Shri Ram Ply Product Thru. Its Partner Shri Arun Kumar Jindal vs. Addl. Commissioner Grade 2 Appeal State Tax Sitapur And 2 Others

Facts

The petitioner, Shri Ram Ply Product, filed a writ petition challenging an order dated 27.02.2023 passed by the Additional Commissioner Grade-2 (Appeal) Sitapur. The appeal was dismissed because it was filed beyond the maximum statutory period. The petitioner's appeal was against an order dated 07.06.2022, which confirmed a demand of Rs. 49.74 Lakhs. The appellate authority calculated the four-month period by considering each month as 30 days, leading to a dismissal based on the appeal being filed on the 121st day. The tax periods in dispute were October and November 2021.

Held

The Court held that Section 107 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, provides for a period of three months for filing an appeal, with a further possibility of extension by one month if sufficient cause is shown. The Court found that the appellate authority erred in calculating the four-month period by assuming each month to be 30 days, which resulted in a 120-day limit. The Court clarified that the four-month period can be longer than 120 days, depending on the specific calendar months involved. Since the appeal was filed on the 121st day, the appellate authority should have considered whether there was sufficient cause for the delay, as provided under Section 107(4) of the Act, 2017, instead of summarily dismissing the appeal. The Court quashed the impugned order and directed the appellate authority to restore the appeal to its original number and decide it on merits expeditiously.

Key Issues

1. Whether the appeal filed by the petitioner was beyond the prescribed period under Section 107 of the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, and if so, whether the appellate authority erred in dismissing the appeal without considering the sufficiency of cause for the delay? Petitioner's contention: The petitioner argued that Section 107 of the Act, 2017, prescribes a period of three months, extendable by a further one month, totaling four months. They contended that the appellate authority incorrectly computed this period by treating each month as 30 days, resulting in a 120-day limit. The petitioner asserted that the appeal was filed on the 121st day and that the appellate authority should have examined the merits of the cause shown for the delay rather than summarily dismissing the appeal on a technicality. Respondent's contention: The learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the respondents did not dispute the legal or factual position presented by the petitioner.