M/S Sahu Land Developers PVT. LTD. Thru. Authorized Signatory Mr. Sanjay Srivastava vs. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Revenue Lko And 6 Others

We may also point out that the remedy by way of a Writ Petition has been held to be available in the judgments referred to above, and in the absence of any statutory specific remedy, it is open to the aggrieved party to approach the juri ictional High Court for redressal of their grievances. The compilation, therefore, presented as a Revision Petition, being not maintainable under Section 58(1)(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, is hereby dismissed.”

In Harbanslal Sahnia v Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd reported in (2003) 2 SCC 107 has reiterated the view of Whirlpool Corporation (Supra) and held as follows: “7……..In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ juri iction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without juri iction or the vires of an Act is challenged……..” (Emphasis added)

The Supreme Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of H.P. reported in (2021) 6 SCC 771 has discussed in detail about the maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and also laid down principles of law that emanates from a plethora of precedents. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “C.

Maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court

The High Court has dealt with the maintainability of the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Relying on the decision of this 10 WRIC No. - 8939 of 2025 Court in CCT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. [CCT v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2020) 19 SCC 681 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 440] , the High Court noted that although it can entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, it must not do so when the aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy available in law. However, certain exceptions to this “rule of alternate remedy” include where, the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the law or acted in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure; or has resorted to invoke provisions, which are repealed; or where an order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Applying this formulation, the High Court noted that the appellant has an alternate remedy available under the GST Act and thus, the petition was not maintainable.

In this background, it becomes necessary for this Court, to dwell on the “rule of alternate remedy” and its judicial exposition. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks [Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court after reviewing the case law on this point, noted : (SCC pp. 9-10, paras 14- 15) “14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for “any other purpose”.

Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its juri iction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without juri iction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field.”

Whether the National Commission can be said to be a “tribunal” for the purpose of exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution by the High Court is concerned, has been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Associated Cement Companies [Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, 1964 SCC OnLine SC 62 : AIR 1965 SC 1595] , which is required to be referred to. In paras 44 and 45, it is observed and held as under : (SCC p. 1609) “44. An authority other than a court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient to say that any outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article

It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals.

The word “tribunal” finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as in Article 136.” Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be a “Tribunal” which is vested by statute with the powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them. Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a “Tribunal” within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the Constitution. Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution, in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party before the High Court concerned under Article 227 of the Constitution, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party approaches the High Court concerned by way of writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.

At this stage, another Constitution Bench decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] is required to be referred to. While dealing with the juri iction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution in respect of powers of judicial review, it is observed and held in para 90 as under : (SCC pp. 307-308) “90. We may first address the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High Courts. We have already held that in respect of the power of judicial review, the juri iction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded. It has been contended before us that the Tribunals should not be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the vires of legislations is questioned, and that they should restrict themselves to handling matters where constitutional issues are not raised. We cannot bring ourselves to agree to this proposition as that may result in splitting up proceedings and may cause avoidable delay. If such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly approach the High Courts and thus subvert the juri iction of the Tribunals. Moreover, even in these special branches of law, some areas do involve the consideration of constitutional questions on a regular basis; for instance, in service law matters, a large majority of cases involve an interpretation of Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the juri iction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution

The scope and ambit of juri iction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. [Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97] , which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel [Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, (2022) 4 SCC 181 : (2022) 2 SCC (Civ) 424] ). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited juri iction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution.

In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above and subject to the observations made hereinabove, it cannot be said that a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution before the High Court concerned against the order passed by the National Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act was not maintainable……” (Emphasis added)

The Supreme Court in Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Suresh Chand Jain reported in (2024) 9 SCC 148 applying the precedent in Ibrat Faizaan (Supra) wherein the petitioner has directly approached the Apex Court under Article 136 of Constitution to 16 WRIC No. - 8939 of 2025 challenge the order passed by National Commission that had affirmed the order of State Commission, held that a party can always approach the High Court having supervisory juri iction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment are quoted hereinbelow:

This Court considered the question for its decision as to whether against the order passed by Ncdrc in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a) (iii) of the 2019 Act, petition before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable. ***

In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion that we should not adjudicate this petition on merits. We must ask the petitioner herein to first go before the juri ictional High Court either by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution or by invoking the supervisory juri iction of the juri ictional High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High Court adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either of the parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.”

In our considered opinion, the appellant having had a remedy before the High Court in a separate juri iction which was equally efficacious, he indulged in the (mis) adventure of invoking its writ juri iction which was rightly not entertained. (Emphasis added)

Upon careful perusal of umpteen judgements of the Supreme Court and sifting through the ratios ordained in the precedents, the following principles emerges with regard to the maintainability of writ petition under Article 226 against the orders passed by District, State and National Commissions in its appellate juri iction: A. Alternative remedy would not operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without juri iction or the vires of an Act is challenged; B. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion; C. An appeal against the order of National Commission to writ court in cases where there are disputed questions of fact or the grounds taken in the writ petition is not so cogent, where prima facie

So far as the issue of maintainability of writ petition before the High Court is concerned, one may look into the judgment of Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation (Supra), Haribanslal Sahnia (Supra) and Radha Krishan Industries (Supra) wherein the court has clarified that writ petition against the order of National Commission is maintainable before High Court subject to some restrictions.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in Ibrat Faizaan (Supra) and Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. (Supra) has held that writ petition against order of National Commission is maintainable either under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain (Supra) has held that writ petition under Article 226 would not be maintainable if there is an alternative remedy under different juri iction of the same High Court.

In light of the judgments referred above, we are of the view that when a supervisory juri iction under Article 227 is available to the petitioner, writ petition under Article 226 should not be normally entertained but the remedy under Article 226 would be available under exceptional circumstances. Furthermore, writ juri iction under Article

In the present case, the District Consumer Forum after perusal of evidence placed on record has held that despite the amount paid by the respondents under the aforesaid scheme, neither the possession had been handed over to them nor any construction work had been carried out by the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the consolidation proceedings had been initiated after the launch of the project by the petitioner. But the District Commission has observed that petitioner was never in possession of the land as it was already under consolidation proceedings and petitioner had taken the aforesaid amount from the respondents by hiding the fact that the land was under consolidation proceedings. Hence, petitioner had committed an unfair trade practice and was therefore liable to return the said amount to the respondents.

The petitioner then approached the State Commission to contend that District Commission had overlooked the fact of possession and consolidation proceedings as the possession is still with the petitioner and it had come under consolidation proceedings after launch of the project by the petitioner which is a ‘force majeure’ event rendering him incapable of completing the project. State Commission has dismissed the appeal by upholding the order of the District Commission. Subsequently, the National Commission also dismissed the appeal on the ground of absence of any substantial question of law.

The petitioner is here before this Court and has again reiterated the same ground that has already been taken by him before the District Commission, State Commission and National Commission who have concurrently come to a finding against the petitioner. The issue of the knowledge of consolidation proceedings as to from when they were being carried out and the fact of possession of the land are purely factual in nature and based on disputed questions of fact which cannot be gone into by us in writ juri iction. The other pleas taken by the petitioner are 21 WRIC No. - 8939 of 2025 also not so cogent as to persuade us to interfere with the findings of the National Commission. It is to be further noted that till date, the petitioner has not given the possession of the land to the respondents who are the allotees of land.

The case of the petitioner does not fall under any of the grounds mentioned herein below:- i) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; ii) where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice; or where the order or proceedings are wholly without juri iction or the vires of an Act is challenged; iii) the findings of the Commission (District Commission, State Commission, National Commission) are perverse.

In fact, we are of the view that the Commissions have rendered a finding that is reasonable and cannot be termed as perverse. Ergo, we come to an obdurate finding that the petitioner has failed to make out a case requiring interference of orders passed by the three consumer commissions.

In light of the above, the writ petition is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. December 2, 2025 Ashutosh/cks/- (Shekhar B. Saraf, J.)