M/S Tirupati Marble vs. Deputy Commissioner
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The petitioners, M/s Tirupati Marble and M/s Shreesh Enterprises, filed writ petitions challenging orders dated 13.09.2023 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Appeals). These orders dismissed their appeals as barred by limitation by one day. The original demands, along with interest under Section 50 of the CGST/RGST Act, were communicated to the petitioners on 13.12.2022. The petitioners filed their appeals on 13.03.2023. The Appellate Authority found the appeals to be one day beyond the prescribed three-month limitation period under Section 107 of the CGST Act and dismissed them without a condonation of delay application.
Held
The Court held that the appeals were within the prescribed limitation period. It reasoned that Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, were applicable. Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, clearly states that if the period for filing an appeal expires on a day when the court is closed, the appeal can be filed on the day the court reopens. Since 12.03.2023 was a Sunday, the appeal filed on 13.03.2023 was within time. The Court also noted that it is the duty of the authority to examine if the matter is within limitation, and in this case, the appeals were within limitation, negating the need for a condonation application. The impugned orders of the Appellate Authority were therefore unsustainable. The Court quashed the orders and remanded the matters back to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeals on merits.
Key Issues
1. Whether the appeals filed on 13.03.2023 were within the prescribed limitation period of three months from the communication of the orders on 13.12.2022, considering Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963? Petitioner's arguments: The petitioners contended that the appeals were within limitation. They argued that under Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the date of receipt of the order (13.12.2022) should be excluded. Furthermore, they invoked Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, stating that since 12.03.2023 was a Sunday, the appeal filed on the next working day, 13.03.2023, was within the period prescribed for filing. Revenue's arguments: The respondents argued that even if the petitioners sought the benefit of Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, they should have made a specific prayer for condonation of delay in their appeal memo. In the absence of such a prayer, the Appellate Authority was justified in dismissing the appeals.
Sections Cited
Section 50, Section 107, Section 9, Section 4, Section 3
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
Order
[2024:RJ-JD:1970-DB] (2 of 5) [CW-17016/2023] 12/01/2024
These writ petitions have been filed by the petitioners aggrieved of the orders dated 13.09.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by respondent No.2, whereby, the appeals filed by the petitioners have been dismissed as barred by limitation by one day.
Qua the petitioners, demands were raised by respondent No.1 along with interest under Section 50 of the CGST Act / RGST Act, which orders were communicated to the petitioners on 13.12.2022. 3. The petitioners preferred appeals before respondent No.2 on 13.03.2023 questioning the validity of the orders dated 30.11.2022 (Annex.2). The limitation for filing the appeal under Section 107 of the CGST Act is 3 months from the date of communication of the order.
When the appeals came up before the Appellate Authority, the Appellate Authority by its impugned orders dated 13.09.2023 came to the conclusion that the appeals were barred by one day and as no prayer has been made seeking condonation of delay by the appellants the appeals were dismissed.
Learned counsel for the petitioners made submissions that rejection of the appeals, as barred by limitation, is wholly unjustified.
Submissions were made that admittedly, the orders in original were served on the petitioners on 13.12.2022 and in terms of provisions of Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (‘the Act of 1897’), the date of receipt of the order was required to be excluded and as the appeals were filed by the petitioners on 13.03.2023, the same was within 3 months and within limitation.
[2024:RJ-JD:1970-DB] (3 of 5) [CW-17016/2023]
Further submissions have been made that under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (‘the Act of 1963’), where the prescribed period for filing of the appeal expires on the date when the Court is closed, the same can be preferred on the day when the Court reopens and as in the present case, on 12.03.2023 it was Sunday, filing of the appeal on 13.03.2023, the day the office of the Appellate Authority reopened, the same was within limitation and dismissal by the respondents in this regard is not justified.
It is prayed that the orders impugned be quashed and set- aside and the respondent No.2 be directed to decide the appeals on merits.
Learned counsel for the respondents made submissions that even when the petitioners were seeking benefit of Section 4 of the Act of 1963 / Section 9 of the Act of 1897, they should have made a prayer in the memo of appeals and in absence of the same the Appellate Authority was justified in dismissing the appeals.
We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record.
The facts are not in dispute, wherein, the order in original was served on the petitioners on 13.12.2022, 12.03.2023 was a Sunday and the appeals were presented on 13.03.2023, when the Appellate Authority found the same as barred by one day only.
Besides the fact that in case the appeals were found barred by one day, the authority should have granted time to the appellants to make an application seeking condonation of delay, however, in view of the express provisions of Section 9 of the Act
[2024:RJ-JD:1970-DB] (4 of 5) [CW-17016/2023] of 1897 and Section 4 of the Act of 1963, the appeals were in limitation.
Section 9 of the Act of 1897 inter-alia provides that in any Central Act or Regulations, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use of word ‘from’ and for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use of the word ‘to’.
Further, Section 4 of the Act of 1963, as noticed herein before, clearly prescribes that where a prescribed period for any appeal expires on a date when the Court is closed, the suit, the appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on the day when the Court reopens.
Admittedly, the appeals, which were presented on 13.03.2023, in light of both the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1897 and Section 4 of the Act of 1963, as 12.03.2023 was a Sunday, the appeals were within limitation prescribed, the rejection of the appeals by the Appellate Authority without adverting to the fact of the 12.03.2023 being Sunday, cannot be countenanced.
Under provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1963, it is the duty of the Authority to examine the matter as to whether the same is within limitation and as the appeals were within limitation, there was no question of the petitioners seeking condonation and/ or indicating any clarification pertaining to the appeals being in limitation. In that view of the matter, the orders impugned dated 13.09.2023 (Annexure-4) cannot be sustained.
[2024:RJ-JD:1970-DB] (5 of 5) [CW-17016/2023]
Consequently, the petitions are allowed. The orders dated 13.09.2023 (Annexure-4) in both the petitions are quashed and set-aside.
The matters are remanded back to the Appellate Authority to decide the appeals on merits in accordance with law. (MUNNURI LAXMAN),J (ARUN BHANSALI),J 2-arunp/-
Reproduced from the public record of the Rajasthan High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.