Kapil Rastogi vs. State Of U.P. And Another
Original PDF →Facts
The applicant, Kapil Rastogi, Director of N.K.S. Jewelers Pvt. Ltd., filed an application under Section 528 of the B.N.S.S. to quash an order dated May 13, 2025, passed by Additional Court 138 N.I. Act, Moradabad. This order summoned the applicant in Complaint Case No. 23741 of 2025, filed by Vibhor Bhatnagar under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (N.I. Act). The complaint alleged dishonor of two cheques, each for Rs. 15,00,000/-, dated February 17, 2025, and February 14, 2025, which were presented on February 21, 2025, and dishonored with the remark 'Payment stop by drawer'. A statutory demand notice was issued on March 6, 2025, followed by the summoning order.
Held
The Court held that the objection regarding the non-service of the statutory demand notice is a question of trial. Relying on Ajeet Seeds Ltd. vs. K. Gopala Krishnaiah, the Court stated that the presumption of service arises when a notice is sent to the correct address by registered post, and whether it was served or not is a matter of evidence to be proved during the trial. The Court found no convincing document on record to delve into this issue at the summoning stage. Regarding the contention that the cheque was a security cheque and thus no legal liability arose, the Court, citing M/s Womb Laboratories Private Limited vs. Vijay Ahuja & another and Sunil Todi and others vs. State of Gujarat, held that whether the cheque was given by way of security and whether it was for the discharge of any debt or liability are matters of defense to be proved during the trial. The Court also noted that the lodging of an FIR and complaints to other authorities are matters of defense to be considered at the trial stage. The presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act was reiterated. Therefore, interference at the summoning stage was declined.
Key Issues
1. Whether the summoning order under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be sustained when the statutory demand notice dated March 6, 2025, was allegedly not served upon the applicant, with service purportedly shown in connivance with the postman. 2. Whether the summoning order can be sustained when the applicant contends there is no legal debt or liability, as the cheque was a security cheque that was allegedly misused, and an FIR was lodged by the applicant against the opposite party no. 2 on August 19, 2025, under Sections 316(2), 318(4), 352, 351 B.N.S., and a complaint was made to MSME. Petitioner's arguments: The applicant argued that the summoning order is unsustainable due to non-service of the statutory demand notice, the cheque being a security cheque and misused, and the lodging of an FIR and complaint to MSME prior to the summoning. Reliance was placed on the fact that GST documents and bills/invoices supported the purchase of jewelry. Revenue's arguments: The learned AGA argued that once cheques are drawn and dishonored, the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act would apply.
Sections Cited
Section 138, Section 139
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD APPLICATION U/S 528 BNSS No. - 35519 of 2025 Court No. - 75 HON'BLE VIKAS BUDHWAR, J.
Heard Sri Krishna Kumar Singh learned counsel for the applicant and Sri drawn two cheques bearing nos 000086 and 000087 of Rs.15,00,000/-each dated 17.2.2025 and 14.2.2025 which on presentation in the bank on 21.2.2025 came to be dishonoured on with the remark "Payment stop by drawer" followed by a statutory demand notice dated 6.3.2025 and the applicant came to be summoned on 13.5.2025 under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
Learned counsel for the applicant submits that the summoning order cannot be sustained for more than one reason, (a) the statutory demand notice dated 6.3.2025 had not been served upon the applicant and service has been shown by the opposite party no.2 in connivance with the postman (b) Versus Counsel for Applicant(s) : Krishna Kumar Singh Counsel for Opposite Party(s) : under:- "
It is thus clear that Section 114 of the Evidence Act enables the Court to presume that in the common course of natural events, the communication would have been delivered at the address of the addressee. Section 27 of the GC Act gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. It is not necessary to aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business.
Applying the above conclusions to the facts of this case, it must be held that the High Court clearly erred in quashing the complaint on the ground that there was no recital in the complaint that the notice under Section 138 of the NI Act was served upon the accused. The High Court also erred in quashing the complaint on the ground that there was no proof either that the notice was served or it was returned unserved/unclaimed. That is a matter of evidence. We must mention that in C.C. Alavi Haji, this Court did not deviate from the view taken in Vinod Shivappa, but reiterated the view expressed therein with certain clarification. We have already quoted the relevant paragraphs from Vinod Shivappa where this Court has held that service of notice is a matter of evidence and proof and it would be premature at the stage of issuance of process to move the High Court for quashing of the proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. These observations are squarely attracted to the present case. The High Court?s reliance on an order passed by a two.Judge Bench in Shakti Travel & Tours is misplaced. The order in Shakti Travel & Tours does not give any idea about the factual matrix of that case. It does not advert to rival submissions. It cannot be said therefore that it lays down any law. In any case in C.C. Alavi Haji, to which we have made a reference, the three. Judge Bench has conclusively decided the issue. In our opinion, the judgment of the two.Judge Bench in Shakti Travel & Tours does not hold the field any more."
As regards the second contention of learned counsel for the applicant that the said cheque is a security cheque and thus no legal enforceable debt or liability stands arisen is also not convincible particularly when the same is a subject of trial.
Reliance has been placed upon the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Womb Laboratories Private Limited Vs. Vijay Ahuja & another (2022) 18 SCC 631 has observed as under:- "In our opinion, the High Court has muddled the entire issue. The averment in the complaint does indicate that the signed cheques were handed over by the accused to the complainant. The cheques were given by way of security, is a matter of defence. Further, it was not for the discharge of any debt or any liability is also a matter of defence. The relevant facts to countenance the defence will have to be proved - that such security could not be treated as debt or other liability of the accused. That would be a triable issue. We say so because, handing over of the cheques by way of security per se would not extricate the accused from the discharge of liability arising from such cheques."
In Sunil Todi and others Vs. State of Gujarat, (2022) 16 SCC 762 the Hon'ble Apex Court has reiterated the aforesaid law.
As regards the third contention of the learned counsel for the applicant that the said cheque has been mistutilized and the complaint has been lodged by the applicant before the other authorities and already a first information report has been lodged against the opposite party no.2 and their faction by the brother of the applicant is concerned the same at best the matter of defence which would be considered at the stage when the trial commences when a decision is to be taken whether it is a case of acquittal or conviction.
As regards the other contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that their bills and invoices and also GST document supporting the purchase of jewellery by the opposite party no.2 from the applicant is concerned the same may not be a relevant consideration at the stage of summoning and the same may be a question which can be raised when the trial commences.
Moreover the presumption under Section 139 of the N.I. Act is always there.
Accordingly, interference is declined. Application stands disposed of leaving it open to the applicant to raise all legal and factual issues as well as issue with respect to the fact that the cheque being a security cheque does not answer the description of a dishonour of the cheque in the trial and the Court has no reasons to disbelieve that the same shall be considered in accordance with law. September 16, 2025 piyush (Vikas Budhwar,J.) PIYUSH KUMAR High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Reproduced from the public record of the Allahabad High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.