M/S, Bhoorathnom Construction Company PVT LTD vs. The State Of Telangana And 2 Others

The instant batch of writ petitions are filed under the Telangana Tax on Entry of Goods into Local Areas Act, 2001. All these batch of writ petitions are being taken up for consideration on one preliminary objection raised by the petitioners arrd for which some of the writ petitions were entertained at the show cause notice level, some at the level of assessment orders, and some against the appellate orders'

The point for consideration by way of the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners are whether the show cause notice or the assessment orders passed in all these bunch of writ petitions are sustainable at all in view of the sPecific period of limitation prescribed under Section 2 1(3) and ljection 21$l of the Telangana Value Added Tax Act, 20O5 (for short, TSVAT Act').

Before we delve into the issue of limitation, it would be relevant at the outset itself to reproduce the t\vo stLb-sections under which the petitioners are backing upon their case. The said two sub-sections of TSVAT Act read as under: "(3) Where the authoitg prescibed is not sotis.fied uith a return filed by the VAT dealer or TOT dealer or the return appears to be incorrect or incomplete, he shall- assess to the best of his judgment uithin four years of <Lue date of the return or within four gears of the date of 17ting of the refirn whicheuer is later. (4) The authoitg prescibed moA, basect on anA infonnation auailable or on anA other bosis, conduct a detaited scruting of the accounts ang VAT deoler or TOT deoler and uthere ang assessmenl as a res"tlt of such scruting becomes necessorA, such assessmett sholl be made u-tithin o peiod of four gears from the end of the peiodfor uthich lhe assessment is to be made."

Though there are various other grounds relso rvhich have been raised by few of the petitioners like the irrrpugned orders being violative of the principles of natural .iustice, but we proceed to decide the batch of writ petitions only on the aspect of limitation. The need for considering the other aspects would only come, in case if the objections of the petitioners so far as limitation is concerned, is overruled or rejected

To set right the facts, it would also be appropriate at this juncture, to reproduce the details of each of the writ petitions so as to ensure that in terms of the given facts in each of these cases, the show cause notice, assessment orders as also the appellate orders as the case may be in each of the cases, have been issued beyond a period of four (04) years as is stipulated under the aforesaid two sub-sections of Section 21 of the TSVAT Act.

The details of each of the writ petitions are reproduced herein under: sl. No. Writ Petition No. Assessment Year Date of Show Cause Notice Date of Assessment Order Date of Appellate Order 1 24123 of 2078 2013-14 31.05.2018 2 24121 of 2Ol8 20t2-13 31.05.2018 3 24227 of 2078 20t2-13 26.O7 .20t7 31.03.2018 4 19069 ot 2O2O 2072,t3 29.O3.2018 30.o5.2020 19044 of 2O2O 201,1-12 29.O3 .20 t8 30.o5.2020 6 16294 of 2O2O 2013 t4 2a.10.2017 21.O5.20t8 27.06.2020 t2665 of 2O2O 20t2-t3 22.O7 .20t7 23.O3.20t4 2a.o5.2020 8 8616 of 2O2O 20Lt-12 22.Oa.20t7 28.O2.tO18 30.o4.2020 9 8455 of 2O2O 20t2 t3 27 .70.2017 28.O2.2018 30.o4.2020

From the details of the writ petitions provi(led in the chart above, prima facie, there is no dispute so far as the show cause notices which are under challenge in few writ p'rtitions and the assessment orders in other writ petitions have a-11 been passed beyond a period of four (04) years as is stipulated under Section 21(3) and 27$) of the Act. Section 6 of the -'l'elangana State Entry Tax Act, 20O1, clearly envisages that for the purpose of assessment, inspection, seizure, enforcement of payment of any tax, so also pal.rnent of interest or penalty by the dealers, the provisions of law to be applied by the authority ccncerned is that which is provided in the Telangana State Generzd Sales Tax Act, 2005. The Telangana State General Sales Tax Act subsequently has been abolished and the TSVAT Act has been introduced and therefore it is the provisions of the TSVAT Ar;t which stands imported for trntry Tax assessment also and it is in this context that Section 21 of the TSVAT Act is being invoked.

Another fact which is apparent from the details provided in respect of different writ petitions mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, except for Writ Petition No.26152 of 2023, Writ Petition No.26297 of 2023 and Writ Petition No.7562 of 2027, is that in the said three writ petitions there is a slight dispute of four (04) years period of limitation prescribed. A11 the other petitions in this batch of writ petitions being decided there is an undisputed clear gap of more than (04) years from the date of filing of the return or four (04) years from the end of the period for which the assessment is to be made i.e. by 3l"t day of March of the fourth year.

According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, an assessment which has been initiated beyond a period of limitation prescribed under the statute, amounts to be an assessment without juri iction and uoid ab iruitio. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners once when the period of limitation itself had lapsed there was no occasion for the respondents to have at the cost of the resources of the state, subject the petitioners to undergo the rigors of an assessment for a period which no longer could had bee n subjected to assessment under Section 21 of the TSVAT Act on the ground of limitation.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the State authorities cannot be permitted to generate revenue invoking the provisions of law which otherwise debars them fr-om invoking. It was also the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that even the statute does not provide for any powers upon officers of the respondents to extend the perlod of limitation beyond a period of four (04) years as per Section 21(4) of the TSVAT Act. L2. Per contra, the learned Special Gover nment Pleader appearing for the respondents opposing the writ petitions drew the attention of the Court to Section 2l(7) of the 'ISVAT Act giving his explanation and justification for having initiated the proceedings under the Telangana State Entry T:x Act beyond a period of four (04) years.

One of the preliminary objections raised by the learned Special Government Pleader was that these writ petitions do not deserve to be entertained by the High Court for the reason that in most of the cases or rather in a,li the c:ases where an assessment order has been passed, there is a remedy of appeal available to the concerned dealer even in cases where the show cause notices have been challenged. It is the further contention of the learned Special Government Pleader that since they are at the show cause stage, the assessee or the dealers would be at tiberty to raise a1l their submissions, contentions and defense through their counter and thereafter it should be left for the Adjudicating Authority or the Appellate Authority or the Assessment Oflicer, as the case may be, to take an appropriate decision. L4. According to the learned Special Government Pleader the authorit5r concerned had initiated the proceedings in all these cases in the teeth of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Jindal Stainless Ltd & Anr vs. State of Haryanar wherein in a batch of petitions, one among them also being that of State of A.P. vs. M/s. Sree Rayalseema Alkalies Company Limited. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that levy of tax by the State under the Act is upon entry of notihed goods and the same cannot be equated with levy of tax on sale of goods levied by the State under Entry 54 List II of the VII Schedule of the Constitution of India. It was also held by the Hon'ble | (2017) i2 SCC l Supreme Court that in addition the levy of trntry Tax by the State does not impede the free flow of inter state trade as guaranteed under Articles 3O 1 and 304 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it was contended by the learned Special Government Pleader that the aspect of limitation in the given factual backdrop as envisaged under Section 2i(3) and Section 2 1(4) of the TSVAT Act would not get attracted herein'

According to the learned Special Governreent Pleader in the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Suprerne Court in the case of M/s. Jindal Stainless Ltd & Anr (suprzL) or in the case of Sree Rayalseema Atkaties Company Limited (supra), the authority concemed have initiated the step with an intention to boost ald increase the revenue of the State which otherwise was in a very bad shape. Learned Special Government Pleader further harped upon the provisions of Section 21(7\ of the TSVAT Act to justify the action of the respondents proceedings beyond a period of four (04) years. IN initiating the L6. It was a-1so contended that since in th<: appeal to the Hon"ble Supreme Court, the issue of validity of levy of trntry Tax of notified goods was pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court from the year 20O8 onwards, the period during which such appeals were pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court would stand excluded by the application of Section 21(7) of the TSVAT Act. Thus, this authority is empowered to make an assessment under the provisions of Section 6 of the Telangana State Entry Tax Act on the petitioner for the period 2OIl-12 L7. According to the learned Special Government Pleader, having regard to scheme of the Act and in particular the mention of the words such as "using them" as "input" for manufacture of other goods" in sub-section (21, the Legislature sought to qualify and provide such exemption only in relation to 'inputs'which are used for manufacture of other goods. The word "input" has not been defined and the general meaning as understood in common parlance is "what is put in". The term "input" cannot be given a wider meaning that those goods which are actually put in to derive the output. Applying the general meaning of the above said word, read along with the context in which it is used, the said word "input" is prefixed with the term "using them" and is further qualifred and suffixed with the words "for manufacture of other goods". Thus, if all the words providing for exemption are construed in its letter and spirit, it would indicate that such exemption is available only in respect of goods which are put in, the process of manufacture to bring about a challge resulting in the new goods coming into existence.

According to the learned Special Governm:nt Pleader the term 'input' used in sub-section (2) of Section 3 would indicate indirect nexus of the modifred goods to the resultant new product emerging out of malufacturing process and in order to be etigible for such an exemption under Section :l(2) of the Entry Tax Act, there has to be a direct nexus between the input so used and the resultant output. A1l the other goods rvhich may aid the process of manufacture cannot be consi'lered as inputs since the legislature sought to provide for exemption only in respect of a class of goods which go into manufacture of other goods as 'inputs'.

Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, it would be relevant at '-his j uncture to take note of Section 2l(71 of the TSVAT Act also, which has been strongly relied upon by the learned Special Government Pleader in defending the action of the respondents in respect of issuance of show cause notice or the order of assessmr:nt and also in matters where the appellate juri iction has also been exercised. L The relevant portion of Section 2l(7) of the TSVAT Act, for ready reference, is reproduced herein under: "Where an assessment has been deferred by the Commissioner under sub section (5) of Section 32 or as the case may be, the Appellote Tibunal under the prouiso to sub-section (4) of Section 33 on account of dng stag granted bg the Appellate Tribunal, or as the case mag be the Telangana High Court or Supreme Court respectiuelg, or ttthereas appeal or other proceedings is pending before the Appellate Tibunal or the High Court or Supreme Court inuoluing a question of lau-t hauing a direct beaing on the assessment in question, the peiod duing uhich the stag order .was in force or such appeal or proceeding was pending shall be excluded in computing the peiod of four Aears or six gears as the case may be for the purpose of making the assessment." In the context ofthe aforesaid provisions of Section 2I(7\ of the TSVAT Act, the learned Special Government Pleader banked hard on the said provision. 2o. According to learned Special Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents-Authorities, as per Section 21(7) in a case where proceedings were sab judice the appellate Tribunal or the High Court for the State of Telangana or the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as the case may be, such period during which the proceedings were pending before the aforesaid judicial forums would get excluded from being calculated for the purpose of computing the period of four (04) years under Section 21(3) and 21(41 and as per Section 21(5) for the purpose of assessment. In this regard, the learned Spec-,al Government Pleader submitted that since in the matters of M/s. Jindal Stainless Ltd {supra) as also that of Sree Rayalseema Alkalies Company Limited (supra) were pending before tl-re Hon'ble Apex Court, the period of limitation would autornatically stand extended. It was also his contention that though there was no litigation qua the petitioners herein before any appellate tribunal or any judicial forums, the question of law being the same was under consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the a-foresaid two decisions and the connected batch of petitions which were decided together. This argument of the learned Special Government Pleader may not have sufficient force of law for the simple reason that the judgment of the Fton'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid batch of matters wa,s delivered on LI.LI.2016, and the impugned notices issued in most of these cases itself or the assessment orders passed wets mttch beyond the period of four years from the date of the judgment and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid batch of matters dealing with the validity of the provisions of the Errtry 'fax. This argument also would not be sustainable for the reason that there are petitioners in whose cases the respondent-Authorities have not waited till the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to commence the proceedings so as to take a uniform stand so far as the limitation is concerned; and in a few cases, the notices were issued much before the decision of the Honble Supreme Court though the adjudication part has been done subsequently, but notices were definitely been issued earlier which is sufficient to show that pendency of the matter before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not a criteria at all. 2L. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab "

Clause (b) of sub-section (6) indicates that Joint Commissioner, in appropriate cdses, maA pass an order for deferment of assessment order to be passed bg the assessing authoitg and once such an order is passed, that peiod has not to be counted while computing the peiod of limitation. Significantlg, this prouision olso mandates the Joint Commissioner to record reasons for defening the orders orl assessment. In essence, therefore, the purport and objectiue behind the prouisions in the Punjab Act as utell as in the Kamataka Act remains the same- Bg making ang ' 1zote1 a s.c.c. zos order of defennent under sub-section (6) of Section 12 of the Karnotaka Sales Tax Act, the Joint Commissioner is, in fact, ochieuing the same purpose of granting more time to the assessing officer to poss the assessmenf order. Some is the purpose behind sub-section (11) of Section 1O oi the l>unjab Act. In uieu-t thereof, it maA not be appropiate to go into the nuanced distinction betuteen "deferment" and "e.ttension" as per the definitions contained in Black's Lottt Dictionary in the giuen situation, u.thich is dealt tuith in the instant appea'ls.

Euen otheruLise, it is important to understarld the ratio laid doun in the judgment of the Katnatakct High Court in BHEL IBHEL u. CCT, (2006) 143 STC 10 (Kar).r . The: issue in the said case before the Karnataka High Cout utas as to tthether the pouter to pass a defennent order is to be exercised euen afier the expiry of the peiod of limitation uthich utas ansutered in the negatiue. The reasons giuen in support of this conclusion are as follott-ts: (ST{: pp. 15-16' para 8) "8. ... Defermenl o1[ assessment has the effizct of enlorging the peiod of limitation uthich did not expire bA the time the defetment order is contemplated to be passed. When once the peiod of timitotion erpires, the immunitg against being subject fo assessmenl sets in and the ight to make assessmenl gets ertingaished. Resort to deferment prouisions does not retrteue the situation. There is no question of deferring assessment ulhich had alreadg become time' baned. The prouision for exclusion of time in computing the peiod of limitation of defermcznt of assessmenl is meant to preuent further ruruing of time against the Reuenue if the limitation had not expired. " (emphasis supplied) It utas also obserued that upon the lapse of the peiod of limitation prescibed, the ight of the Departmenf ,o assess an assessee geb ertinguished and this extension confers a uery ualuable right on the ossessee.

The argument of the leamed Senior Counsel for the appellants based on Section 148 CPC tttould be of no consequence. This section categorically states that pouer to enlarge the period can be exercised euen uthen peiod oiginaltg fixed has expired. Likeu.tise, reliance upon Section 139(2) of the Income Tax Act is misconceiued. That prouision is made for the benefit of lhe assessee u.thich empouters the assessing officer to grant an ertension of time for filing of the return of income and, therefore, obuiouslg rttill haue no bearing on th.e issue at hand. Moreouer, this Court in Ajanta Electicals case ICIT u. Ajanta Electicals, (1995) 4 SCC 182] , uthich is relied upon bg the learned counsel for the appellant, hetd that the time ccin be extended euen after the time allouLed onginatlg ho's expired on the interpretation of the toords 'it hos not been possible" occurring in Section 133(2) of the Act. The Court, thus, opined that the aforesaid expression would mean that the time can be extended euen after originat time prescribed in the said prouision has expired. Same is our ansluer to the argument of Mr Ganguli predicated on Section 28 of the Arbitration Act, 194O as that prouision utas in altogether different context." "

The first limb of both section 21(7) ond section 31(4A), tthich prouide for the consequences of defennent of assessmenf and appellate proceedings, utould operate onlg u-then the potuer of deferment is specificallg conferred on a specified authoity/ authorities and is exercisetd by them pursuant to such confennent. A plain and litera.l reading of the oforesaid prouisions moke it clear that setction 2 1 (7) , section 32(4A) and section 32(7) onlg prouide for the consequences of deferment of (i) assessment, (ii) appeal before the appellate authoitg, and (iii) reuision under section 32 of the VAT Act, respectiuelg. Theg do no| bg tLemselues' confer on the said authoities the pou.ter to defer the proceedings. It is only because section 32(5) specificctltg confers such a pou)er, can the Commissioner defer reuision proceedings initiated under section 32(1) and (2) of the VAT Act. The uery fact that, uLhile the consequences of defennent orf assessment proceedings, appellate proceedingts before the appellate authority and reuision proceedings ar<z specificollg prouided for, but the pouer of defennent of proceedings is resticted onlg to reuision proceedings under section 32 of the VAT Act, shouts that the Legislature has for the present, neither explicitlg nor bg necessary implicatiot'-, chosen to confer the pouer to defer either the assessment proceedings I2014 SCC Online Hyd 1101 under section 21 of the VAT Act or the appellate proceedings under section 31 of the VAT Act.

This question can be examined from another angle also. Ambiguitg, if ang, in a statutory prouision can be remoued applying the Hegdon's Rule. Tlrc Hegdon's Rule is that, for the sure and tnrc interpretation of all staattes in general (be theg penal or beneficial, restictiue or enlarging of the common law), four things are to be discerned and considered: (1) uhat was the common law before the making of the Act/ Rules ; (2) uhat tDas the mischief and defect for uthich the common latu did not prouide ; (3) uhat remedg the Legislature has resolued to cure ; and (4) the true reason of the remedy. The court is alutags to make such constntction as shall : (a) suppress the mischief and aduance the remedg ; and (b) suppress subtle inuentions and euasions for the continuance of the mischief pro priuato commodo (for piuate benefit) ; and (c) add force and life to the cure and remedy according to the trae intent of the makers of the Act/ Rules pro publico (for the public good). The Hegdon's Rule is applied in order to suppress the mischief tuhich uas intended to be remedied as against the literal rule which could haue otheruuise couered the field. (Paragankandigal Erauath Kanaprauan Kalliani Amma u. K. Deui (1996) 4 SCC 76, Goodgear India Ltd. u. State of Haryano [1997] 1OS STC 465 (P&H) ; (1997) 116 PLR 252, Ameer Trading Corpn. Ltd- u. Shapoorji Dota Processing Ltd' (2OOq 1 SCC 7O2, Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume.44(1), 4th Reissue, para 1474, pages 9O6-07, Bengat Immunitg Compang Limited u. State of Bihar [1955] 6 STC 446 (SC) ; (19ss) 2 SCR 6os ; AIR 1955 SC 661 ; In re Mogfair Propertg Compang (1898) 2 Ch 28, Eastman Photographic Mateials Compang I'imited u' Comptroller-Generdl of Patents, Designs and T rade Morks [1898] AC 571 (HL), Notional Insurance Co. Ltd. u. Baljit Kaur (2oo4) 118 c-c 4s5 (SC) ; (2ooa) 2 SCC 1).

Section 1a$) of the APGST Act prouided that it shall be loutful for the Commissioner of Commerc:ial Taxes to direct, bg general or special order, any assessing authoritg to defer assessment in respect of ang class o/ g<tods ctr ang class of dealers pending claification bg it of ang question referred to it, if such question has a direct bearing orr such assessrnenl. The prouiso to section 21ft) of the APGST Act, ulhich is in pan materia uith the prouiso to section 33ft) of the VAT Act, also enabled the STAT, in certain cir'iumstances, to defer hearing of the appeal before it. Section 14(5) of the APGST Act uas identical to section 21(7) of the VAT Act before its annendmen| and similar to section 21(','/) of the VAT Act after its omend-ment. It is useful to read section la(fl of the APGST Act in juxtaposition utith section 21(7') of the VAT Act both before, and afier, its omendment bg Act 21 of -2O11. 33. The Legislature, hauing retained a prouision similar to section la(fl of the APGST Act in section 21(7) of the VAT Act, has consciouslg chosen not to make a prouision similar to section 1a@) of the APGST Act ttthich conferred on the Commissioner the potuer, in certain circurtstances' to direct the assessing authoritg to dekr assessmenl proceedings. The Commissioner has not been conferred the pouer to d-efer ossessment proceedings under 1:he VAT Act, and his pouer is nou limited onlg to de'fer reuision proceedings under section 32 thereof, that too onlg in the circumstances referred to, and subiect to the limitations prescibed, in sub-section (5) thereof. The Legislature hcts consciously chosen not to confer on the Comntissioner the : pou,ter to defer assessmen, proceedings under the VAT Act euidentlg because, unlike the APGST Act, sections 2O(2) and ft) of the VAT Act prouide for self-assessmenf and, except in , the circumstances refened to in sub-sections (3) to (5) of section 21, no assessment order need be passed under the VAT Act. The legislatiue intent is to remedg the mischief u.thich, under section 1a@) of the APGST Act, enabled the Commissioner to defer assessment proceedings, and therebg I ensur. that assessment proceedings, under the VAT Act, are i not interdicted before its completion, and are completed uithout hindrance. In the absence of a prouision in the VAT I A"t, similar to section 1a$) of the APGST Act, none of the authoities under the VAT Act can be said to haue been empowered to defer assessment proceedings.

Dealing with the words "or" as well as "and", recently the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Customs Pallonji & Company Pvt. Ltd.4 held at paragraph Nos.22 and 23 as under, viz., "22, Hauing noticed some of the precedents in the field of interpretation of stdtutes, u)e nou) moue on to a little bit of English gramman The uord oor" os utell as the u.tord 'and" is o conjunction; and it is uell knouLn that a conjunction is used to join utords, phrases, or clauses. On hou-t the conjunctions "or" and "and" are to be read, guidance could be drawn from authoitatiue texts and judicial o 1ZOZS1 S.C.C. Ontine SC 1330 decisions. As per Justice G.P. Singh's Pinciples of Statutory Interpretation, the utord "or" is normallg disjunctiue u'thi'le the word "ond" is normollg conjunctiue. In English laut, the position is cleor as crystal, os exploined bg Lord Scrulton in Green u. Premier Glgnrhonug Slate Co. Ltd. [Green u Premier Glgnrhonuy slate co. Ltd., (1928) 1 KB 561 at p 569 (CA)l , that one does not read "or" as "and" in a stafilte unless one is obliged, because "or" d.oes not generallg meant "and'" and "and" does not generallg mean "or".

When the meoning of the prouision ir' question is clear and unambiguous bg the usage of "or" in Clause 2(s), there remains no force in the submission of Ms Bagcl"Li that "or" should be interpreted os "and". In our opinion, the: utord "or" emploged in Clause 2(s) manifests the legislatiue intent of prescibing an alternatiue. Going bg the go 'l'den rule of interpretation that uord-s should be read in their orclinary, natural, ond grammatical meaning' the u-tord "or" in Clause 2(s) ctearty appears to us to haue been used to reJlect the ordinary and, nonnol sense, that is, to denote an alternatiue, giuing a choice; and, t e connot assign it a different meaning unless it leads to uagueness or makes Clause 2(';) absolutelg unttorkable. We ore fortified in our uiettt bg the decision of this Court in Si Jegarom Educational Trust t'' A'G Sged Mohideen [Sri Jegaram Educational Trust u' A G' Sged Mohideen, (2010) 2 SCC 513 : (2O1O) 1 SCC (Ciu) 4981 , tpherein it toas held thus : (SCC p. 516, poro 11) "

It is nou.t utell settled that a prouision of a stotute should haue to be read as it is, in a natural monne1 plain and straight, trtithout odding, substituting or omitting ong uLord:;. Whi.le doing so, the utords used in the prouision slnuld be assigned and ascibed their natural, ordinarg or popular meaning. OnIy uhen such plain and straight reading, or ascibing the natural and norrnal meaning to the utords on such reading, Ieads to ambiguitg, uagueness, uncertaintg, or absurdity tuhich uLere not obuiouslg intended bg the legislature or the latumaker, a court should open its interpretation toolkit containing the settled ntles of construction and interpretation, to arriue at the tnte meaning of the prouision. While using the tools of interpretation, the court should remember that it is not the author of the statute uho is empowered to amend, substitute or delete, so as fo change the structure and contents. A court as an interpreter cannot alter or amend the lana. It can onlg interpret the prouision, to make it meaninqfii ond utorkoble so as to achieue the legislatiue object, tuhen there is uagueness, ambiguitg or absurdity. The purpose of interpretation is not to make a prouision uthat the Judge thinks it shttuld be, but to make it uLhat the legisloture intended it to be."

Very recently, a Division Bench of the Gujarat High in the Gujarat and otherss, held at paragraph Nos.168, 77O & 771 as under, viz., '(zozo) az e.s.r.n. :z (cui) L "768. The illustration giuen bg Mr. Soparkar for the purpose of demonstrating thot the impugned amendment is arbitrarA and unreasonable is quite opt. 77O. Then u)e ore taking about unreasonableness in the impugned prouision, ue should look into the English decision in the case of Kruse u. Johnson 11895-90l All ER 1O5. It has been obserued as under : "IJnreasonableness in u.that sense t If for instance they uere found to be partial and unequal in their operation betueen diJferent classes, if theg were manifestly unjust, i1' theg disclosed bod faith, if theg inuolued such oppressiue or gratuitous interference with rights oJ- those subject to them as could find no iustification in the minds of the redsonable men, the courl might uLell say Parliament neuer intended to giue authoity to make such rules ond that thezg are unreasonable and ultra uires.' 24. ln Municipat Corporation of Delhi u. Birla. Cotton, Spinning and Weauing Mills, Dellti AIR' 1968 SC 1232, a Constitution Bench of th<: apex: court had occasion to examine the issue. Thtt court approued the aforesaid pinciple enunciated in the: case of Ktuse u. Johnson [1895-90] All ER 105. 25- Chief Justice Wanchoo approuing the principle: sctid

In such case of the act of such a body in exercise of the pou)er conferred on it bg latu is unreasonable, the court can held that such exercise is uoid for unreasonableness. This pinciple ttas laid dotun as far back as 1898 in Kruse u. Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91, in connection uith a bge law made bg o countg Council.. .. The court held that a bye laut could be struck doutn on the ground of unreasonableness.' Hidagatullah, J. agreed ond said 'Nou the ruIe regarding reasonableness of bge laws utas laid doun in Kntse u. Johnson (1898) 2 QB 91. The rule has been uniuersallg accepted and applied in Indio and elseu.tlere.' Sikri, J. concurred : 'I agree utith the learned chief justice and Hidagatullah, J. that in suitable cases taxation in pursuance of delegated pouers bg a Municipal Corporation can be struck doutn os unreosonable by courts. If Parlioment chooses to delegate utide pou)ers it runs the risk of the bge laus or the ntles framed under the delegated pouers being challe ng e d as unre as o nable'. "

In the case of Mafatlal Industies Ltd. u. Union of India [1998] 111 STC467 (SC), the Supreme Court obserued that atlouLing refund claims begond the stipulated peiod of limitation based on the decisions rendered in other cases uould "do uiolence to seueral utell-accepted pinciples of laut". It uas further obserued that "one of the important principles of laLU, based upon public policg, is tlrc sanctitg attaching to the finalitg of anA proceeding, be it ct' suit or anA other proceeding". Denouncing the tegalitg of the proctice of claiming refund after number of Aears based on subsequent d.ecisions it was obserued that "But according to the present practice, u-tits and suits are being filed after lapse of a long number of years and the rule of limitation appli<:able ;in that behalf is soid to be three years from the date of discouery of mistake of laut. The incongnity of the situatic'n needs no emphasis."

Earlier also the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of "or" at paragraph Nos.28 to 32, held as under, viz', "

The aforesaid. discassion leads us to the or'-lg ineuitoble consequence which is this: the utord "op" occurrhtg in Rule 18 connot be giuen literal intetpretation as that leads to uarious disostrous results pointed out in the precedin'q disr:rzssion and., therefore, this tuord has to be read as "ond" as that is rthot was intended by the rule-maker in the scheme oJ things and, to carry out the objectives of Rule 18 and ai'so to bing it on a por u.tith Rule 19. 29. We are conscious of the principle that the utord "or" is normally clisjunctiue and 'and" is normally conjunctiue (see [Jnion of Indio u. Kamalabai Harjiuandas Parel:h [AlR 1968 SC 377: (1968) I SCR 4631 ) Howeuer, tt''ere mag be '1zote1 t s.c.c. tso circumstances where these uords are to be read as uice uersa to giue elfect to manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from the context. 30- Of course, these tulo tttords nonnallg "or" and "and" are to be giuen their literal meaning in unless some other part of the same stotute or the clear intention of it requires that to be d.one. Houteuer, uthereuer use of such a rttord uiz. "and"/ "or" produces unintelligible or absurd results, the Court has the pouer to read the utord "or" as "and" and uice uersa to giue effect to the intention of the legislature tuhich is otheru-tise quite clear. This uas so done in Stote of Bombag u. R.M-D- Chamarbaugtaala [AIR 1957 SC 699 : 1957 SCR 874] and u-thile doing so, the Court obserued as under: (AIR p. 7O9, para 2O) "2O. ... Consideing the noture, scope and effect of the impugned Act, LDe entertain no doubt uhateuer that the first category of prize competitions does not include ang innocent prize competitions. Such is tt-that ute conceiue to be the clear intentton of the legislature as expressed in the impugned Act read as a whole and to giue effect to this obuious intention as ute are bound to do, ue haue perforce to read the word 'or' appeaing in the quatifuing clause afier the word 'promoter' and before the utord 'or' as 'and-'. Well-knoutn canons of consttuction of statutes permit us to do so- (See Maxtuell on the Interpretation of Statutes, loth Edn.' p. 2s8.)"

In J. Jogalalitha u. IJnion of India [(1999) 5 SCC] 138 j 1g9g SCC Pd 6701 , the prouisions of Secti<>n 3 of the Preuention. of Corruption Act, 1988 empou)er the Gouernment to appoint as mang Special Judges as maA be nzcessorg for such areo or areas or for such case or group of cases, as maA be specifed in the notification. Construing the italicised "or" it raos held that it tuould mean thot the Gouernment has the pouer to do either or both the things i.e. the Gouemment moA, euen for an area for uthich a Special JudgTe hns been appointed-, appoint a Special Judge for a case or group of cases.

LikeuLise, in Mazagaon Dock Ltd. u. CIT and Excess Profits Tax IAIR 1958 SC 861 : (1959) 1 SCR 848] , tuord "or" occurring under Section a2Q) of the Income Tax Act, 1922 u)as constnted as "and-" uhen the Court found that the legislature "could not haue intended" use of the expression "or" in that Section. We haue alreadg explained the stotutory scheme contained in the Act and the Rules u.tltich express manifest intention of the legislature which prouide for granting of both kinds of rebates to the a.ssessee. In Mazogaon Dock Ltd. IAIR 1958 SC 861 : (1959) 1 SCR 848] ' this aspect utas explained in the follouing mattner: (AIR p' 865-66, para 1O) "1O. The utord 'or' in the clause tuould appear to be rather inappropiate, as if is susceptible of the interpretation that tahen some profits are made but they are less thant the normal profits, tox could onlg be imposed either on the one or on the other, and that accordirtglg a tax on the actual profits eanted utould bctr the imposition of tox. on profits uhich might haue I I

As regards the other three writ petitions, viz., Writ Petition No.26152 of 2023, Writ Petition No.26297 of 2023 and Writ Petition No.7562 of 2O2l are concerned wher,e there was an issue as regards the proceedings being barred by limitation or not, in Writ Petition No.26152 of 2023 the Assessment Order is for the year 2016-77 which is four (04) years from the last date of the Financial Year, i.e., from 31.03.2017 Llll 31.03.2021, whereas the Assessment Order in the instant ceLse is one which has been issued on 3O.O9.2O21 which is much beyond the four year period. Therefore, for the reasons stated jn the preceding paragraphs, we are of the considered opinion that the said Writ Petition No.26152 of 2023 also for the same ground ,Ceserves to be and is accordingly a1lowed. No costs. 2a. Similarly, in Writ Petition No.26297 of 2023, the Assessment Order is for the period Aprll, 2017 to June, 2O17, i.e., for a period of two (02) months, as subsequently the new tax regime under the G.S.T. had come into force. For these two month period also, i.e., from April, 2017 to Junt:, 2017, the four year period would come to an end in June, 2O21. However, the Assessment Order in the said writ petition had been passed on 13.09.2021 which again is beyond a period of four (04) years, and for the reasons mentioned in the earlier writ petition, viz., Writ Petition No.26152 of 2023, the present Writ Petition also ,i deserves to be and is accordingly allowed on the same ground on lwhich the other batch of writ petitions have been allowed. No costs.

Coming to the third writ petition, i.e., Writ Petition No.7562 of 2O2L, the Assessment Order is for the year 2Ol4-15, i.e., which is four (04) years from the last date of financial year, i.e., from 31.O3.2015 to 30.01.2019, and the impugned show- cause notice was issued on 30.01.2019 and the Assessment ,Order was passed on 09.O2.2019, i.e., just around ten (10) days' time from the date of issuance of the show-camse notice' Therefore, though the period of limitation hits the assessment up till January,2Ol5, but the period February and March, 2015, the period comes within the four years of limitation prescribed' Thus, the Assessment Order would be sustainable on the aspect of limitation only for the period February and March, 2015' However, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners drew the attention of the Court to the hasty manner iri which the proceedings were concluded, i'e', the show-cause notice issued on 3O.01.2O 19 and also the fitral Assessment Order passed on 09.O2.2079, i.e., just around ten (10) days. He further made a categorical statement that even the show-cause notice which was issued by the respondent-Autl-rorities was not effectively served and no opportunity of persorLal hearing was provided to the petitioners. He, therefore, conter.ded that for the reason that the limitation had expired, the respondents, by- passing the statutory proceedings prescribed for an effective I hearing, abmptly issued the impugned notice and con.cluded the I proceedings in ten (1O) days' time. Thus, we r1o not Iind any hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that the impugned Assessment Order dated O9.O2.2O19 even though is within limitation for a period of two (02) months, i.e,, Februar5r and March, 2015, but for the reason that there is a <:lear violation of principles of natural justice and also violation of the statutory provisions prescribed before passing of the impugned Assessment Order, the order dated 09.02.2019' passed by the Assessing Oflicer would not be sustainable ald the same j deserves to be set aside. Therefore, the Writ Petition No.7562 of 2021 therefore also deserves to be and is accordingly allowed. No costs.

It is by now a well settled proposition of law that when the plain reading of the provision of law is unambiguous and is very clear in its intent and object, the need for giving a different interpretation which is other-wise not reflected on its plain reading, cannot be permitted or that may not be sustainable. The argument advanced by the learned Special Government Pleader in the given factual backdrop and the judicial precedents referred to in the preceding paragraphs would not be I sustainable. Therefore, ali the Writ Petitions to the aforesaid .extent would be liable to be allowed, as either the show-cause ,t lnotices or the assessment orders in all the writ petitions have ribben issued beyond the period envisaqpd under Section 21 ofthe Act. Therefore, the impugnecl notices and orders are all set AS The Writ Petitions are allowed. No cdsts As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed. ide \ That Rule Nisi has been made absolute in respect of WP.No.19069, 19044, 16294, 12665, 8616 and 8455 of 2020. Witness the HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SRI ALOK ARADHE, on this Friday, the Twenty Sixth Day of April, Two Thousand and Twenty Four. B. SARASWATHI ASSISTANT BEGFfRAR ///I -v SECTIOMOFFICER to,

The Appellate Joint Commissioner (ST), Hyde'rabad Rural Division, Hyderabad.

The Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Hyderabad Rural Division, Hyderabad 10-The Commercial Tax Officer, Jeedimetla Division, Hyderabad, Telangana' 1 1. The Principal Secretary, Revenue (ST), ptate of Telangana, Secretariat, Hyderabad. l2.Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Secundrabad Division. l3.Assistant Commissioner (ST), Ashoknagar Circle, Hyderabad 14.The Commercial Tax Officer, Hisamganj Circle, Secutrdrabad 15.The Commercial Tax Officer, Hyderguda-Ashoknagar Circle, Hyderabad. 16.The Principal Secretary to Government, fi"r"nr" (CI--ll) Department, State of Telangana, Secretariat, Hyderabad 1 7. The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer-.l , Nizamabad Circle, Nizamabad- 18.The CommercialTax Officer-ll, Nizamabad Cirole, Niz:amabad. 19.The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Opp: Gandhi Bhavan, Nampally' State of Telangana, Hyderabad- 20.The Deputy Commercial Tax Officer - l, Ramgopalpet Ranigunj Circle, Begumpet Division Hyderabad. 21 . The Commercial Tax Officer, Kodad circle Kodad, Te angana State. 22.One CC to SRI KARAN TALWAR, Advocate [OPUCI 23.Two CCs to SRI SWAROOP OORILLA, Special Government Pleader' High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad [OUT] 24:One CC to SRI M. NAGA DEEPAK, Advocate [OPUC] 25.One CC to SRI S. DWARAKANATH, Senior Counsel IOPUC] 26.One CC to SRI SRINIVASA RAO KUDUPUDI, Advocate [OPUC] 27 .One CC to SRI KARTHIK RAA,4ANA PUTTAMREDD\', Advocate [OPUC] 28.Two CD Copies MP