M/S. Carry Co. vs. Union Of INDIA And Ors.
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The petitioner, M/s Carry Co, challenged an order dated December 24, 2024, passed by the appellate authority under Section 107 of the WB GST/CGST Act, 2017. The appeal was rejected solely on the grounds of delay. The petitioner argued that the impugned order, uploaded on the portal, did not constitute valid service as it was not served through the primary modes specified in Section 169(1)(a) to (c) of the Act. The revenue contended that service via the common portal, as per Section 169(1)(d), is a valid mode of service. The original order under Section 73 of the Act for tax periods 2017-2018 to 2019-2020 was preceded by a show-cause notice uploaded on the portal, to which the petitioner responded. A subsequent order dated December 28, 2023, was also uploaded on the portal.
Held
The Court held that the plain and unambiguous language of Section 169(1) of the GST Act indicates that the listed modes of service are alternative. Therefore, making an order available on the common portal (Clause (d)) is a valid mode of service, and it is not mandatory to exhaust modes (a) to (c) first. The Court respectfully disagreed with the view expressed by the Madras High Court in P.N. Traders. Consequently, the petitioner's contention that service was not complete without personal service or service via registered post/e-mail was rejected. Regarding the delay, the Court found that the appellate authority had mechanically rejected the appeal, erroneously believing it lacked the power to condone delay beyond the extended period. Citing a Division Bench judgment of its own High Court in S.K. Chakraborty & ors. vs. Union of India, the Court found this reasoning unacceptable. The Court set aside the appellate authority's order and, considering the pending constitution of the appellate tribunal and the petitioner's explanation for delay (though not entirely sufficient), directed the appellate authority to hear the appeal on merits upon payment of Rs. 25,000/- to the High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.
Key Issues
1. Whether service of an order under the GST Act, made available on the common portal as per Section 169(1)(d), constitutes valid service in the absence of prior service through modes specified in Section 169(1)(a) to (c)? - Petitioner's argument: Service is not complete unless the primary modes of service (personal delivery, registered post, speed post, or e-mail) are first attempted and fail, citing the Madras High Court's decision in P.N. Traders vs. Deputy State Tax Officer. - Revenue's argument: Section 169(1) lists alternative modes of service, and making the order available on the common portal (Clause (d)) is a valid and sufficient mode of service on its own. 2. Whether the appellate authority erred in mechanically rejecting the petitioner's appeal on grounds of delay without properly considering the application for condonation of delay, particularly in light of the High Court's view on the appellate authority's power to condone delay beyond the extended period?
Sections Cited
Section 169, Section 107, Section 73, Section 169(1), Section 169(1)(a), Section 169(1)(b), Section 169(1)(c), Section 169(1)(d), Section 169(1)(e), Section 169(1)(f), Section 169(2), Section 169(3), Section 73(9), Section 107(4)
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Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
order or communication as the case may be by registered post while Clause (c) provides for sending the communication to the E-mail address provided at the time of registration or as amended from time to time. While the mode of service in the case of Clause (d) contemplate, by making the same available on common portal. Alternatively, as per Clause (e), the mode of service is by publication in the newspaper. Thus, the mode of service provided in the above clauses are all in the alternative and the same is amplified by use of the word „or‟ after each clause.
Insofar as the Clause (f) is concerned, the same starts with the words “if none of the mode aforesaid is practicable”. Having regard to the clear language used in Clause (f), it would transpire that only if the manner of service as contemplated in Clauses (a) to (e) of sub-Section 1 of Section 169 is not practicable then and in such circumstances the mode and manner of service through Section 169(1) Clause (f) is permissible. In addition thereto, a perusal of the provisions contained in sub Sections 2 and 3 would clearly establish that a decision or order or summon or notice or communication as the case may be is required to be effected or is deemed to have been served on the date on which the same is tendered or published or a copy is affixed as per Clause 1. 11. Having regard thereto, the making the same available on the portal or publication in the newspaper, under Clauses (d) or (e) as the case may be, can be said to be
6 sufficient communication of decision, order, summon, notice as the case may be. Sub-Section 3 of Section 169 does not support the petitioner‟s case either. Although, in the Judgment delivered in the case of P.N. Traders (supra), by quoting a passage from WP (MD)No. 26481 of 2024 the Coordinate Bench of the Hon‟ble Madras High Court had set aside the order of assessment and though Mr. Mukherjee by relying on paragraph 7 of the said Judgment has attempted to make out a case that Section 169 mandates service of notice in-person or by registered post or to the registered e-mail at the first instance and alternatively, on the failure to complete service through the aforesaid modes that making the same available on the portal or publication through the newspaper would constitute good service, I am unable to accept the same especially having regard to the clear language employed in Section 169 of the said Act. It is well settled that for the purpose of interpretation of the statute, the unambiguous and plain language of the statute has to be given preference.
In the instant case, I find that the unambiguous and plain language employed in Section 169(1) read with sub- Sections 2 and 3 makes it amply clear that the service of notice can be effected by any of the modes provided for in Clauses (a) to (f) of Section 169(1) of the said Act. The only restriction in my view in effecting service, is found in Clause 169(1)(f) since, the opening words of the said Clause requires that “if none of the modes as aforesaid is practicable”, that is to say modes of service provided for in Clauses (a) to (e) is not practicable, then the mode of
7 service as provided in Clause (f) can be applied. Thus, having regard to the clear language employed in Section 169 of the said Act, no view, contrary to the intention expressed in the above section is acceptable. As such I respectfully disagree with the view expressed by the Hon‟ble Madras High Court in the case of P.N. Traders (supra).
In view thereof, I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that service of notice of the order under Section 73 of the said Act on the petitioner was not complete without a personal service thereof on the petitioner as per the mode provided in Section 169(1) Clauses (a) to (c) of the said Act.
On the issue of consideration of the application for condonation of delay, I find that the appellate authority had mechanically by relying on the provisions of sub- Section 4 of Section 107 of the said Act and by treating that it has no power to condone the delay beyond the extended period of one month, had rejected the appeal. In this context, I may note a Division Bench of our High Court in the case of S.K. Chakraborty & ors. vs. Union of India (MAT 81 of 2022 & MAT 82 of 2022) has already taken a view on the power of the appellate authority to condone the delay beyond the extended period of one month. Having regard thereto, I am unable to accept the reasoning provided by the appellate authority.
In view thereof, I set aside the order dated 24th December, 2024. 16. Considering the case made out by the petitioner and the explanation provided though, the explanation does not
8 appear to be entirely sufficient however, considering the fact that at present the appellate tribunal is yet to be constituted and in the fitness of things it would only be appropriate to direct the appellate authority to hear out and dispose of the appeal on merit subject however, the petitioner making payment of a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to the Secretary, High Court Legal Services Committee, High Court, Calcutta.
In the event the petitioner makes payment of the aforesaid amount within a period of 4 weeks from date, the appellate authority having regard to the observations made herein shall hear out the appeal on merits by giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
With the above observations and directions, the writ petition is disposed of.
(Raja Basu Chowdhury, J.)
Reproduced from the public record of the Calcutta High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.