it is alleged to be contrary to public policy.

Contention of the respondent is that there was a patent illegality in the award, which cannot be countenanced as a valid ground for rejecting the prayer for enforcement of the award under Section 48 of the Act. The grounds for refusing enforcement are limited to the situations where the award is contrary to (i) fundamental policy of Indian law, (ii) the interest of India and (iii) justice or morality. In this context, reference may be made to judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shri Lal Mahal Ltd. Vs. Progetto Grano Spa, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 433. The issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in that case was whether that it is contrary to the contract between the parties and/or is patently illegal. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that the expression “public policy of India” under Section 48(2)(b) is an expression of wider import than the expression “public policy” in Section 7(1)(b)(ii) of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961. It was further argued that the expansive construction given by the Apex Court to the term “public policy of India” in the case of Saw Pipes (Supra) must also apply to the use of the same term “public policy of India” in Section 48(2)(b). The Hon’ble Supreme Court, upon revisiting its two previous judgments in Saw Pipes Ltd. (supra) and Phulchand Exports

Section 58 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the English Arbitration Act’)provides that an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal, pursuant to an arbitration agreement, is final and binding on both the parties and on any persons claiming through or under them, however, subject to the right to challenge such an award by any available arbitral process of appeal or review or in accordance with the provisions of the said English Arbitration Act. Section 67 of the English Arbitration Act provides that a party to arbitral proceedings may apply to the Court for challenging any award of the arbitral tribunal as to its substantive juri iction; or for an order declaring an award made by the tribunal on the merits to be of no effect because the tribunal did not have substantive juri iction. Section 68 of the English Arbitration Act provides that a party to the arbitral proceedings may apply to the court for challenging an award in the proceedings on the ground of serious irregularity affecting the tribunal, the proceedings or the award. Section 68 (2) of the said Act enumerats the type of serious irregularities referred to in sub-section (1) thereof. Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act provides that a party to arbitral proceedings may file an appeal before the Court on a question of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings in which the Court has power to confirm the award, vary the award, remit the award to the tribunal, in whole or in part, for reconsideration in the light of the court’s determination, or set aside the award in whole or in part. According to Section 70 of the English Arbitration

The Supreme Court in Eitzen Bulk A/S Vs. Ashapura Minechem Ltd. reported in (2016) 11 SCC 508, was dealing with a dispute between the parties arising out of a contract for charterers for shipment of bauxite from India to China. Clause 28 of the Contract provided that any dispute arising out of the C.O.A, is to be settled by arbitration in London and that English Law shall apply. The Arbitration was held in London according to English Law. The respondent Ashapura Minechem Limited was held liable and was directed to pay a sum of U 36,306,104/- together with compound interest at the rate of 3.75% per annum. It was further directed to pay U 74,135 together with compound interest at the rate of 3.75% per annum and another sum of 90,233.66 Pounds together with compound interest at the rate of 2.5% per annum. Before the arbitration had commenced, the respondent Ashapura Minechem Limited filed a suit along with an application for injunction before the Civil Judge at Jam-khambalia, Gujarat, praying for declaration of the Arbitration Clause contained therein as illegal, null and void ab-initio. The civil suit was dismissed for want of juri iction and appeal filed by respondent Ashapura before the Gujarat High Court was dismissed as withdrawn. The respondent Ashapura Minechem Limited thereafter resorted to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in respect to the award passed in London before the District Judge, Jamnagar, together with an injunction application. The appellant Eitzen Bulk A/S applied for enforcement of the award in the

The question is whether the above stipulations show the intention of the parties to expressly or impliedly exclude the provisions of Part I to the Arbitration, which was to be held outside India, i.e., in London. We think that the clause evinces such an intention by providing that the English Law will apply to the Arbitration. The clause expressly provides that Indian Law or any other law will not apply by positing that English Law will apply. The intention is that English Law will apply

The Bombay High Court in POL India Projects Ltd. vs. Aurelia Reederei Eugen Friederich GmbH reported in 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 1109 was faced with a somewhat similar situation where the enforcement of an English Award was sought and the opposite party asserted that they were not governed by

The Arbitrator and the Appellate Tribunal in the present case have passed a reasoned award after considering the claim submissions of the petitioner. This Court in the scope of Section 48

This Court also observes that Section 48 of the Act of 1996 does not give power to review the Foreign Award on merit at the

At this juncture, this Court also considers it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. Vedanta & Ors Ltd., reported in (2020) 10 SCC 1, as hereunder:- “114. The judgment in Parsons [Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'industrie du Papier, 508 F 2d 969 (2nd Cir 1974)] has been followed in various other juri ictions. [ See, e.g., BCB Holdings Ltd. & Belize Bank Ltd. v. Attorney General of Belize, 2013 CCJ 5 (Appellate Juri iction, 26-7-2013); Traxys Europe S.A. v. Balaji Coke Industry (P) Ltd., 2012 FCA 276 (Federal Court of Australia, 23-3-2012); Uganda Telecom Ltd. v. Hi-Tech Telecom Pty. Ltd., 2011 FCA 131 (Federal Court of Australia, 22-2-2011);

The International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA) Guide to the Interpretation of the 1958 New York Convention: A Handbook for Judges (2011), states that while considering the grounds for refusal of a foreign award, the Court must be guided by the following principles: (I) no review on merits; (ii) narrow interpretation of the grounds for refusal; and (iii) limited discretionary power.

Given the well-settled position in law with respect to the finality of awards in international

Secondly, the appellants have not made out as to how the award is in conflict with the basic notions of justice, or in violation of the substantive public policy of India.

In the seminal judgment of Parsons [Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v. Societe Generale De L'industrie du Papier, 508 F 2d 969 (2nd Cir 1974)], which has been followed in various juri ictions, including by the Indian Supreme Court in Renusagar case [Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644], it was held that enforcement may be refused only if it violates the enforcement State's most basic notions of morality and justice, which has been interpreted to mean that there should be great hesitation in refusing enforcement, unless it is obtained through “corruption or fraud, or undue means”.

The Singapore Court of Appeal in PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA [PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (Persero) v. Dexia Bank SA, 2006 SGCA 41] while interpreting international public policy, opined that:

And the above issue was decided in para 15 to 26 as under:- “15. India was one of the earliest signatories to the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 (for short “New York Convention”)

The New York Convention superseded the Geneva Convention of 1927 to facilitate the enforcement of foreign Arbitral Awards5. Article V(2) of the New York Convention reads as under:

The precursors to the New York Convention on the contrary provided for an expansive scope for invoking the public policy ground based on the violation of the “fundamental principles of the law”. Although the notion that ‘public policy’ is ‘a very unruly horse’ has gained traction over the years6, one would also do well to remember the words of Lord Denning who said that, “With a good man in the saddle, the unruly horse can be kept in control.” This would suggest that a proper understanding of this branch of law by the horse rider would be necessary. In that context, one of the earliest cases that dealt with the aspect of “public policy” and the general pro-enforcement bias of the New York Convention was the decision in Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier,8 where the United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit noted:

The above decision has been followed in various juri ictions including the Supreme Court of India in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co9. The articulation of the “forum State’s most basic notions of morality and justice” has been legislatively adopted in the Indian Arbitration Act,1996. The legal framework concerning enforcement of certain foreign awards in International Commercial Arbitration is contained in Part II of the said Act. In this juri iction, we must underscore that minimal judicial intervention to a foreign award is the norm and interference can only be based on the exhaustive grounds mentioned under Section 48.10 A review on the merits of the dispute is impermissible 11. This Court in Vijay Karia v. Prysmian Cavi E. Sistemi SRL,12 had noted that Section 50 of the Indian Arbitration Act,1996 does not provide an appeal against a foreign award enforced by a judgment of a learned Single Judge of a High Court and therefore the Supreme Court should only entertain the appeal with a view to settle the law. It was noted that the party resisting enforcement can only have “one bite at the cherry” and when it loses in the High Court, the limited scope for interference could be merited only in exceptional cases of “blatant disregard of Section 48”. This principle of pro- enforcement bias was further entrenched by the Supreme Court in Union of India v Vedanta13. 18. At this point, we may also note that Courts in some countries have recognized that when applying their own public policy to Convention Awards, they should give it an international and not a domestic dimension14. The Arbitration legislation in France15, for instance, makes an explicit distinction between national and international public policy, limiting refusal of enforcement only to the latter ground. Scholars have noted that the New York Convention’s structure and objectives argue strongly against the notion that reliance should be placed on local public policies without international limitations.16 The objective behind such a distinction is to make it less difficult to allow enforcement on public

At this point, we may also benefit by noting that the International Law Association issued recommendations19 at a conference held in New Delhi in 2002 on international commercial arbitration and advocated using only narrow and international standards, while dealing with “public policy”. The recommendations have been regarded as reflective of best international practices. The ILA also defined international public policy as follows: “(i) fundamental principles, pertaining to justice or morality, that the State wishes to protect even when it is not directly concerned; (ii) rules designed to serve the essential political, social or economic interests of the State, these being known as ‘lois de police’ or ‘public policy rules’; and (iii.) the duty of the State to respect its obligations towards other States or international organizations.”

Being a signatory to the New York Convention, we must therefore adopt an internationalist approach20. What follows from the above is that there is a clear distinction between the standards of public policy applicable for domestic arbitration and international

Even though the New York Convention does not explicitly mention “bias”, the possible grounds for refusing recognition of a foreign award are contained in Article V(1)(d)(irregular composition of arbitral tribunal), Article V(1)(b) (due process) and the public policy defence under Article V(2) (b). Courts across the world have applied a higher threshold of bias to prevent enforcement of an Award than the standards set for ordinary judicial review21. Therefore, Arbitral awards are seldom refused recognition and enforcement, considering the existence of a heightened standard of proof for non – recognition and enforcement of an award, based on alleged partiality22. It invokes a higher threshold than is applicable in cases of removal of the arbitrator. This is for the reasons that, greater risk, efforts, time, and expenses are involved in the non- recognition of an award as against the removal of an arbitrator during the arbitral proceedings.

What is also essential to note is that Courts across the world do not adopt a uniform test while dealing with allegations of bias24. The standards for determining bias vary across different legal systems and juri ictions25. English Courts26, for instance, adopt the “informed or fair minded” observer test to conclude whether there is a “real possibility of bias”. Australia 27 adopts the “real danger of bias” test and Singapore28 prefers the standard of “reasonable suspicion” rejecting the “real danger of bias” test. Therefore, the outcome of a challenge on the ground of bias would vary, depending on domestic standards.

Cautioning against applying domestic standards at the enforcement stage, Gary Born29 emphasizing on the adherence to international standards, makes the following observation: “In light of developing sources of international standards with regard to

Embracing international standards in arbitration would foster trust, certainty, and effectiveness in the resolution of disputes on a global scale. The above discussion would persuade us to say that in India, we must adopt an internationally recognized narrow standard of public policy, when dealing with the aspect of bias. It is only when the most basic notions of morality or justice are violated that this ground can be attracted. This Court in Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)30 had noted that the ground of most basic notions of morality or justice can only be invoked when the conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction of fundamental notions or principles of justice.

In view of the above discussion, there can be no difficulty in holding that the most basic notions of morality and justice under the concept of ‘public policy’ would include bias. However, Courts must endeavor to adopt international best practices instead of 30 (2019) 15 SCC 131 domestic standards, while determining bias. It is only in exceptional circumstances that enforcement should be refused on the ground of bias.

Finally, it has been held in para 42 to 44 as under:- “42. This long list of events points to a saga of the award- holder’s protracted and arduous struggle to gather the fruits of the Award. The Award Debtors raised multiple challenges and also defied the Court’s order. They had to serve jail time for such contemptuous actions. In this backdrop, the travails of Award holders suggest a Pyrrhic victory. It is not unlike the situation articulated by the playwright & author Oscar Wilde who commented - “In this world, there are only two tragedies. One is not getting what one wants, and the other is getting it.”35 As can be noticed, in this case, despite the award being in their favour, the award- holders found themselves embroiled in multiple litigations in different forums by the concerted and unmerited action of the appellants. It will bear mention here, that in every forum the award debtors have lost and Courts’ verdicts are in the favour of the award holders. Despite this, the benefit of the foreign award is still to reach the respondents. This sort of challenge where arbitral bias is raised at the enforcement stage, must be discouraged by our Courts to send out a clear message to the stakeholders that Indian Courts would ensure enforcement of a foreign Award unless it is demonstrable that there is a clear violation of morality and justice. The determination of bias should only be done by applying international standards. Refusal of enforcement of foreign award should only be in a rare case where, non- adherence to International Standards is clearly demonstrable.

The High Court in this matter has rightly held that the award- debtors have failed to substantiate their allegation of bias, conflict of interest or the failure by the Presiding Arbitrator to render disclosure to the parties, as an objection to the enforcement of the award. The award debtors have failed to meet the high threshold for refusal of enforcement of a foreign award under Section 48 of the Indian Arbitration Act. Accordingly, the decision given by the High Court for enforcement/execution of the foreign

Even as the appeals filed by the award debtors are dismissed, the respondents, notwithstanding their victory in all the legal battles until now, must not be allowed to feel that theirs is a case of winning the battle but losing the war. In the circumstances, we emphasize the need for early enforcement of the foreign award by the competent forum, without showing any further indulgence to the award debtors. It is ordered accordingly. The appeals stand dismissed on these terms.”

In the instant case also, the respondent-award debtor has lost before the Arbitral Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal on the basis of the similar issue raised in this arbitration application. The awards passed by both the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal have not been challenged by the respondent before any other forum of law at London (United Kingdom) and both the awards have attained finality. The verdicts, embodied in the two awards, have been rendered in favour of the petitioner. Despite this, the benefit of the Foreign Award is still beyond the reach of the petitioner and it has been deprived to enjoy the fruits of the award. The objections raised by the respondent, at the stage of execution, cannot be allowed by this Court. This Court would not like to send a message to stake holders that the foreign award will not be executed unless it is demonstrated by the respondent that there is any violation of morality and justice. The allegation of bias can be adjudicated only by applying the international standards. Enforcement of a foreign award can only be refused in the rarest cases where there is clear non-adherence to International Standards. After contesting two prolonged battles/proceedings

The 246th law commission report has emphasized that Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 sets out an exhaustive list of grounds to challenge an award, and these mainly relate to procedural issues without going into substantive issues. Previously, the Law Commission had stated that Section 34 must expressly state that an award cannot be set aside merely because the tribunal has made a mistake of law, or because the court of law takes a different view of the evidence. Now, the law commission has suggested that section 34 also states "For the avoidance of doubt the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute."

In 2015, the Arbitration & Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015 introduced major changes to Section 34 of the Act, as suggested by the 246th Law Commission Report. These changes were focused on restricting courts from interfering with the arbitral awards on the ground of "public policy". The amendment added, explanation 2 to Section 34(2) as well as Section 2A. Explanation 2 of Section 34(2) states "For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian Law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute."

Since the 2015 amendment to the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, the courts have avoided giving a wider meaning to the term "public policy" or interfering with the merits of the case.

This Court further observes that there is a very narrow scope to interfere with the Foreign Award on merits upon the application preferred for enforcement thereof. It is clear that there was an agreement between the parties and after the dispute, the matter was referred for arbitration, whereupon, the learned Arbitrator, after considering the material on record, passed the Award in question.

This Court also observes that the present application is for enforcement of the Foreign Award and at present the objections raised by the respondent do not hold any ground at the enforcement stage, as per the aforementioned precedent law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Since this Court in the scope of Section 48 is not entitled to examine merits of the foreign award, therefore, arguments on merits advanced by the respondent need not be entered into in greater details. In proceedings seeking enforcement of the foreign award and making the foreign award a decree of this Court, this Court cannot sit in appeal on the findings recorded by the Arbitral Tribunal. Conclusions and Directions:-

Thus, the objections raised by the respondent do not hold any substance, and the same are hereby rejected.

In view of the above factual situation, the Foreign Award dated 28.09.2021 passed by the Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA) in Appeal Award No. 4618-A is accordingly treated as a decree of this Court, in view of Section 49 of the Act of 1996, which provides that, “Where the Court is satisfied that the foreign award is enforceable under this Chapter, the award shall be deemed to be a decree of that Court”.

In view of the analysis of the afore-discussed facts and applicable laws, the subject foreign award deserves to be declared as decree of this Court and is accordingly so declared. Consequently, upon being declared decree of this Court, the said award is binding on the parties in terms of Section 46 of the Act of 1996 and is now liable to be enforced under Section 48 of the Act. Accordingly, the petitioner, upon taking further and necessary steps, is entitled to get the award executed as a decree of this Court, in accordance with the relevant provisions and the applicable laws.

The application is disposed of, in the terms indicated above with no orders as to costs.

Thus, it is ordered that the Foreign Award in question shall be enforceable and executable as a decree of this Court. For the purpose of enforcement and execution, the respondent is directed to disclose its assets by way of filing an affidavit, within a period of six weeks from today, before the Executing Court. The applicant shall be at liberty to seek further directions for the enforcement