M/S. Pearl Beverages LTD. vs. The State Of Andhra Pradesh
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judgment petitioner’s case. And the further contention of the petitioner/assessee is that 15. breakages of bottles take place in the process of manufacturing, hence it forms part of cost of production, cost of sale and the damaged/broken bottles were not reused or manufactured of the bottles and same were sold as scrap on payment of duty on nominal value, that the duty paid by them on broken/ damaged bottles is entitled for Input Tax Credit. 16. revision petitioner's case. The Tax Revision Case has now been taken up for consideration on 11.03.2025 by this Court. The challenge in this tax revision legislation of amendment to Rule 20(2)(n) vide (CT-II) Dept, dated 29.12.2005, introduced VAT act denying the ITC for coolers would
Clause (n) to sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of the AP VAT \/s. State of Andhra Pradesh (1 supra) is not applicable to the present facts of the case and each clause will have a distinct meaning and the amended clause regarding clause (h) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of the AP VAT Rules that was struck down cannot be compared with the current provision, i.e., clause (n) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 20,
hence prayed to dismiss the revision case. After hearing both sides, the point that arises for consideration is that whether the amendment introducing clause (n) to sub-rule (2) of Rule 20 of the AP VAT Rules, 2005, is with retrospective or prospective effect? 22. ■\ %
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Retort to the arguments put forth by both the learned counsels, this Court delivers the following order: The Hon’ble Apex Court in a case of Union of India and another Vs. Pradeep Kumari and others reported in (1995) 2 SCC 736, inter alia held that in relation to beneficial legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the provisions of such a legislation, the Court should adopt a construction which advances, the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of 24. curtailing the benefit conferred by it.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in Girdhari Lai & Sons Vs. Balbir Nath Mathur & Others, reported in (1986) 2 SCC 237 relying on the other decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the object and purpose of the amendment to remove the mischief and defect for which the amendment was necessitated is required to be considered and borne in mind and the Parliament’s intention is ascertained and the object and purpose of the legislation is known, it then becomes the duty of the Court to give the statute a purposeful or a functional interpretation. In Koteswar Vittal Kamath \/s. Rangapa Baliga & Co., reported in (1969) 1 see 255 a three-Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court emphasised the distinction between “supersession” of a rule and 26. . .....
13 “substitution” of a rule and held that the process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is made to cease to exist and, next, the new rule is brought into existence in its place.” With respect to the presumption against retrospective operation, it is observed and held as under in para 14 and 15:-
The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes.... In determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is “to explain” an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospectively. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. An amending Act may be purely declaratory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect (ibid., pp. 468-69).
Though retrospectivity is not to be presumed and rather there is presumption against retrospectivity, according to Craies (Statute Law, 7th Edn.), it is open for the legislature to enact laws having retrospective operation. This can be achieved by express enactment or by necessary implication
14 from the language employed. If it is a necessary implication from the language employed that the legislature intended a particular section to have a retrospective operation, the courts will give it such an operation. In the absence of a retrospective operation having been expressly given, the courts may be called upon to construe the provisions and answer the question whether the legislature had sufficiently expressed that intention giving the statute retrospectivity. Four factors are suggested as relevant: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what .it was the legislature contemplated. The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right. (Meaning In simpler terms, if a law gives you a privilege or benefit that you have not yet fully earned or that is not considered an "accrued right," and that law is repealed, you do not have the protection of the rule against retrospectivity to stop that repeal from affecting. \
In a recent decision of this Court in National Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation of India Ltd. v. Union of lndia[(2003) 5 SCC 23] it has been held that there is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. Every legislation whether prospective or retrospective has to be subjected to the question of legislative competence. The retrospectivity is liable to be decided on a 15 few touchstones.such as; (i) the words used must expressly provide or clearly imply retrospective operation; (ii) the retrospectivity must be reasonable and not excessive or harsh, otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as unconstitutional; (iii) where the legislation is introduced to overcome a judicial decision, the power cannot be used to subvert the decision without removing the statutory basis of the decision. There is no fixed formula for the expression of legislative intent to give retrospectivity to an enactment. A validating clause coupled with a substantive statutory change is only one of the methods to leave actions unsustainable under the unamended statute, undisturbed. Consequently, the absence of a validating clause would not by itself affect the retrospective operation of the statutory provision, if such retrospectivity is otherwise apparent.
The Hon’ble Apex Court following held that “In this context, it is important to emphasise that the absence of arbitrary power is the first essential of the rule of law upon which our ] . whole coF\stitutional system is based. In a system governed by rule of 16 law, discretion, when conferred upon executive authorities, must be confined within clearly defined limits. The rule of law from this point of view means that decisions should be made by the application of known principles and rules and, in general, such decisions should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is the antithesis of a decision taken in accordance with the rule of law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Koteswar Vittal Kamath Vs. Rangapa Baliga & Co. Case (supra), has suggested four factors as relevant to give the statute retrospectivity: (i) general scope and purview of the statute; (ii) the remedy sought to be applied; (iii) the former state of the law; and (iv) what it was the legislature contemplated. The rule against retrospectivity does not extend to protect from the effect of a repeal, a privilege which did not amount to accrued right. Meaning in simpler terms, if a law gives a privilege or benefit that not yet have fully earned or that is not considered an "accrued right," and that law is 29. repealed, one person do not have the protection of.the rule against retrospectivity to stop that repeal from affecting one person.
17 S J • M w f'' . / The Hon'ble Supreme Court mA.A.Calton Vs. The Director of Eduoahon and another reported in (1983) 3 SCC 33, held that the with retrospective effect subject to the and that no retrospective effect i'v 30. legislature may pass laws recognized constitutional limitations should be given to any statutory provision so as to impair or take away unless the statute either expressly or by necessary directs that it should have such retrospective effect. an existing right implication The Hon’ble Apex Court in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Milts and Chandra Yograj S/nha reported in AIR 1961 SC = 1961 SCC Online substantive rights should not be express provision or form, have been given retrospective operation held to be taken away except by clear implication, many Acts, though prospective in if the intention of the legislature is apparent. According to the law as laid out by the Apex Court in hand, whether the right vested under Section 13(2) of the AP revoked retrospectively. Relevant provisions and affective disposal of the issue raised in the 32. s aforementioned rulings, in the present case on that has accrued and become are VAT Act can be extracted for facility case. “N ,
18 Credit for Input Tax is available Under Section 13(2)(a); reads thus; VAT dealer on the date of (2) (a) A dealer registered as a commencement of the Act, shall be entitled to claim for the under APGST Act, 1957 (Act VI of 1957) [on the sales tax paid stock held in any form in the State] [Substituted for 'On the by Act No. 34 of 2006, w.r.e.f.1-4- Stock held in the state' 2005.]on the date conditions and in the manner as may be prescribed; of commencement of the Act subject to the Provided that such goods should have been purchased from 1.4.2004 to 31.03.2005 and are goods eligible for input tax credit. prescribed, input tax credit (b) Subject to the conditions if any shall be allowed to a VAT dealer on registering as VAT dealer if any input tax is paid or payable in respect of all purchases of taxable goods, where such goods are for use in the business as in stock on the effective VAT dealer, provided the goods are and such purchase occurred not more than date of registration three months prior to such date of registration. Rule 37(2)(d) of APVAT Act, 2005 reads as follows; Relief of Sales Tax at the 37. Conditions for the Commencement of Act. (2)(d) envisages or shall be subject to the conditions of Rule 20; postulates that “The sales tax credit allowed The contention of revision petitioner in this revision petition is that the purchases of 33. the petitioher is eligible for Sales Tax Relief on 19 coolers, which are purchased during the year 2004-05. And the petitioner has purchased during the relevant period. Note: Clauses (n)(o) and (p) were added by G.O.Ms.No.2201 Rev. Dt.29.12.2005 with retrospective effept from 01.04.2005. After amendment rule clause (n) was introduced to sub-rule (2) to rule (20) of AP VAT Rules. Rule 20 envisages about Input Tax Credit. Sub-rule (2) spells out about negative list. Under Sub-rule 2, the following shall be the items not eligible for input tax credit as specified in sub^section (4) of section 13. Clause (n)“refrigerators, coolers and deep freezers purchased Soft Drink [and ice cream] Manufacturers not for use in their manufacturing premises In Rule 20(2)(h), the items were substituted.”
Undisputedly, the revision petitioner bought the refrigeratprs and coolers between 2004 and 2005, and as of that date, the petitioner is eligible for an input tax credit. Under Rule 20(2) of the AP VAT Rules, 2005, the revision petitioner. M/s Pearl Beverages, is entitled to and eligible for the interest-tax credit (ITC) on refrigerators, coolers, and deep freezers purchased by manufacturers of soft drinks and ice cream. This is because the right was taken away due to an amendment made under Section 37 of the AP VAT Act, which introduced provision (n) to the negative list without providing any justification. The amendment is not clarifying, and since a vested right cannot be taken away retrospectively, it is unfair, and arbitrariness applies.
As seen from the Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court 'i judgments of the Apex Court “thus a right accrued to the assessee on the date when they paid the tax on the materials or the inputs and the right would continue until the facility available there gets work out or until the goods existed. /Recording to a plain reading of Rule 20(2) of the AP VAT Rules, 37. 2005, the revision petitioner. M/s Pearl Beverages, is entitled to and eligible for the Input Tax Credit (ITC) on refrigerators, coolers, and deep freezers purchased by manufacturers of soft drinks and ice cream. This 21 is because the right was taken away due to an amendment made under Section 37 of the AP VAT Act, which introduced provision (n) to the negative list without providing any justification. The amendment is not clarifying, and since a vested cannot be taken away retrospectively, it is unfair, and arbitrariness applies. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has given different meaning to 38. the retrospective effect and contrary to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and to the law laid in Asian Peroxide Limited \/s. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra). Thus, the right accrued to the revision petitioner/Assessee/Pearl Beverages Limited on the date when they paid tax cannot be taken away by way of amendment. As held by the apex court in several decisions referred above that a rule cannot be applied retrospectively removing the accrued or vested right, as the amendment has not given any reason for effecting retrospectively . The second contention raised by the counsel for the revision 39. petitioner is that of the petitioner/assessee is that breakages of bottles take place in the process of manufacturing, hence it forms part of cost of production, cost of sale and the damaged/broken bottles were not reused or manufactured and same were sold as scrap on payment of 22 ^ ‘’A duty on nominal value that the duty paid by them on broken/ damaged bottles is entitled for Input Tax Credit. Capitalised goods also known as capital assets or producer of goods, are tangible assets used by business to produce other or service, like machinery, buildings and equipment, and not intended for direct consumption.
An Input Tax Credit can be claimed when a manufacturer buys a raw material and pays a certain amount of tax on those purchases. They can deduct that tax amount from the tax they need to pay when 41. selling their finished products. Where in the case on hand the petitioner / assessee who purchased glass bottles for not to use'for manufacture to produce some other product by using the product purchased and petitioner is not the manufacturer of the bottles. The petitioner / assessee has purchased the bottles for storing of the liquid which does not fall under the manufacturing of another product.
The contention of the petitioner / assessee is that FIFO (First in First out) method would be applicable. FIFO method is generally used to determine the value of any item moving out of a stock account and those remaining in stock at any point of time. When applied to an account holding dematerialised stock, it implies that, out of the existing
23 % holdings, the item that first entered into the account is deemed to be the first to be sold out. There is no evidence the product moved of stock those remaining in stock and they are invoiced. The second issue is answered against to the revision petitioner.
Accordingly, the impugned order under challenge of the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is hereby set aside to the extent indicated above.
The amount paid by the revision petitioner is refundable to the extent of input tax credit on the coolers and refrigerators. The revision petitioner is entitled to the input tax credit for the coolers and refrigerators, while the rest of the claim is rejected. The Tax Revision Case is, therefore, allowed partly. There shall 45. be no order as to costs. As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, in this case shall stand closed. S.V.S.R. MURTHY JOINT REGISTRAR //// SECTION OFFICER To,
The Andhra Pradesh VAT Appellate Tribunal, Visakhapatnam, Visakhapatnam district
One CC to Sri. A Sarveswar Rao, Advocate [OPUC]
Two CCs to Government Pleader for Commercial Tax ,High Court of Andhra Pradesh. [OUT]
Three CD Copies stu
HIGH COURT DATED:07/05/2025 ORDER TREVC.No.10 of 2024 2 3 JUL 2025 )S rrentSectio SfiAIfi. o PARTLY ALLOWING THE TAX REVISION CASE
Reproduced from the public record of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.