M/S. Rajeshwara Rao Allam vs. The Commissioner Of Customs And Central Tax
Original PDF →Facts
The petitioner, M/s. Rajeshwara Rao Allam, filed a writ petition challenging an order-in-appeal dated June 28, 2025, passed by the Commissioner of Customs and Central Tax, Appeal - I Commissionerate. This appellate order rejected the petitioner's appeal on grounds of limitation. The original order-in-original (OIO) was passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Central Tax on December 29, 2022. The petitioner filed an appeal against this OIO on May 13, 2025, which was approximately 1 year and 2.5 months after the OIO was passed. The petitioner contended that they received telephonic instructions from the department only in February 2025, applied for and received a certified copy of the OIO on February 18, 2025, and subsequently filed the appeal. The petitioner also deposited 7.5% of the disputed tax as pre-deposit.
Held
The Court held that service of notice by electronic mode, specifically through email, is an acceptable mode of service. The Court referred to a division bench judgment of the same High Court in "Computer Task Information Technology Services Private Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, Secunderabad and Others," which held that Section 169(1)(c) of the CGST Act permits service by sending a communication to the email address provided at the time of registration. The Court further noted that Section 112(8)(a) of the CGST Act allows for the continuation of assessment or adjudication proceedings instituted under existing law and recovery of amounts as arrears of tax under the CGST Act. Therefore, the argument that Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, is silent on electronic mode of service, rendering it impermissible, was rejected. The Court also observed that the petitioner, having received the show-cause notice electronically, replied to it, and subsequently failed to appear for personal hearings despite repeated notices sent to the same email address, could not claim the period of limitation from the date of receiving a certified copy. The Court found no due diligence on the petitioner's part and dismissed the writ petition.
Key Issues
1. Whether the service of notice by electronic mode, specifically through email, is a legally permissible and valid mode of service under the relevant provisions of law, particularly in relation to the Central Excise Act, 1944, and the CGST Act, 2017? (Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, Section 169(1)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017). The petitioner argued that service by email is not mandated by the Act and is therefore unacceptable. They contended that the OIO was received in person on February 18, 2025, making their appeal filed on May 13, 2025, within the period of limitation. The revenue, represented by the learned Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC, argued that service through email is permissible and legally valid, citing Section 37C of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and Section 169(1)(c) of the CGST Act, 2017. They contended that the petitioner had replied to a show-cause notice sent via email, and subsequent personal hearing notices were also sent to the same email address, to which the petitioner failed to respond. The revenue also argued that the OIO was sent to the same email address.
Sections Cited
Section 37C, Section 112(8)(a), Section 169(1)(c)
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Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
The Court made the following: ORDER
IN THE HTGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGAI\A AT HYDERABAD THE HON'BL E SRI JTISTICE P.SAM KOSHY ANI) RI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA THE HON'BLE S WRIT I'ETITI.ON No.33880 of 2025 DA'IE OF ORDER: 24-02.2026 Between : M/s. Rajeshwara Rao Allarrr ...Petitioner AND The Commissioncr of Customs & Central Tax, Appeal - I Commissionerate, L B Stadium Road, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad and 3 others. . . Respondents ORDER: (pcr thc Iton'hlt'Sri'lustice l'' Sttn Kttshvt Heard Mr. Ganesh Bhujanga Rao Vadduri' learned counsel fol the petitioner; and Mr. R.Strshanth Rcddy, learrred Senior Standing Counsel for CBIC appearing on behalf of rcspondents'
I'agc2ofll 2' -l he instant * rit petition is fired by rhe petitionc'r undt,r Articrc 22(r of tlre corrstirution of Incria assairing rhc order dared 21i.06.202.i. in Ap;rcal No.5:t/1015-ltR (S1-), passed by respondenr No. l. 3. l ida tlrc impugncd order, the respondenr No. I re.icctcd the appeal pref'erred b1 the pctitioncr on the grouncl of lir-nitation,
The bricl'facts and datcs relevanr for ad.ludication ol the instant case are thar the orde r- In-originar (rbr short 'oro') !r'as onc *,hich r.r,as passcd on 29.11.2022 by respondent No.
Againsr thc said OlO. rhe petitioner pr-elen'ecl an appeal under Section g5 of the l-.inancc Act belirre respondent No. i . 'Ihe appeal was ljted on 1j.05.2025. The rc u.as a dela1, ol abotrt 2t/: \eatS in filing thc appeal. F.xplaining the dclav. the contention of the pctitioner was that hc had rcceivcd telcphonic instructions fionr the I)eparlment only in Fcbr.uary,201_s. lrnnrcdiatel-r., he had applied lor rhc ceftified copy ar-rd received thc szrme on 18.02.2025 and rherealler thc appeal was filed on t j.0_s.1025. l.hereforc.
the appeal was Illed rvithin the pcriocr of lir-nitatio.. fhe otr-rer contention of the petitioner rvas that along with the appeal, he has also depositcd
PaseSofll 7.5o/o of the disputed tax as pre-deposit. Thus, the respondent No. I ought to have held that the appeal has been fited within the period of limitation and thereafter should had proceedcd to decide the case on its own merits in accordance with law
Learned counsel for the petitioner contetrded that order passed by respondent No.l was in violation ofthe principles of natural justice as no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the appeal of the petitioner was rejected on the ground of limitation. It was also contended that since the OIO passed by respondent No.2 on 29.12.2022 was received on 18.02.2025, the appeal fi led by the petitioner before respondent No. I was within thc period of limitation. Thus, the respondent No.l was not corect and justified in rejecting the appeal of the petitioner and the order passed by respondent No.l is iltegal, unjustified and in violation ol' thc principles of natural j ustice. Leamed counsel lor the petitioner further contended that serving a I copy by e-mail is not what is mandated under the Act and, thCrefore, if 6
I)agc4ofll thc Departnrent is clainting to have served lhrough e-mail, thc same is not acceptable and is irr contra'r,ention to the statutory, nror isions.
Leanred counsel lor the petitioner lurther conlended that respondent No. I r.r,ithout verilying whether the petitioner had rcceivcd the inrpugncd ordcr tlrrough e-mail or not, unjustifiably rcjecting the appeal ol'thc petitioncr as tirne barred despite the petitioner stating that OIO u,as received in person fronr the office of the rcspondent No.2 on t8.01.2025 .l-hcrelore, the appeal before respondenl No. I was flled wcll within the period o1'linritation
It was lastll, contended by the leamed counsel lbr the pctitioncr that once u,hen the stature provides for a procedurc to be lbllowcd so fzrr as scrving of thc orders passed by authorities, it has to bc done accorulingll . Any other rnode other than what is prescribed under thc startutc rvould uot bc acceptable r.nodc of service
Page5ol'll 9. notice was issued on 21.12.2020. The show-cause notice was served upon the petitioner through e-mail. To the said show-cause notice, the petitioner submitted his reply on 04.02.2021. Subsequently after the reply to the show-cause notice was received, the authorities fixed the case for personal hearing in order to abide by the principles of natural justice and personal hearing was scheduled for 10.01.2022,27.01.2022 and I1.11.2022 and notices in this regard were again served o, rhe same e-mail on which the show-cause notice was issued and to which the petitioner had replied. However in spite of r.epeated opportunities, the petitioner did not attend any of the personal hearings and as a consequence the OIO was finally passed on 29.11.2022. ' zorz 1ze1 s.r.n. 299(Bomf Lj
I)age6ofll I l. Learncd Senior Standinp. Counsel for CBIC further conrended that the copy ol thc order dated 29. ll.2022 was also sent at the same c_mail ID ol' the l-.ctitioner t. which the show-cause notice u,as issued and to which the pcririoncr replied on l l.Ol.2023. After the order was sent by e-nrail, still there was no response from the petitioner,s side either in availi,g thc reurecly ol appeal or challenging it before any other forur,. Abruptll'thc pcritioncr files an application lor certified copy and obtains the sa,.e on 18.02.2025, and even thereafter, after about 3 months' ti,e an appeal q'as fi led befbre rcspondent No. I .
Iteferr.inq to Scction 37Cl of the Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short 'the Act') thc contcntion of the leamed Senior Standing counscl tbr [--BIC *as that service through e-mail is permissible and is legaly valiC. I'he pcritioner cdnnot cry foul on the same. Once when the show_ cause notict \\'as sent through e-mail, to the petitioner has also rcsponded bl, tiling his replr,. il'he fails to takc appropriate action on the OIO u,hich rvas served on the same e-mail there \ /as no reason rvhy the petitioner should not ha'e taken appropriate legal recourse available under the sratute. Thus, the explanatio_g. heirgTrdviGd by the petitioner l should not be accepted and the writ petition should be dismissed affirming the order passed by respondent No. I .
It was also the contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel lor CBIC that even otherwise the order passed by respondent No. I is one which could have also been challenged by the petitioner by way of an appeal under Section 86 of the Act
Ilaving heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, admittedly there was an OIO passed on 29.11.2022 Before passing of the OIO, a show-cause notice was issued which was served electronically to the petitioner. The petitioner having received the show-cause notice electronically entered appearance before the authorities and filed his detailed reply. Subsequently there has been neither any proper response from the petitioner's side, nor did the petitioner appear in any of the personal hearing notices issued on various dates rnentioned in the preceding paragraphs. It is only therealter that the order was passed on 29.11.2022, which again was served electronically
Page8olll upon the petitioner ilt tlle same e-mail at u,hich the show-cause notice was issued inrtialll anci to rvhich the petitioner had also responded.
The clucstion ri'hether the sen,ice of notice by electronic mode u'ould be an acceptable rnode of service or not came up lor consideration beftrre a Division llerrch of this High Court itself in the case of Computer f-ask Information Technology Services Private Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner of Customs and Ccntral Excise, Sccunderabatl antl Othcrs2. wherein in paragraph Nos. l3 to 16, it has been held as undcr " 13.'l'ha (-(iST .1,: t (a te into being in the vear 2017 and sacticlt IJJ thcraof lettl.t vitlt miscellan?ott.\ tronsitional provision.s". It is ttltpositt to t'ott.sitlet strh-section (8)(a) oJ' section 112 oJ the L.(iS7 A,:t. tthiclt rttrls thtr.t ll)(8t(tt) t'lUrt' irt p rsuotlcc o.f on assessntenl or attjud it rrt irttt ltrot't,edings instittted, wlrcther bet'bre, on or u/let tht'ttt 4xtinted dor,', under lhe cxislinp law. any Ltntottnl o-/ t0\ trllare.\t. /inc or nenalt)' becornes t-!!! v eJqbl!1 ry! !!,!-l t!_-p!!; e!!. t h e s a n rc s h a I l, u n I e ss recoverctl under lhe e.ristirtg law, be recovergd as an 'z 2025 SCC OnLrne TS 199
7, Page9olll arrear of latt untler lhis Acl and the amoutll so recovcred slulL nrtt he adntissible as inpul-lax credit under t his Act. " (emphasis suPPlietl)
A minute reatling o.[ the oforesaid provision makes it clear tlnt o .r' ()ssessment or adjudication proceedings instituted before' or aJier the oppointed dot' can continue and the amount will be recovcrable as an arrear of trtt under the CGST Act'
Section 169(t)(cl ofthe CGST Act reads thus:' " t69( 1)(c). by sendinq a communication to his e-rnail address provided at the time of registrtttiott or as amended fr om time lo time; or"
A conjctint readirtg of sections 1a2(8)(a) and 169(l)(c) of the CGST Act shows that the at'gument of the learned Senior Standing Ctntnsel for CBIC has sttbstantial fttrce The provision relating to service of nolice provided under the CGST Act can be appLied in victt' of secl ion t't 2 (B) (a) of the CGST Act in relation to antt other e.tisting law, which inclttdes the 1911 Act' Thus, we are unable ttt pcrstrude ourselves with the line of argument of the learned crtunsel .for the pelitioner lhat since section 37C of the l9't'l Act is silenl abottl tlrc eleclronic ntode of service through e-mail elc'' the -said mode is imperntissible or not acceplable' "
f'agc l0 of I I 16. [:l'en otherqisc thc 'Act itself subsequently has been amended wlicreby' irt adclitiorl to the llotice to be serrt bv legistcrcd post IS conccmed: nlode of scrvice bl' speed post has also been made acceptable under Section 3 7
In tl're instant casc, the petitioner having received the show-cause rlotice. havins respondcd to the same b1' filing a detailcd reply and subseqLrentl)' not participatin!r. in thc llrther proceedings and rvaking up fronr slumber after 27, years and thereafter apptying tbr a certified copy ancl obtaining the satnc. then trving to claim the period ol limitation from the date of receiving the certified copy would not be acceptable The person u'ho appeal's hclbrc the atrtholities alter proper service and having pafticipalecl at thc initial stagcs ol-tlle procecdings has to shorv certain due diligence on his part in lbllowing up the nlatter with the authorities so as to kttow t.he status of thc proceedings and proceed on the same' No1 shor.i,ing dr"re diligencc or tirllorv up is no ground fbr any syrlrpathetic consideration, particularl) rr herr it is fiorn somebodv who is in the busirress carrnot be cquated s ith a rustic villager or a layman'
Pagc ll of ll
For all the afbresaid reasons, we do not find any good ground raised by the petitioner calling for an interference to the impugned order 28.06.2025 passed by respondent No.l. The writ petition therefore deserves to be and is accordingly dismissed.
As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending if any, shall stand closed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. S .A. JAYASREE ISTANT REGISTRAR //// To, SECTION OFFICER eal - | Commissionerate, 1 The gommissioner of Customs and Central Tax. Aoo L B Stadium Road, Basheerbagh. Hydei;baa*^ """
The Deputv Commissioner of Central Tax, Saroornagar CGST Division, Ranga Reddy CGST Commls.io""ot"lrrrri6i"","Ljiiprr, Hyderabad.
The Secretary. Mrnistrv of Finance, Government of lndia, 3rd Floor, Jeevan Deep Bu itding, SansadMarg. rlil b;ii,; 1 i'o'0o i "" 4 The Assistant commissioner of centrar rax, Nagore cGST Division. Ranoa Reddy CGST Commissionerai., rurlJe, Uipaiffieraoao
One CC to SRt GANESH BHUJANGA RAO VADDURI, Advocate. [OPUC]
One CC to SRt R Sushanth Reddy, (SC FOR CBtC) topUCI
One CC to SRt N BHUJANGA RAO, Deputy Soticitor Generat of lndia, Hioh Court for the State of Telangana at HyOeii6aa. iOiUCl- - -
Two CD Copies BSK BS P*(. I \ r
HIGH COURT DATED:2410212026 ORDER WP.No.33880 of 2025 DISMISSING THE WRIT PETITION WITHOUT COSTS PM{. rt6\c \)a R 1 t1 s E h Hrtn I! o ( rJ t ( 4 ).r 1 * I -.\. ( ^ t 6 i)
Reproduced from the public record of the Telangana High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.