Radhika Kunwar @ Radhika Kuer @ Radhika Kumari vs. The State Of Bihar

The following prayer has been made by the petitioner;- “(i) Issuance of an appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari or any other writ/ writs for quashing the order dated 14.01.2025 passed by Secretary-cum- Revisional Authority, Environment, Forest and Climate Change Department, Bihar 2/11 Patna in the Revision Case No.- Forest Case (Rev.)-10/2022 (as contained in Annexure -P-6) to this petition and whereby and whereunder learned Revisional Court has been pleased to dismiss the Revision Application without proper appreciation of the material available on the record and law involved in this case and further be pleased to (ii) set aside the order dated 08.07.2022 passed by the collector-cum-District Magistrate, Rohtas, Sasaram in confiscation Case no.05 of 2020 (as contained in Annexure-P-5) to this petition and also (iii) set aside the order dated 07.12.2019 passed by the Authorized officer-cum-Forest Divisional Officer, Rohtas (Sasaram) of Sasaram Division in Forest Confiscation Case No.29/2019 (as contained in Annexure-P- 4) to this petition. (B) For commanding and directing the respondents for release of seized/ confiscated articles of the petitioner as mentioned in Para-6 of this writ petition in connection with Dehri Nagar P.S. Case No. 562 of 2019 dated 18.08.2019.”

From the original order dated 07.12.2019 passed by the Authorized Officer-cum-Forest Divisional Officer, Rohtas (Sararam) in Confiscation Case No.29 of 2019, it 3/11 appears that the petitioner was neither issued notice nor heard before passing the order. Thereafter the aforesaid order dated 07.12.2019 has been confirmed by the appellate authority vide its order dated 08.07.2022 and the Revisional Authority vide its order dated 14.01.2025. 4. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P. & Ors., reported as (2025) 7 SCC 545 has emphasized on the imperativeness of principles of natural justice, particularly, before an administrative authority acting as a quasi judicial function and has held as under:- “43. The opportunity of hearing is considered so fundamental to any civilised legal system that the courts have read the principles of natural justice into an enactment to save it from being declared unconstitutional on procedural grounds [Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545] .

It has been argued before us that if the failure to provide hearing does not cause prejudice, observing the principle of natural justice may not be necessary. In this context, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] speaking through Chinappa Reddy, J. considered such arguments to be “pernicious” and held that “ [t]he non-observance of natural 4/11 justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary”. The Supreme Court, however, has drawn out an exception where “on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, and under the law only one penalty is permissible, then the Court may not compel the observance of natural justice” [Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 : (1981) 51 Comp Cas 210; Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, (2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965].

Professor I.P. Massey [I.P. Massey, Administrative Law (8th Edn., 2012).] has commented on this shift as under: “Before the decision of the highest Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379], the rule was that the principles of natural justice shall apply only when an administrative action has caused some prejudice to the person, meaning thereby that he must have suffered some “civil consequences”. Therefore, the person had to show something extra in order to prove “prejudice” or civil consequences. This approach had stultified the growth of administrative law within an area of highly practical significance. It is gratifying that in Jagmohan [S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379] , the 5/11 Court took a bold step in holding that a separate showing of prejudice is not necessary. The non-observance of natural justice is in itself prejudice caused. However, merely because facts are admitted or are undisputable it does not follow that the principles of natural justice need not be observed.”

In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717], the Supreme Court observed that where an enquiry is not convened by any statutory provision and the only obligation of the administrative authority is to observe the principles of natural justice, the court/tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of the rule of fair hearing and violation of the facet of that rule. In other words, a distinction must be made between “no opportunity” or “no adequate opportunity”. In the case of the former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid and the authority may be asked to conduct proceedings afresh according to the rule of fair hearing. But in the latter case, the effect of violation of a facet of the rule of fair hearing has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice.

In Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE [Dharampal Satyapal Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 8 SCC 519 : (2015) 33 GSTR 1], this Court dealt with the prejudice question as under: (SCC p.

In a more recent decision in State of U.P. v Sudhir Kumar Singh [State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706] , the position of law was summarised as under: (SCC pp. 748- 49, para 42) “42. …42. 1. Natural justice is a flexible tool in the hands of the judiciary to reach out in fit cases to remedy injustice. The breach of the audi alteram partem rule cannot by itself, without more, lead to the conclusion that prejudice is thereby caused.

Where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, except in the case of a mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest, but also in public interest.

No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non- challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on 8/11 facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice.

In cases where facts can be stated to be admitted or indisputable, and only one conclusion is possible, the Court does not pass futile orders of setting aside or remand when there is, in fact, no prejudice caused. This conclusion must be drawn by the Court on an appraisal of the facts of a case, and not by the authority who denies natural justice to a person.

The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non-observance of natural justice.”

Considering the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Krishnadatt Awasthy (supra), it is clear that the principles of nature justice must be adhered to strictly. The doctrine of audi alteram partem has three basic essentials. Firstly, a person against whom an order is required to be passed or whose rights are likely to be affected adversely, must be granted an opportunity of being heard. Secondly, the authority concerned should provide a fair and 9/11 transparent procedure and lastly, the authority concerned must apply its mind and dispose of the matter by a reasoned or speaking order.

In my opinion, the petitioner should have been issued proper notice and should have been given a chance of hearing in the confiscation proceeding.

In view of the above, the original order dated 07.12.2019, appellate order dated 08.07.2022 and the revisional order dated 14.01.2025 are quashed and set aside. The matter is remitted back to the Authorized Officer-cum-Forest Divisional Officer, Rohtas at Sasaram for fresh consideration and decision in accordance with law after hearing the petitioner, within eight weeks from the date of communication of this order.

Since no fruitful purpose will be served in keeping the vehicle seized, therefore, considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sunderbhai and the same has been mentioned in para-6 of the writ petition, shall be released in favour of the petitioner by way of interim relief with the following conditions:

Accordingly, this application is allowed with the aforesaid directions.