Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present :
The Hon’ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
WPA 19620 of 2024
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited & Ors.
Vs.
Employees Provident Fund Organization & Anr.
Mr. Shiv Shankar Banerjee
Mr. Santanu Chatterjee
Mr. Siddhartha Chandra
… for the petitioner
Mr. Mihir Kundu
... for the respondent no.1/
PF Authority
Ms. Shahina Haque
Ms. Ayesha Hussain
… for the respondent no.2
Heard on & Judgment on : 02nd January, 2026
Ananya Bandyopadhyay J.
1. The petitioners are led by Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, a
Government of India undertaking governed by Central Rules and
Regulations. The orders and consequential demand notices to have
been issued by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II and
Assessing Officer under Section 7Q and 14B of the Employees
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, the
proceedings emanating from all default in respect of provident fund
contribution pertaining to the contractor respondent No.2 being
M/s. Reju Enterprise for the period culminating in June, 2019 are
not in dispute. According to the petitioner, the order dated
2
30.03.2023 passed by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II
and Assessing Officer in proceeding under Section 14B being Diary
No. 31/2022 holding respondent No.2 to be liable to pay the
contributions for the period from 01/2019 to 06/2019 amounting
to Rs. 5,02,860/-. Vide demand notice dated 30.03.2023 issued by
the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-II and Assessing Officer
under Section 7Q the respondent No. 2 was directed to pay for the
period as aforesaid amounting to Rs. 1,95,076/- only both the
aforesaid demand notices were received at the office of the petitioner
on 10.04.2023.
2. A Revenue Recovery Certificate dated 03.05.2023 was issued under
Section 8 of the EPF and MP Act, 1952 by the Assessing Officer
asked the Recovery Officer to recover the sum of Rs. 6,97,936/-
from the respondent No.2.
3. It had been the consistent case of the petitioners that till 2018,
there had been no delay whatsoever in clearing the contractor’s bills
and all statutory payments stood duly discharged. Any penalty if at
all for that period arose solely from the contractor’s own failure to
comply with statutory formalities and could not in equity or in law
be thrust upon the principal employer.
4. The narrative thereafter must be viewed against the backdrop of
great financial stress faced by BSNL during 2019, followed closely
by the unprecedented disruption occasioned by the COVID-19
pandemic. Even during this turbulent phase, the petitioners
asserted that the primary cause for delay in bill clearance laid in
3
the repeated failure of M/s. Reju Enterprise to submit complete bills
with mandatory statutory documents relating to EPF/ESI/GST and
challans. It was specifically stated that bills for June, 2019 were
submitted as late as October, 2020 and were nevertheless paid by
BSNL.
5. A crucial and undisputed fact emerged from the record that the
contractual
employment
the
respondent
No.2/
M/s.
Raju
Enterprise stood terminated with effect from July, 2019. At the
request of the contractor himself. This position was fortified by
correspondence wherein the proprietor of the contractor expressed
inability to continue the work, owing to prolonged illness following
COVID-19 and further stated his incapacity to submit bills beyond
July, 2019. It was thus emphatically asserted that no contractual
relationship subsisted thereafter.
6. Despite this, Orders dated 30th March, 2023, were passed under
Section 14 B of the aforesaid Act holding BSNL liable for damages,
coupled with demand notices under Section 7Q of the aforesaid Act
followed by revenue recovery certificate and a fresh demand notice
dated 4th July, 2023 for a consolidated sum of Rs.6,97,936/-. The
petitioners contended the authorities failed to consider the fact of
termination of the contract, the admitted payment of all bills up to
June-July, 2019 and the fact that BSNL had already approached
the provident fund authorities as early as September 2020 seeking
waiver of penal damages.
4
7. The petitioners had approached the Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court seeking redressal. However, the said
application
was
dismissed
on
the
ground
of
limitation,
notwithstanding the plea that the petitioners acquired knowledge of
the impugned proceedings only upon receipt of the fresh demand
notice in July, 2023 and that the approach to the aforesaid
Tribunal was within the statutory period reckoned therefrom.
8. It was also urged that M/s. Reju Enterprise was an independently
registered establishment under the EPFO possessing its own code
number and that settled judicial precedent held where a contractor
maintained separate statutory registration, the principal employer
could not be fastened with liability for the contractor’s, default in
remittance of provident fund contributions, particularly in the
absence of any subsisting contract.
9. In essence, the grievance of the petitioners was that statutory
authorities proceeded mechanically overlooking material facts,
contractual termination, admitted payments and binding principles
of law, thereby imposing liability upon BSNL for a period beyond
July, 2019 when neither work was performed, not any employer-
employee relationship, direct or indirect could be said to exist.
10. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner submitted that
the impugned proceedings initiated under section 7Q and 14B of
the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act,
1952 suffered from fundamental legal infirmities and resulted in
5
fastening
liability
upon
the
petitioners
in
a
manner
not
contemplated by law.
11. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioners further asserted
that they neither held the EPF Code in question nor maintained any
employer-employee relationship with the workmen engaged by the
contractor.
12. It was contended that the original proceedings were commenced
against M/s. Reju Enterprise an independent contractor having its
distinct EPF code for all default in remittance of statutory
contributions in respect of its employees for the period spanning
1.1.2005 to 11.04.2022. The petitioners asserted that such default
did not arise on account of any act or omission attributable to
them, particularly when the contractor maintained a separate code
and independently employed its workmen.
13. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioners drew attention to
the order dated 30.03.2023 passed by the Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner-II & Assessing Officer under Section 14B whereby
liability for the period January 2019 to June 2019, was a portion
upon the petitioners as well as the demand notice of the same date
issued under section 7Q. It was submitted that both the order and
the demand notice while legally unsustainable inasmuch as the EPF
code in question stood exclusively in the name of the contractor and
the petitioners were neither the account holders nor contributors
under the said code.
6
14. It was further submitted that a revenue recovery certificate dated
03.05.2023 was subsequently issued under Section 8 of the
aforesaid Act for recovery of an aggregate sum of Rs.6,97,936/-
from the petitioners, even though, according to the petitioners, such
amount, if a payable was due from the contractor, the initiation of
recovery
proceedings
was
stated
to
be
arbitrary
and
disproportionate.
15. On the issue of maintainability, the Learned Advocate representing
the petitioners acknowledged that they had approached the Central
Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court by filing EPF
Appeal No.18 of 2023 which was dismissed on 20.12.2023 solely on
the ground of limitation without any adjudication on merits. The
Learned Advocate representing the petitioners further submitted
that such dismissal on technical grounds had resulted in grave
prejudice as substantial legal issues raised by them, remained
unanswered and unaddressed.
16. The Learned Advocate for the petitioners further submitted that the
EPFO lacked jurisdiction to apportion liability between different
code holders, particularly when the contractor had an independent
registration, and the petitioners had not employed the workmen
directly. It was urged that no proceeding could have been validly
drawn against the petitioners without a clear determination of
employer-employee
relationship
and
without
proper
notice
establishing their liability as principal employer.
7
17. It was further contented that the contractor had ceased operations
and the contract stood terminated with effect from July, 2019 at the
instance of the contractor himself owing to financial distress and ill
health. All bills raised by the contractor up to the said period were
claimed to have been duly cleared. Consequently, the Learned
Advocate representing the petitioners submitted no liability could be
imposed upon them beyond the period during which contractual
work was not actually performed.
18. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioners also sought to
explain the circumstances prevailing during the relevant period
submitting that the petitioners were undergoing acute financial
stress in the year 2019, compounded by the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic which severely disrupted operations. It was urged that
these contextual factors were not adequately considered by the
assessing authority.
19. Lastly, it was submitted that the petitioners had approached the
authorities promptly upon receipt of a fresh demand notice dated
04.07.2023, and that the writ petition was filed to prevent
irreparable financial injury arising from enforcement of an order
which, according to them was jurisdictionally flawed, and contrary
to statutory scheme.
20. On these grounds, the Learned Advocate representing the
petitioners prayed for appropriate interference by this Court in
exercising of its writ jurisdiction.
8
21. The Learned Advocate representing the respondent no.1 on the
other hand submitted that the writ petition was not maintainable
both on account of statutory finality and on the well-settled limits of
writ jurisdiction. It was contended that the proceedings under
Section 14B and 7Q of the aforesaid Act were conducted in
accordance with law after issuance of multiple notices and avoiding
due opportunity of hearing to have been given to all concerned
parties including the petitioners. The Learned Advocate for the
respondent no.1 categorically disputed the plea of violation of
natural justice pointing out that the petitioners had actively
participated in the proceedings before the provident fund authority
and were fully aware of the case against them. The belated
challenge was characterised as an afterthought prompted by the
failure of the petitioners to secure relief before the statutory forum.
22. On the point of limitation, it was submitted that the Learned
Advocate representing the respondent no.1 submitted that the
Appellate Authority rightly declined to entertain the petitioners’
appeal, the same having been filed beyond the statutorily prescribed
period.
23. It was further urged that the statute drew a clear line beyond which
even equitable considerations could not travel. Once such line was
crossed, the Appellate Forum was denuded of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the findings recorded by the original authority had
attained finality.
9
24. It was further submitted that the respondents in the guise of
invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India, sought re-
appreciation of facts and the circumvention of statutory limitation
which was impermissible. The Learned Advocate representing the
respondent no.1 thus urged no ground should have been
constituted for interference with the impugned orders.
25. The Learned Advocate representing the respondent no.2 adopted a
distinct position from and yet intersecting stance compared to the
submissions of the Learned Advocate representing the respondent
no.1. At the threshold it was contended that the writ petition was
barred by Section 7L(4) of the aforesaid Act inasmuch as the
proceedings had culminated in dismissal thereby conferring
statutory finality and rendering the present writ to be a disguised
second appeal.
26. It was further asserted there existed no privity of dispute against
respondent No.2 in the writ proceedings as the core controversy
pertained to the statutory obligations of the principal employer. It
was further emphasized respondent no.2 functioned as a duly
licensed contractor under the Contract Labour Regulation and
Abolition Act, 1970 with its status repeatedly acknowledged by the
petitioners themselves through issuance of Form (V) Certificates
and successive licenses.
27. On facts, the Learned Advocate representing respondent no.2
projected as having acted in good faith and with diligence, even
paying wages and statutory dues from its own funds despite
10
prolonged non-payment of bills by the petitioners from December,
2018 onwards. It was submitted that repeated representations to
the petitioners, highlighted the financial constraints and statutory
exposure, and the delay in provident fund remittances was directly
traceable to the petitioners’ failure to release payments in time.
28. The Learned Advocate representing the respondent no.2 relied upon
the findings of the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, who
after appreciating the record held the petitioners responsible as
principal employer for the delay post January 2019 and directed a
bifurcation of liability. It was contended that such finding was
reasoned fact based and not amenable to interference in writ
jurisdiction.
29. Further emphasis was placed on the termination of the contract
after June 2019 and the absence of any work or billing thereafter.
Allegations of continued liability beyond that period were described
as unsupported by record. Respondent no.2 also pointed to what
was characterised as selective and discriminatory conduct on the
part of the petitioners in settling dues of other contractors while
leaving respondent no.2 unpaid.
30. At the outset, it was not in dispute that proceedings under Section
7Q and 14B of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act 1952, what duly initiated by the competent
authority, notices were issued, opportunities of hearing were
afforded and all stakeholders, including the petitioners participated
in the process. The orders dated 30.03.2023 together with the
11
consequential
steps
taken
thereunder
thus
could
not
be
characterised as having been passed in breach of principles of
natural justice.
31. It was borne out from the annexure to the writ petition as well as
the affidavits and opposition that proceedings under Section 7Q and
14B of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous
Provisions Act 1952, where initiated upon detection of delayed
remittance of provident fund contributions in respect of workmen
engaged through respondent no.2. The daily order-sheets and
notices next to the affidavits of respondent no.1 demonstrated that
multiple opportunities of hearing were afforded to all concerned
parties, including the petitioners, both physically and through
virtual mode.
32. The
annexed
notices,
inter
alia,
15.05.2022,
21.09.2022,
25.10.2022 and 16.12.2022, with the corresponding attendance
records and hearing notes, clearly belie the petitioners’ plea of
absence of receiving notice or denial of opportunity. Participation by
the petitioners in the proceedings stood for the reinforced by the
representations and correspondence placed on record, including
minutes of meetings and internal communications sum of which
form part of annexure ‘R’ series.
33. The petitioners’ principal grievance rest on the assertion that
liability had been fastened upon them, notwithstanding the
existence of a contractor with a separate EPF Court. This argument,
however, overlooked the statutory scheme which cast a continuing
12
responsibility upon the principal employer to ensure that statutory
dues meant for the benefit of workmen were not defeated by
contractual arrangements. The said Act was a piece of beneficial
legislation and its interpretation could not be so constructed as to
permit statutory obligations to dissolve in the interstices of
outsourcing.
34. The work orders, contractual conditions and correspondence,
annexed by both sides further revealed that work orders were
frequently issued post facto a fact not seriously disputed. Such
delayed issuance as reflected in the work order for the period
January-March 2019 issued on 28.05.2019 materially impacted
timely submission of bills and consequently the financial liquidity of
the contractor. These factual aspects were taken into account by
the Assessing Authority as was evident from the reasoning recorded
in the order dated 30.03.2023 which was annexed to the writ
petition.
35. The order dated 30.03.2023 passed by the Regional Provident Fund
Commissioner-II under Section 14B of the said Act annexed to the
petition reflected a reasoned consideration of the materials on
record. The authority took note of the payment pattern prior to
December 2018, the subsequent delays post, January 2019, and
the role played by the principal employer in release of payments.
Upon such assessment, liability was apportioned holding the
respondent no.2 responsible for the period up to December 2018
13
and the petitioners liable as principal employer for the period,
January 2019 to June 2019.
36. The contemporaneous demand notice under Section 7Q of the said
Act as annexed quantified the interest component for the same
period.
The
subsequent
revenue
recovery
certificate
dated
03.05.2023 issued under Section 8 of the Act and placed on record
was merely a consequential step flowing from the adjudicatory
orders and could not be viewed in isolation.
37. In para 30 sub para (3) of the Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme,
1952 states as follows:
“…..it shall be the responsibility of the principal employer to pay
both the contribution payable by himself in respect of the
employees directly employed by him and also in respect of the
employees employed by or through a contractor and also
administrative charges”.
38. In the instant case, the petitioners had sought the contractors being
the respondent No.2 to engage workmen for the purpose of
executing the work of the petitioners as per the terms and
conditions of the contractual agreement. The Form (V) issued in
favour of the respondent No.2 delineated the status of the
petitioners to have been the principal employer in conspicuous
terms. The workmen to have been directly controlled by the
respondent No.2 were in fact discharging the functions as per the
orders mentioned in the contractual agreement to be accomplished
in favour of the petitioners. Accordingly, the petitioners, cannot in
the facts and circumstances of the instant case, negate the status
14
or responsibility of being accorded the nomenclature of the principal
employer. Nonetheless, this Court at this juncture refrains to
interfere with the merits of the case, though the rival submissions
of the parties concentrated to the extent of deciphering the status of
the petitioner to be the principal employer, the liability of payment
or remittance towards provident contributions, delay in payment
thereof, apportionment etc. The writ petition in prayer ‘A’ succinctly
stated as follows:
“(a) A writ in the nature of mandamus do issue setting aside the
order dated 20.12.2023 passed in EPF 18 of 2023 by the
Learned Central Government Industrial Tribunal Cum Labour
Court Kolkata Bench”.
39. It is pertinent to assail the aforesaid order “No doubt, from the
materials on record it appears the default in payment of contribution
was in respect of employees engaged by its service provider or
contractor M/s. Reju Enterprise. It has also come on record that M/s.
Reju Enterprise though a covered establishment under the Act of
1952 was unable to deposit the EPF dues of its employees engaged
to work in the establishment of BSNL in time due to non-clearance its
bill for years together by the principal employer BSNL. Due to delay in
clearance of the bill by the principal employer BSNL, the contractor
has sought for termination of its contract as service provider.
Section 7-I of the Act provides that (1) any persons aggrieved by a
notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by
the Central Government or any authority, under the proviso to sub-
15
Section (3), or sub-section (4), of section 1, or section 3, or sub-section
(1) of Section 7A, or section 7-B (except an order rejecting an
application for review referred to in sub-section (5) thereof), or section
7-C, or section 14-B, may prefer an appeal to a Tribunal against such
notification or order. (2) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall filed in such form and manner, within such time and be accompanied by such fees, as may be prescribed. While Rule-7 of the Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1997 provides (1) Every appeal filed with the Registrar shall be accompanied by a fee of two thousand rupees to be remitted in the form of cross demand draft on a nationalized bank in favour of the Registrar of the Tribunal and payable at the main branch of that Bank at the section where the seat of the said Tribunal is situated. (2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. Provided that the Tribunal may if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, extended the said period by a further period of 60 days. (3) Provided further that no appeal by the employer shall be entertained by a Tribunal unless he has (deposited with the Tribunal
16 a Demand Draft payable in the Fund and bearing) 75 per cent of the amount due from him as determined under section 7-A. Provided also that the Tribunal may for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under section 7- O. Therefore, in view of Rule 7 of Tribunal Procedure Rules, 1997, the Appellant ought to have filed the present appeal within 60 days of passing of the order u/s 14B i.e. within 30th May, 2023 and/or in case the Appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring appeal within the prescribed period of 60 days then such period may be extended by a further period of 60 days. In the present case, the Appellant has failed to explain the reason of its inability to prefer an appeal within the prescribed period of 60 days or thereafter. For the sake of argument even if further period of 60 days is granted to the Appellant then Appellant ought to have filed the case by 29th July, 2023, but it has filed the present appeal on 28-08-2023 after the lapse of more than 120 days and that too without any explanation. The Appellant has taken a plea in memo of appeal that it received the order u/s 14-B on 10-04-2023, but it has failed to produce supporting document to prove that it was served with the copy of the order passed u/s 14-B on 30.03.2023 by the authority of EPFO only 10-04-2023. Therefore, in view of the above discussion this Tribunal holds the present appeal stands barred by limitation and not maintainable.
17 Accordingly, the appeal no. EPF-18 of 2023 is dismissed being barred by limitation”.
40.The Learned Advocate representing the respondent No.1 relied upon the decision cited in Naval K.G. School, Under Navy Education Society, Represented by its Co-ordinator Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner1, the paras 6 and 8 read as follows:
“6. The Appellate Tribunal's impugned order dated 13.12.2019 is entirely consistent with the decision of the Division Bench in Manganga Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. (supra) and the decision of the Single Judge in Resort Mello Rosa (supra). In both these decisions, upon due consideration of the provisions of the EPF Act and the Rules, including in particular Rule 7(2), this Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an appeal under Section 7-1 of the EPF Act. As a consequence, the Appellate Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in excess of 120 days. Accordingly, there is neither any juri ictional error nor any illegality in the Appellate Tribunal's impugned order dated 13.12.2019 so as to warrant interference in the exercise of writ juri iction. 8………………the Petitioner should have instituted the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal either within the prescribed period of limitation of 60 days or within 120 days after showing sufficient cause. The Petitioner did neither. The Petitioner instituted an appeal much beyond the statutorily prescribed period of 60 days or 120 days. As noted earlier, the Appellate Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Petitioner's appeal on the ground that it had no juri iction to condone the delay beyond 120 days.....”.
1 1. 2023 SCC Online Bom 2180
18
41.The document marked as annexure P-8 to the writ petition depicted the memo of appeal filed before the Central Industrial Tribunal- cum- Labour Court wherein Paragraph No. 6.3 stated as follows: “That vide demand notice dated 30.03.2023 issued by Regional Provident Fund Commissioner-Ii & Assessing Officer under Section 7Q directed BSNL to pay for the period from 01/2019 to 06/2019 amounting to Rs. 1,95,076/- (Rupees One Lakh Ninety Five Thousand and Seventy Six Only). It is pertinent to mention that both the order under Section 14B and Demand Notice under section 7Q was received in the Office of the Appellant on 10.04.2023. Photocopy of the Demand Notice dated 30.03.2023 along with the envelop is annexed hereto and marked with letter ‘A2’.”
42.The appellant therein being the petitioner in the instant writ petition in unequivocal terms on affirmation stated both the order under Section 14B and the demand notice under Section 7Q of the Employees’ Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act 1952 were received in the office of the appellant on 10th April, 2023. 43. Rule 3 of Para 30 (Payment of Contributions) of the Employees’ Provident Funds Scheme, 1952 stated as follows:- “(3) It shall be the responsibility of the principal employer to pay both the contribution payable by himself in respect of the employees directly employed by him and also in respect of the employees employed by or through a contractor and also administrative charges.”
44.The petitioners should have preferred the appeal before the Learned Tribunal within 60 days from the date of passing of the order dated 30.03.2023. The Learned Advocate representing the petitioner
19 submitted that the Rules framed under the aforesaid Act were directory and not mandatory. In contradiction to the aforesaid statement the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are cited as follows: In the case of Commissioner of Custom and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Ltd.2 the para 32 reads as under:-
"
32.As pointed out earlier, the language used in Sections 35, 35-B. 35-EE. 35-G and 35-H makes the position clear that an appeal and the reference to the High Court should be made within 180 days only from the date of communication of the decision or order. In other words, the language used in other provisions makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning the delay only up to 30 days after expiry of 60 days which is the preliminary limitation period for preferring an appeal. In the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The High Court was, therefore, justified in holding that there was no power to done the delay after expiry of the prescribed period of days." the relevant para 4 and 5 reads as under:- “ 4…………… respondent No. 1 has rightly rejected the appeal preferred by the petitioner as the same was filed after about one year of passing of the assessment order by the respondent No. 2 and as such the impugned orders dated 20.09.2012 and 2 (2009) 5 SCC 791 3 2019 SCC Online Jhar 1713
20 14.09.2011 passed by the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 respectively do not warrant any interference of this Court. 5. ………… the respondent No.1, after considering the provisions of Section 7(2) of the Act, 1952 and Rule 7(2) of the EPFAT (Procedure) Rules, 1997 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules, 1997'] has held that the appeal was required to be preferred within 60 days from the date of the order passed under Section 14B of the Act, 1952 and the Learned Appellate Tribunal has power to condone the delay only up to further 60 days and not beyond that. On conjoint reading of Section 71 (2) of the Act, 1952 and Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1997, it would emerge that the appeal under Section 7 I (2) is to be presented by the aggrieved person within 60 days from the date of issuance of the order. It has also been provided inter alia that the Appellate Tribunal may extend the said period for further period of 60 days, if the appellant provides sufficient reason for condoning the delay. Thus, it appears that there is a statutory bar in entertaining any appeal preferred by the aggrieved person beyond the period of +60=120 days”.
45.The Learned Tribunal in absence of sufficient reasons could not have exercised the discretion to condone further delay of 60 days which would be evinced from the averments in the memo of appeal as annexed wherein the predicament on the part of the appellant/petitioner plausibly being prevented to file an appeal was not narrated in its proper perspective.
46.In view of the decisions cited above as well as the statutory provision, the explanation and the reasons cited by the Learned Tribunal in the order impugned should not be interfered with as the Learned Tribunal statutorily had been devoid of juri iction to
21 condone the delay beyond 120 days irrespective of the number of the days delay.
47.Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed.
48.Urgent certified website copy of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously after complying with all necessary legal formalities. c.m., A.R.(ct.)
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay, J.)