Sy Associates Private Limited vs. Sales Tax Officer Class Ii Avato Ward 95 & Anr.
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Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 2 of 14
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, J.
The present petitions have been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking similar reliefs, viz., condonation of delay in filing statutory appeals and a direction to the Appellate Authority to register and decide the appeals of the petitioner under Section 107 of the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), however, they arise out of different Orders-in-Original in relation to different financial years.
Since the grounds urged and the nature of relief sought from this Court are similar, these petitions are being adjudicated and disposed of vide this common order.
The facts necessary for adjudication of the present petitions are as below: A. The petitioner is a private limited company, duly registered under the Act, and is engaged in the business of execution of work contracts and is carrying on construction activities in Delhi. Its registered office is at Chittaranjan Park, South Delhi. B. Respondent no. 1 is the officer under the Act, who issued the Show Cause Notice (in short referred to as ‘SCN’) in Form GST DRC-01 under Section 73 of the Act. C. Respondent no. 2 is the Appellate Authority before whom an appeal against the order passed by respondent no. 1 lies under Section 107 of the Act. W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 3 of 14 D. In W.P.(C) 2613/2026, a SCN bearing Reference No. ZD0709230247382 dated 23rd September, 2023 was issued to the petitioner for the Financial Year 2017–2018 under Section 73 of the Act, alleging excess availment of Input Tax Credit and proposing recovery of tax along with applicable interest and penalty. E. Under the said notice, the last date for filing the reply was fixed as 23rd October, 2023, and the date of personal hearing was scheduled for 3rd October, 2023. As the petitioner failed to submit its response within the prescribed period, two reminders came to be issued by the respondent-authorities. The first reminder dated 17th November, 2023 was issued calling upon the petitioner to submit its reply by 24th November, 2023, and a further date for personal hearing was fixed for 27th November, 2023. Again, upon the petitioner’s failure to respond or appear pursuant to the aforesaid reminder, another reminder dated 21st December, 2023 was issued, thereby calling upon the petitioner to submit its reply by 26th December, 2023, and also fixing a further date of personal hearing on the same date. F. As a sequel to above, the juri ictional officer passed an adjudication order bearing Reference No. ZD071223155554H dated 27th December, 2023 under Section 73 of the Act, confirming a total demand of Rs. 54,15,344/-, comprising of tax of amount Rs. 25,78,736/-, penalty of Rs. 2,57,872/-, and interest of Rs. 25,78,736/-. G. In W.P.(C) 3109/2026, a SCN bearing Reference No. ZD0705240284794 dated 24th May, 2024 was issued to the W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 4 of 14 petitioner for the Financial Year 2019–2020 under Section 73 of the Act for a similar violation as stated above. H. In the said SCN dated 24th May, 2024, the last date for filing a reply was fixed as 24th June, 2024 and the date of personal hearing was scheduled for 26th June, 2024. As the petitioner failed to submit its response within the prescribed period, a reminder dated 09th July, 2024 came to be issued by the respondent, calling upon the petitioner to file its reply by 16th July, 2024, so also fixed a further date of personal hearing on 19th July, 2024. I. Consequently, for the Financial Year 2019–2020, the respondent-authority passed an adjudication order bearing Reference No. ZD070824084360B dated 24th August, 2024 under Section 73 of the Act, thereby confirming a total demand of Rs.1,11,17,625/- towards tax of Rs.57,32,922/-, interest of Rs. 47,92,095/-, and penalty of Rs.5,92,608/-. J. It is an admitted position that the petitioner could not respond to the aforesaid SCNs, so also did not appear for the personal hearings in either of the proceedings. K. It is the case of the petitioner that the promoter of the petitioner company faced extraordinary personal circumstances, inasmuch as his four year old daughter was diagnosed with a rare paediatric inflammatory disease, i.e., Kawasaki disease in November 2023. L. It is further the case of the petitioner that owing to the aforesaid circumstances, the promoter of the petitioner company was unable to supervise the daily affairs of the business and had W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 5 of 14 entrusted the responsibility of managing financial matters and statutory compliances, including GST-related compliances to the company’s tax consultant. However, the said tax consultant failed to inform the promoter about the notices issued by the GST Department and also neglected to take appropriate steps to ensure that replies were submitted within the prescribed period and that the petitioner was duly represented during the personal hearings. M. Thereafter, the petitioner engaged another tax consultant during the first week of January 2026, who upon reviewing the GST portal, informed the petitioner that the SCNs had not been replied to and that Orders-in-Original had been passed under Section 73 of the Act for the Financial Year 2017–2018 as well as the Financial Year 2019–2020 and that appeals were required to be filed against the same. N. As the limitation period of three months for availing the statutory remedy of appeal against the aforesaid orders had expired, it is the case of the petitioner that he has been rendered remediless, as the Appellate Authority under the Act is not vested with the power to condone any delay beyond the period prescribed under Section 107 of the Act. As such, the present petitions have been preferred before this Court.
The learned counsel for the petitioner would urge that in the absence of any element of gross negligence, mala fides, or deliberate intention of causing delay in filing the statutory appeal, this Court, in exercise of its writ juri iction, can condone the delay in filing the appeal upon sufficient cause being shown by the petitioner. It is stated W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 6 of 14 that the delay occurred on account of the medical condition of the daughter of the promoter of the petitioner company, so also due to the previous tax consultants. According to him, these circumstances constitute sufficient cause and demonstrate that the delay was bona fide and neither intentional nor deliberate. To strengthen his plea reliance is placed on the judgments in the matter of Movers International Private Limited Vs Union of India & Ors 2025 (9) TMI 1330; Shaik Abdul Azeezvs Stateof A.P. (2024) 15 Centax 321 (A.P.); Kajal Dutta v. Assistant Commissioner of State Tax & Ors 2023 SCC OnLine Cal 5885; Vasudeva Engineering & Ors. Vs. UOI & Ors, 2024 (11) TMI
It is further urged that it has been consistently held by the Apex Court that the expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal and justice-oriented interpretation so that technicalities of limitation do not defeat the substantive rights. Furthermore, it is claimed that the primary consideration is the sufficiency and acceptability of the cause shown and not merely the length of delay
As against above, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents would urge that the petitioner has approached this Court after an inordinate delay. In particular, in W.P.(C) No. 2613 of 2026, there is a delay of 685 days in preferring the appeal, and in W.P.(C) No. 3109 of 2026, there is 429 days’ delay. It is contended that such prolonged delay bars the petitioner from seeking discretionary relief under the writ juri iction of this Court.
Heard. W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 7 of 14
At the outset, we are required to have regard to the provision of Section 107 of the Act, relevant portion relating to the aspect of limitation reads thus:- “Section 107. Appeals to Appellate Authority.- (1)Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person.
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(4) The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month.”
What emerges from a plain reading of the said provision is that the prescribed period to file an appeal under Section 107(1) of the Act is of three months from the date on which the order is communicated to the person aggrieved by such order. Further, sub-section (4) confers a limited discretion upon the Appellate Authority to condone a delay in filing an appeal for a further period of one month after the three months period has expired, provided sufficient cause is shown.
As the petitioner could not file a statutory appeal against the Orders-in-Original within the prescribed period of three months from the date of communication of the orders, or even within the further W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 8 of 14 period of one month available under the statute, the statutory remedy of an appeal is now barred by limitation.
It is in such circumstances the petitioner has approached this Court, seeking condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. So as to explain the delay, the petitioner has cited primarily two grounds. First, it is contended that the tax consultant engaged by the petitioner- company failed to take the appropriate steps in this matter. Secondly, the medical condition of the petitioner's minor daughter is sought to be urged, which according to the petitioner, constitutes sufficient cause for this Court to exercise its extraordinary juri iction and condone the considerable delay of 685 days and 429 days in the respective petitions.
We find that the ground urged in regard to the failure of the tax consultant remains unsubstantiated, as no communication has been placed on record showing that the petitioner-company ever called upon the consultant to explain his failure nor is there any material to show that any proceedings were initiated against him for the said lapse which is now sought to be cited as an explanation for the delay.
Insofar as the medical condition of the daughter of the promoter of the petitioner-company is concerned, we are constrained to observe that the role of the promoter was to issue necessary instructions for taking recourse to the statutory remedy of an appeal. Moreover, there is nothing on record to suggest that the said promoter was the sole person taking care of the company or that other directors/promoters of the company were not able to take steps or issue necessary instruction for filing an appeal within the prescribed time period. W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 9 of 14
At this stage, we may note the observations of the Co-ordinate OnLine Del 646, which read as under:
“64. A careful reading of the aforesaid decision would bring to the fore that the legislative intention to provide a specific period of limitation, thereby excluding the general applicability of the Limitation Act, 1963, must be respected. The Supreme Court has observed that the plenary powers of the High Court cannot in any case exceed the juri ictional powers under article 142 of the Constitution of India, and even the Supreme Court cannot extend the period of limitation de hors the provisions contained in any statutory enactment.
Section 107(4) firstly prescribes a general time frame within which an appeal may be preferred. Once that period has elapsed, it stipulates that the appeal may be instituted within a further period of one month. The provision thus prescribes an additional period of one month within which an appeal may be instituted. That section however stops at that and does not allude to aspects such as sufficient cause or other similar factors which may have prevailed and led to the appeal not being lodged within the time prescribed. The provision thus clearly excludes the general principles which the law recognises as relevant for the purposes of condonation of delay. It is this facet of section 107(4) which appears to have weighed upon various High Courts to hold that the said provision excludes the principles underlying section 5 and other provisions concerned with condonation contained in the Limitation Act. It is this facet which triggers section 29 of the Limitation Act and results in the exclusion of the W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 10 of 14 other provisions governing condonation contained in that statute. xxx
Likewise, the Allahabad High Court in Yadav Steels v. Additional Commissioner [(2024) 129 GSTR 308 (All); 2024 SCC OnLine All 2396.] dealt with a matter wherein the appeal was filed 66 days after the expiry of the additional one-month period, making it ineligible for condonation, decision of the appellate authority that refused to entertain it in view of section 107(4) was upheld. Emphasizing the significance of the statutory limitations in tax laws, particularly in the context of the CGST Act, it was also pointed out that limitation provisions are crucial in ensuring the timely resolution of disputes, promoting legal certainty, and facilitating efficient tax compliance. It was held that given the complexity of tax laws and the potential for disputes between taxpayers and authorities, such provisions establish a structured framework that prevents undue delays and ensures fiscal stability. It was thus observed that section 107 of the CGST Act, being a self- contained provision, prescribes a specific limitation period for filing appeals, reflecting the legislative intent to expedite dispute resolution and by setting strict time-limits, the provision ensures that tax-related matters are adjudicated without unnecessary delays, thereby enhancing administrative efficiency and revenue certainty. It was held that section 5 of the Limitation Act generally allows for extensions in exceptional cases but its application is expressly excluded in taxation statutes where specific time frames are prescribed.
That being the legal position, we unhesitatingly find that the decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Mukul Islam v. Assistant Commissioner of Revenue [(2024) 129 GSTR 313 (Cal); 2024 SCC OnLine Cal W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 11 of 14 8544.] wherein the court overturned the order that had rejected the appeal holding that the CGST law does not explicitly exclude the Limitation Act as also the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Venkateswara Rao Kesanakurti v. State of Andhra Pradesh [(2025) 140 GSTR 440 (AP); 2024 SCC OnLine AP 3905.] , wherein it was held that Limitation Act is applicable to condone the delay in filing
the appeal beyond one month under the CGST Act, cannot be of any assistance to the petitioners.
In summary, the power to condone delay caused in pursuing a statutory remedy would always be dependent upon the statutory provision that governs. The right to seek condonation of delay and invoke the discretionary power inhering in an appellate authority would depend upon whether the statute creates a special and independent regime with respect to limitation or leaves an avenue open for the appellant to invoke the general provisions of the Limitation Act to seek condonation of delay. The facility to seek condonation can be resorted provided the legislation does not construct an independent regime with respect to an appeal being preferred. Once it is found that the legislation incorporates a provision which creates a special period of limitation and proscribes the same being entertained after a terminal date, the general provisions of the Limitation Act would cease to apply.
In view of the forgoing discussion, as it is evident that each of the appeals was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation provided by sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the CGST Act, the aforesaid writ petitions lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.” (emphasis supplied)
W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 12 of 14
It is important to take note of the decision of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the matter of Abhishek Trading Corporation vs Commissioner (Appeals) [2024] 159 taxmann.com 763 (Allahabad), the relevant observations of which are reproduced as under:
“7. The Central Goods and Services Act is a special statute and a self-contained code by itself. Section 107 of the Act has an inbuilt mechanism and has impliedly excluded the application of the Limitation Act. It is trite law that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will apply only if it is extended to the special statute. Section 107 of the Act specifically provides for the limitation and in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Accordingly, one cannot apply Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the aforesaid provision.”
A reference could also be made to the decision of a three Judge Bench of Hon’ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Hindustan Machine Tolls Limited, 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 18790, wherein it was held as under:
“19. The power conferred under Articles 226/227 is designated to effectuate the law, to ensure that rule of law is enforced and the statutory authorities and other organs of the State act in accordance with law. It is not to be invoked whereby authorities are directed to act contrary to law. Wherever, the extent of condonable period is specifically prescribed by a statute, it would not be appropriate even under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution to entertain the writ petition so as to breach the express provision in the statute and act contrary to the mandate of the legislature. It is for the legislature to prescribe the limits or not W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 13 of 14 to do so for condoning the delay. Exercise of extraordinary writ juri iction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India would amount to doing violence to the statutory provision and rendering the same otiose. In other words, the legislative intent is clear that the Parliament never intended that delay beyond specified period in filing the appeal could be condoned. It is not for the High Court to re-write the statute in the garb of exercise of its juri iction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. The view which has been expressed by us herein above, is supported by various judicial precedents.”
In view of the aforesaid judgments, we have no hesitation to hold that the delay cannot be condoned by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 beyond the period prescribed under the Act, viz., the initial period of three months with the further condonable period of one month. Once such period has expired, High Court cannot in exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India condone delay, especially of 685 and 429 days, as the same would lead to going contrary to the scheme of the Act.
In the present cases, the Order-in-Original in W.P.(C) No. 2613 of 2026 was passed on 27th December, 2023, and the Order-in-Original in W.P.(C) No. 3109 of 2026 was passed on 24th August, 2024. The delay sought to be condoned by this Court in both the petitions are substantial. Having regard to the scheme of the statute and Section 107 of the Act and the fact that strict deadlines in tax matters help in ensuring efficient administration and revenue certainty, we are not inclined to condone such inordinate delays. W.P.(C) 2613/2026 & 3109/2026 Page No. 14 of 14
Accordingly, the present petitions lack merit and are dismissed with Costs.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
A copy of this judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE (JUDGE)
AJAY DIGPAUL (JUDGE)
MARCH 25, 2026/ay/sk
Reproduced from the public record of the Delhi High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.