Baljeet Singh And Anr vs. Santosh Bhutani

The present Rent Control Revision Petition, filed under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 19581, read with Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, assails the Judgement dated 22.03.20222 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi3, in the Eviction Petition, being RC/ARC No. 961/20194. 2. By way of the Impugned Judgement, the Application filed by the Petitioners seeking leave to defend came to be dismissed and an Eviction Order, with respect to Shop No. 4932/7, Fataknamak, Hauz

Smt. Santosh Bhutani6, the Respondent herein, instituted the Eviction Petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the DRC Act, seeking eviction of the Petitioners from the Subject premises, which was let out to the Petitioners.

In the Eviction Petition, the Respondent pleaded that she was the owner of the Subject premises, having derived title thereto through a registered Will dated 19.08.20007, executed by her mother, Smt. Vidyawati. It was further pleaded that the Subject premises had initially been let out by the Respondent’s mother to the father of the Petitioners, Late Sh. Rajinder Singh Jolly, and that the Respondent had subsequently become entitled to the premises, after the demise of their father.

It is stated that the Eviction Petition was allegedly founded upon the bona fide requirement of the Respondent for the purpose of settling her son, Sh. Pawan Bhutani, who, according to the Respondent, did not have any other shop or business premises from which he could carry on business and earn his livelihood.

The Respondent pleaded that she herself had no source of income and that the Subject premises was required to enable her son to commence/establish his business.

Along with the Eviction Petition, the Respondent placed on record, inter alia, the documents relied upon in support of her alleged

Upon receipt of summons in the Eviction Petition, the Petitioners filed their Application seeking leave to defend, accompanied by their respective affidavits, disputing the case set up by the Respondent.

The Petitioners raised, inter alia, objections concerning the Respondent’s title to the subject premises, the relationship of landlord and tenant, and the bona fide requirement pleaded for her son. The Petitioners also placed material before the learned ARC concerning the alleged business activities of Sh. Pawan Bhutani and the occupation and use of other portions of the property.

In particular, the Petitioners placed on record material relating to the business being carried on by Sh. Pawan Bhutani under the name and style of “Jai Durga Enterprises” from the first floor of the Subject premises, and also referred to material concerning other business activities carried on by members of the Respondent’s family. The Petitioners accordingly sought leave to contest the Eviction Petition on the basis of the grounds raised in their Application seeking leave to defend and the material placed on record before the learned ARC. Subsequently, a Reply to the leave to defend Application came to be filed by the Respondent.

The learned ARC, after considering the pleadings and material placed on record, proceeded to adjudicate the Application seeking leave to defend and, vide Judgment dated 22.03.2022, i.e., the Impugned Judgement, the learned ARC dismissed the Application seeking leave to defend and allowed the Eviction Petition filed by the RC.REV. 178/2022

Consequently, an Eviction Order came to be passed in favour of the Respondent, directing the Petitioners to hand over possession of the Subject premises to the Respondent. The Petitioners, being aggrieved by the Impugned Judgement, instituted the present Revision Petition.

On the first date of hearing of the present Petition, this Court, vide Order dated 28.07.2022, issued Notice to the Respondent and, in the interregnum, stayed the execution of the Impugned Order.

During the pendency of the present Revision Petition, the Respondent passed away. Thereafter, the question of bringing her legal representatives on record arose. The matter was also taken up in connection with an Application seeking fixation of user and occupation charges.

This Court, vide Order dated 10.12.2024, recorded that the Respondent had passed away and that her son was the surviving legal heir. The Court further directed the learned counsel for the Petitioners to take appropriate steps for bringing the legal representative of the Respondent on record.

By the same Order, this Court also dealt with the question of user and occupation charges. The user and occupation charges were fixed at Rs. 25,000/- per month for the period commencing from 22.09.2022 to 30.11.2024 and at Rs. 30,000/- per month from 01.12.2024 onwards.

Significantly, the interim protection granted by this Court on 28.07.2022 was directed to continue subject to payment of the said RC.REV. 178/2022

Thereafter, despite opportunities having been granted on several occasions, the Petitioners did not take steps for filing the Application for impleadment of the legal representatives of the deceased Respondent.

Subsequently, on 26.02.2026, the learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) passed an Order recording that the matter remained pending for payment of costs of Rs. 2,000/- and for filing the Application for impleadment of the legal representatives of the deceased Respondent. The Order further recorded that, despite repeated opportunities granted vide Orders passed by learned Joint Registrar (Judicial) dated 11.02.2025, 05.05.2025, 28.08.2025 and 27.11.2025, the Petitioners had failed to take steps for filing the aforesaid Application.

The aforesaid Order also records that the present Petition, owing to the requirement of impleadment of the Legal Representative of the Respondent, had not been placed before this Court for more than a year and, consequently, directed that the matter be placed before this Court on 07.04.2026 for further directions.

On 07.04.2026, when the present matter was taken up for hearing by this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners sought adjournment. Consequently, the matter was re- notified to be listed on 09.07.2026 before this Court.

On 09.07.2026, the present matter was taken up for hearing and, with the consent of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties, was taken up for final disposal.

At this juncture, this Court deems it apposite to note that on 09.07.2026, the learned counsel appearing for the parties were RC.REV. 178/2022

Accordingly, the present matter is being considered and adjudicated on the basis of the submissions advanced by learned counsel during the course of hearing on 09.07.2026, the documents placed across the Bar and the material available on record.

Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent would submit that no surviving lis remains for adjudication in the present proceedings since the Eviction Order under challenge has already been executed in accordance with law.

Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject premises has been handed over to the Respondent on 13.10.2025 pursuant to the Warrants of Possession issued by the learned Executing Court. It would, therefore, be contended that the relief sought in the present Petition has already been effectuated and nothing further survives for consideration.

Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that it is no longer res integra that where peaceful possession of the tenanted premises has already been restored to the landlord in execution of the Eviction Order, the Revision Petition challenging such Eviction Order becomes infructuous.

Learned counsel for the Respondent would submit that the aforesaid position of law stands squarely covered by the Judgment of this Court in Gulzar Singh & Anr. v. Raj Rani & Ors.

The said

Learned counsel for the Respondent, to further substantiate the aforesaid contention, would place reliance upon the subsequent Judgment of this Court in Noor Ahmad & Anr. v. Mohd. Sadiq9, to submit that, in materially similar circumstances, the tenant’s Revision Petition was dismissed as infructuous after the subject premises had been restored to the landlord through execution proceedings.

It would be submitted that this Court in Noor Ahmad (supra) specifically considered the contention that the Revision Petition ought nevertheless be decided on merits and, after examining the Judgments relied upon by the tenant, declined to undertake such an exercise once possession had been recovered by the landlord in accordance with law.

Learned counsel for the Respondent would, thereafter, draw the attention of this Court to the Order dated 23.09.2025, whereby the learned Executing Court issued Warrants of Possession, pursuant to which the Bailiff executed the Warrants on 13.10.2025 and delivered vacant and peaceful possession of the subject premises to the Decree Holder. The said Order was placed across the Bar for perusal of this Court.

Learned counsel would also draw the attention of this Court to the Order dated 07.11.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court, whereby the execution proceedings were expressly recorded as having been satisfied, and lawful and peaceful possession having been transferred to the Respondent through her legal heir. The aforesaid Order was also placed across the Bar for perusal of this Court.

Learned counsel for the Respondent would accordingly submit, relying upon the aforesaid Decisions of this Court and in the backdrop of the subsequent developments in the present case, that any adjudication upon the merits of the grounds raised in the present Petition would amount to an exercise in determining a purely academic question.

Learned counsel for the Respondent would thus submit that the Respondent, having already obtained possession, pursuant to the Eviction Order, in accordance with law, no effective relief can now be granted to the Petitioners in the present proceedings and, accordingly, that the present Revision Petition be dismissed as having become infructuous.

Per contra, learned counsel for the Petitioners would be forthright in submitting that although vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject premises has already been delivered to the legal heir of the Respondent, however, the present Petition has not become infructuous merely on account of possession of the Subject premises having been obtained by the Respondent pursuant to the execution proceedings.

Learned counsel for the Petitioners would contend that the present Petition challenges the legality of the Eviction Order passed by the learned ARC and that the grounds urged in the present Petition raise substantive issues which warrant consideration by this Court and, accordingly, would submit that the present Petition ought to be considered on merits and the Impugned Judgement be set aside.

Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, would submit that the challenge on merits, is confined to the finding returned by the learned ARC with respect to the bona fide requirement pleaded RC.REV. 178/2022

Learned Counsel for the Petitioners would submit that the learned ARC has erred in concluding that the Respondent had established a bona fide requirement, particularly since the case set up in the Eviction Petition was founded upon bona fide requirement that the Subject premises were required to enable the Respondent to settle one of her sons, Mr. Pawan Kumar Bhutani, by facilitating the commencement of business.

Learned Counsel would submit that the aforesaid basis of the alleged bona fide requirement was subsequently departed from by the Respondent in her Reply to the Application seeking leave to defend. It would be submitted that the Petitioners had specifically brought to the notice of the learned ARC, that Mr. Pawan Kumar Bhutani, for whose benefit the bona fide requirement was originally pleaded, was already carrying on business in the name and style of “Jai Durga Enterprises” for the past 15 years, and that the said business was being conducted from the first floor of the Subject premises itself.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioners would further submit that documents pertaining to the GST registration and returns of the said firm were also placed on record before the learned ARC, wherein Mr. Pawan Kumar Bhutani was reflected as the sole proprietor of the said firm. It would, therefore, be contended that the material placed before the learned ARC directly contradicted the basis upon which the bona fide requirement had originally been pleaded.

Learned Counsel for the Petitioners would submit that, only after the aforesaid facts were brought to the notice of the learned ARC, did the Respondent acknowledge that her son was already carrying on the said business and, accordingly, altered the basis of the RC.REV. 178/2022

In rejoinder submissions, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent, controverting the aforesaid submissions, would submit that the Reply to the Application seeking leave to defend forms part of the pleadings and constitutes material forming part of the record before the learned ARC, on the basis of which the Eviction Petition was adjudicated.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent would submit that there was no departure from, or abandonment of, the bona fide requirement pleaded in the Eviction Petition, rather the Respondent merely elaborated upon the requirement in response to the grounds sought to be raised by the Petitioners in their Application seeking leave to defend, including the facts brought on record by the Petitioners themselves.

Learned Counsel for the Respondent, therefore, would submit that the learned ARC committed no error in returning a finding in favour of the Respondent on the aspect of bona fide requirement, the said finding having been arrived at upon an overall consideration of the pleadings and material available on record. It would, accordingly, be submitted that the present Petition, insofar as it assails the finding of bona fide requirement, is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.

This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and, with their able assistance, perused the material available on record, including the Judicial Orders and precedents placed across the Bar.

For the sake of convenience and clarity, the ensuing discussion is arranged under separate headings corresponding to the principal

It is made clear that the said headings are merely intended to facilitate the orderly appreciation of the reasoning and are not to be construed as creating isolated distinction between the issues. The Judgment is to be read as a whole, and the findings recorded under each heading shall be understood in the context of, and in conjunction with, the findings and reasoning contained in the other parts of the Judgment.

The principal question which arises for consideration, in the backdrop of the alleged subsequent developments in the present case, is whether a Rent Control Revision Petition challenging an Eviction Order under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act can be disposed of as being rendered infructuous, when the Eviction Order has been lawfully executed and pursuant thereto, vacant and peaceful possession of the tenanted premises has been restored to the landlord.

The aforesaid question necessarily invites, at the outset, the consideration of this Court to the legal position in context of the effect of the delivery of peaceful possession of tenanted premises to the landlord pursuant to execution of the Eviction Order. The said aspect has received consideration by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as by this Court in a consistent line of authorities, which shall now be adverted to. RC.REV. 178/2022

In N.C. Daga v. Inder Mohan Singh Rana10, the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of a challenge to the Judgment of this Court affirming the decision of the learned Rent Controller declining leave to defend in an Eviction Petition instituted under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. During the pendency of the said proceedings, the possession of the tenanted premises had already been taken pursuant to execution of the Eviction Order. In view of the aforesaid development during the pendency, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to examine the rival contentions any further, observing that, once possession had been taken pursuant to execution of the Order permitting eviction, such an exercise “would amount to rendering a decision on a purely academic question”. The relevant portion thereof, being Paragraph No. 6, reads as under:

The aforesaid principle was subsequently reiterated in the Judgement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vinod Kumar Verma v. Manmohan Verma11, where, upon being informed that possession of the premises had already been taken over by the landlord, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that nothing further survived in the Appeals and accordingly disposed of the same as being infructuous. The aforesaid

The aforesaid principle was also directly applied by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in circumstances materially analogous to those obtaining in the present case, and the conclusion so arrived came to be affirmed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

In Neelam Sharma v. Ekant Rekhan12, a Revision Petition arose from an Eviction Order passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act and, during the pendency of the Revision, possession of the subject premises had been taken over by the landlord in execution proceedings. Taking note of the said subsequent development, the Coordinate Bench of this Court held that the Revision Petition had become infructuous. The relevant observation reads as under:

Significantly, the aforesaid Judgment was thereafter carried in challenge before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neelam Sharma v.

Having thus noticed and considered the aforesaid Judgements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it would now be apposite to examine the manner in which the aforesaid principle has been interpreted, developed and consistently applied by this Court in the context of Revision Petitions arising under the DRC Act.

This Court is conscious of the fact that the question, at hand in the present case, has, over the years, engaged the attention of this Court on numerous occasions, resulting in a substantial and consistent body of judicial authority. It would serve little purpose to burden the present Judgment by traversing each decision rendered on the subject. The authorities noticed hereinafter are, therefore, not intended to be exhaustive, but are illustrative of the consistent judicial approach adopted by this Court and sufficiently represent the manner in which the question has been considered and dealt with in successive decisions.

In Mohd. Akram v. Nafisa Begum14, a Coordinate Bench of this Court, most recently, was faced with a similar circumstance. The said matter also arose from a Revision Petition under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act challenging an Eviction Order passed under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. During the pendency of the Revision Petition, it was confirmed before the Court that possession of the demised premises had already been handed over to the landlord. After noticing the Judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.C. Daga (supra) and Vinod Kumar Verma (supra), the Coordinate Bench held that the Revision Petition had become infructuous. The relevant observations are contained in Paragraph No. 9 of the said Order, which reads as under:

A similar view of taken by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Nathi Lal Chaurasia (since deceased through LR) v. Sushila Devi Jain & Anr.15 reiterated that where an Eviction Order has gained fruition and has been implemented through execution proceedings resulting in the landlord obtaining possession in accordance with law, the Revision Petition challenging such Order becomes infructuous. The relevant portion of the said Judgement reads as under:

Likewise, in Gulzar Singh & Anr. (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon noticing that possession of the tenanted premises had already been restored to the landlords in execution of the Warrant of Possession, held the Revision Petition to have become infructuous.

The Coordinate Bench, in holding so, relied upon the decision of this Court in Om Prakash Ashok Kumar & Sons v. Ajay Khurana16, which in turn relied various Judgements and Orders of this Court, inter alia, in Poonam Bangia v. Harbhagwan Dass Chandiramani17, Mange Ram v. Rajesh Narain Goel18 and Ram Avtar v. Anuradha Shukla19. The relevant portion thereof read as under:

Accordingly, in view of the above observations made in the judgment dated 26.07.2024 passed in RC.REV. 284/2023 and as the possession of the tenanted premises has already been restored RC.REV. 178/2022

The aforesaid Judgments, though not exhaustive, sufficiently demonstrate the consistency with which the aforesaid principle has been recognised and applied by this Court. This consistent judicial approach leaves no room for doubt that the legal position in this regard is now well settled and can no longer be regarded as res integra.

The legal position, therefore, which emerges from the aforesaid

In such circumstances, the Revisional Court is no longer in a position to grant any meaningful or executable relief against an Eviction Order which has already attained fruition through execution. Where no independent or surviving relief otherwise preserves a live controversy between the parties, the Revision Petition would consequently be liable to be dismissed as having become infructuous.

It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid legal position that the subsequent developments in the present case fall for consideration.

In the present case, the Eviction Order passed by the learned ARC was stayed by this Court vide Order dated 28.07.2022. The said RC.REV. 178/2022

The aforesaid position, however, subsequently underwent a material change. Learned counsel appearing for the Respondent has placed across the Bar, an Order dated 23.09.2025 passed by the learned Executing Court, which records that the interim protection granted by this Court had ceased to operate on account of non- payment of the stipulated user and occupation charges, in terms of the Order dated 10.12.2024 of this Court. The learned Executing Court, consequently, proceeded to issue Warrants of Possession in respect of the Subject premises. The relevant portion of the said Order reads as under: “…It is submitted in the affidavit that stay order/interim protection granted by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been vacated as no payment of rent has been received from JD. Warrants of possession is pressed accordingly. Issue Warrants of Possession against the JDs on filing of PF as well as an affidavit of the DH to the effect that there is no stay against the eviction order, within 07 working days, returnable for 07.11.2025.”

The Warrants of Possession were thereafter executed by the Bailiff on 13.10.2025 and, consequently, vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject premises was delivered to the Respondent. RC.REV. 178/2022

In the considered view of this Court, the aforesaid developments are not merely collateral to the controversy before this Court, but goes to the very substratum of the relief sought in the present Revision.

The Impugned Eviction Order has, in the interregnum, been acted upon through the process of execution, culminating in the legal heir of the Respondent obtaining vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject premises. Therefore, the very relief which was sought to be interdicted by the present Petition has already been effectuated through execution.

It is equally significant to note that the said possession was neither voluntarily surrendered by the Petitioners nor obtained otherwise than through due process of law. The possession was delivered pursuant to Warrants of Possession issued by the learned Executing Court and was thereafter expressly recorded as having been handed over to the Decree Holder i.e., the legal heir of the RC.REV. 178/2022

The present case thus falls squarely within the circumstances contemplated by the aforesaid line of authorities and the principles distilled therefrom. The Eviction Order has travelled beyond the realm of mere executability and has attained fruition through the process of execution, culminating in the Respondent obtaining vacant and peaceful possession of the Subject premises. The very relief which constituted the foundation of the Impugned Order has, therefore, already been effectuated in accordance with law.

In view of the foregoing discussion and the principles enunciated hereinabove, this Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the present Revision Petition has become infructuous and is liable to be dismissed on this ground.

The aforesaid conclusion, however, is sought to be resisted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners, who has raised an objection that, notwithstanding the subsequent delivery of possession, the present Revision ought nevertheless to be adjudicated on merits. The aforesaid contention, however, does not inspire the confidence of this Court.

The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in N.C. Daga (supra) assumes particular significance in this regard. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in circumstances where possession of the tenanted premises had already been obtained pursuant to execution of the Eviction Order, declined to enter into the finer details of the rival contentions, observing that, once possession had been taken in RC.REV. 178/2022

The distinction between an Eviction Order which is merely executable and one which has actually been executed is, therefore, material. It is not the mere existence or executability of the Eviction Order which renders the Revision infructuous; rather, it is the subsequent execution thereof, coupled with delivery of vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord pursuant thereto, which results in the relief sought in the Revision having already been effectuated.

In the present case, that stage has not only been reached but conclusively crossed. The Warrants of Possession have been executed, possession has been delivered, and the execution proceedings have thereafter been recorded as satisfied, rendering the present Petition, as already discussed, infructuous.

Ordinarily, having arrived at the aforesaid conclusion, no further adjudication on the merits of the challenge would be warranted. However, the Petitioners have pressed the merits of the present Petition and since the challenge is confined to the narrow issue of bona fide requirement, this Court, for the sake of completeness and without treating the same as the basis for disposal of the present Petition, deems it appropriate to examine the said limited contention sought to be raised by the Petitioners upon the merits of the present Petition.

Before proceeding to examine the said ground of challenge urged on behalf of the Petitioners, it would be apposite to advert to the RC.REV. 178/2022

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.20, Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh21, and, more recently, in Abid-Ul-Islam v. Inder Sain Dua22, has consistently held that the juri iction exercised by the High Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is supervisory and revisional in character and cannot be equated with the exercise of appellate juri iction.

The aforesaid principles have also been reiterated and relied upon by Coordinate Benches of this Court, inter alia, in Pankaj Pahwa v. Prem Wati & Ors.23, and Sanjeev Hiranandani v. Sunny Grover24. 81. In Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while elucidating the legislative intendment underlying Section 25-B of the DRC Act, observed that the omission of an appellate remedy against an Order passed by the learned Rent Controller is conscious and deliberate. The juri iction conferred upon the High Court is, therefore, one of superintendence over the decision-making process, including the legality and propriety thereof, and does not permit the High Court to substitute its own view for that of the learned Rent Controller merely because another view on the material available on record may be possible. The relevant observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court read as under:

In Pankaj Pahwa (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court, upon considering the principles enunciated in Abid-Ul-Islam (supra), reiterated that the juri iction exercised by this Court under the proviso to Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act is limited in scope and that this Court is not expected to substitute or supplant its view for that of the learned ARC/RC. The revisional scrutiny is confined to examining the decision-making process and determining whether the Impugned Order suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record or an absence of adjudication warranting interference.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the position which emerges is that, while exercising juri iction under the proviso to Section 25- B(8) of the DRC Act, this Court is neither required nor permitted to undertake a fresh appreciation of the material on record with a view to arrive at an independent conclusion on the merits of the dispute. Interference would be warranted only where the Impugned Orders suffer from a juri ictional error, manifest illegality, material irregularity or perversity, or where the conclusion arrived at by the learned ARC/RC is wholly unreasonable or founded upon an erroneous premise of law. RC.REV. 178/2022

It is within the aforesaid limited parameters of revisional scrutiny that the grounds urged on behalf of the Petitioners against the Impugned Order are required to be examined.

At this juncture, it is appropriate to notice the findings rendered by the learned ARC, with respect to the aspect of bona fide requirement of the Respondent. The relevant portion of the Impugned Judgement reads as under: “Bonafide requirement:-

The next element of Section 14 (1) (e) of the DRC Act is whether the need of the petitioner qua the tenanted premises is bonafide or not.

In this regard, it is stated that the petitioner is married and is having two sons, Kapil Bhutani and Pawan Kumar Bhutani. The petitioner, whose one son, namely Pawan Kumar Bhutani, whom the petitioner wants to settle in his life by doing some business and for this purpose, the present petition is filed on bonafide ground qua the tenanted shop. It is stated that the respondents are not using the tenanted shop in question and have occupied the same for nothing. But as per the information, the respondents are using the tenanted shop as godown.

In leave to defend application, it is stated by the respondents that Pawan Kumar Bhutani, for whose bonafide need, the present petition is filed, has been doing the business of trading of various items, i.e, tubes, pipes and hoses and fitting. For example - Joints, Elbows, Flanges of Plastic, Artificial Guts of Harden Protein, Rigid of Polymers of Ethylene, Tubes of Polythylene, Copper Tubes and Pipe Fittings, etc. for the last 15 years under the Name and Style of Jai Durga Enterprises, having its Principle office at 4932/7, Hauz Qazi, Delhi, from the first floor of the suit property and the said firm of Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani happens to be a Sole Proprietor and has been submitting its GST Returns with concerned authorities vide GST No. 07AAHP8849B1ZU. It is stated that the need of the petitioner is neither genuine nor bonafide as Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani is not dependent upon the petitioner, either financially or for accommodation because he is bachelor, i.e., unmarried. It is stated that the area where the tenanted premises is situated has become commercialized to the extent of upper floors also and as per the petition, the petitioner is in possession of entire first floor and the business activities are being In reply to leave to defend application filed by the petitioner, it has been admitted that Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani is doing business from the first floor of the premises in question. But since 2019, he wanted to start his business from the tenanted shop at ground floor which is convenient and comfortable for him to start business and to continue the business from the suitable premises in question at the ground floor and it is well settled that the landlord is not supposed to sacrifice his convenience and comfort for the sake of tenant. It is stated that Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani wants to start his business from the premises in question at ground floor. It is stated that it is well settled that reply to leave to defend is a part of pleadings. It is stated that the petitioner is entitled to decide how and in what manner he should start business and the petitioner is the best judge of his commercial requirement and has got complete freedom in the matter and the petitioner is to decide as to how he would like to start business comfortably. Neither can the tenant nor the Court dictate him in this aspect. Therefore, the ground taken by the respondents is only for the sake of defence, without having any substance. It is stated that it is a well settled law that the Court has to consider the entire material on record including supporting documents to take into consideration the case of the parties and if the tenants plea do not make out any case, then, leave to defend must be refused. It is stated that the Pawan Kumar Bhutani is unmarried and single. The need of the petitioner for her son is genuine and bonafide as the premises in question is convenient and suitable which is situated at the ground floor.

Having heard the arguments and perusal of entire material on record show that it is stated by the respondents in their leave to defend application that the petitioner has not disclosed the fact that Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani, for whose bonafide need, the present petition is filed, has been doing the business of trading of various items, i.e, tubes, pipes and hoses and fitting. For example - Joints, Elbows, Flanges of Plastic, Artificial Guts of Harden Protein, Rigid of Polymers of Ethylene, Tubes of Polythylene, Copper Tubes and Pipe Fittings, etc. for the last 15 years under the Name and Style of Jai Durga Enterprises, having its Principle office at 4932/7, Hauz Qazi, Delhi, from the first floor of the suit property and the said firm of Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani happens to be a Sole Proprietor and has been submitting its GST Returns with concerned authorities vide GST No. 07AAHP8849B1ZU. Therefore, the need of the petitioner is neither genuine nor bonafide because Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani is not dependent upon the petitioner, either financially or for accommodation because he is a bachelor/unmarried. It has further been submitted that the area where the tenanted shop is situated has become commercialized to the extent of upper floors also and the petitioner is in the possession of entire first floor and the business activities are being The petitioner in the petition has mentioned that she is married and is having two sons, namely, Kapil Bhutani and Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani and she has filed the present petition to settle her son Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani in his life by doing some business. She has also admitted in her reply to leave application that her son Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani is doing his business from the first floor of the tenanted premises. But since 2019, he wanted to start his business from the tenanted shop at ground floor which is convenient and comfortable for him to start business and to continue the business from the suitable premises in question at the ground floor.

In this regard, the Hon'ble High Court in Rajesh Jain v. Quazi Sammin Ahmad 2015 (2) RLR 438, has laid down that :- “since eviction was sought for commercial purposes, it was rightly held that ground floor of the property would be more suitable.” In another case titled as “Viran Wali Vs. Keldeep Rai Kochar, cited as 174 (2010) DLT 328”, it has been laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi that :- “any business which is being run from the ground floor will attract more customers than the business being run from the basement and the tenant can not dictate the landlord as to how and in what manner the landlord should use his own property.” Moreover, in Kanta Sachdeva & Ors. Vs. A.D. Choudhary bearing R.C. REV. No. 362/2011, it has been held that:- “The learned ARC has rightly observed that the upper floors’ halls cannot be used for setting up office for the son of the respondent and in any case, the office on the ground floor from where the sale is to be conducted, is more convenient than on the upper floor. He also observed, and rightly so, that the tenant cannot compel and dictate the landlord to set up the office for his son on the upper floor of the suit premises, which are undisputedly being used for storage of books. It cannot be disputed that the business of sale of books as also the office for the same can be better looked after and managed from the ground floor than from the upper floor. It is well known fact that office situated on the ground floor is more convenient than on the upper floors and the landlord/owner has all the rights and choices to have the business/office for himself or his family members in the premises which is more suitable and convenient, if the bonafide of the landlord is established.”

Further, the law regarding the bonafide need has been made clear by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case titled as “Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., reported as AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 100”, whereby it was held that : RC.REV. 178/2022

In the present petition, the petitioner has mentioned that she requires the tenanted shop for the bonafide need of her son, Sh. Pawan Kumar Bhutani, who wants to start his business and to continue the business from the tenanted shop at ground floor.

By applying the ratio of abovesaid judgments in the present matter, it can be said that the Court shall not doubt the bonafide need of the petitioner as asserted by her in her petition. It has also been established that the ground floor is more suitable place to start and to continue any business activity. Hence, it can be said that the petitioner has been able to establish her bonafide need qua the tenanted shop.” (Emphasis supplied)

A perusal of the aforesaid findings of the learned ARC makes it evident that the learned ARC was conscious of the contention raised by the Petitioners regarding the Respondent’s son, Mr. Pawan Kumar Bhutani, already carrying on business from the first floor of the Subject premises. The said aspect was expressly noticed and forms part of the reasoning returned by the learned ARC.

The learned ARC, however, proceeded to consider the distinction between the existing business being carried on from the first floor and the requirement pleaded for the ground-floor shop. After considering the material on record and the judgments relied RC.REV. 178/2022

Significantly, the learned ARC has not proceeded on the premise that the Respondent’s son was not carrying on any business. Rather, the existence of the said business was expressly noticed, and the requirement was adjudicated on the basis that the ground-floor premises were sought on the assertion that they would provide greater convenience and suitability for carrying on the business. The mere fact that the Respondent’s son was already carrying on business from the first floor, therefore, cannot by itself render the requirement pleaded by the Respondent not bona fide.

Further, the submission that the Respondent altered or resiled from the case set up in the Eviction Petition also does not, in the facts of the present case, disclose any ground warranting interference. The Reply to the Application seeking leave to defend forms part of the pleadings and was therefore a part of the record and the learned ARC was entitled to consider the pleadings and material placed before it as a whole. The subsequent clarification that the ground-floor premises were sought for greater convenience and suitability in carrying on the existing business cannot, by itself, be characterised as a withdrawal of the original plea of bona fide requirement.

The contention of the Petitioners, therefore, essentially seeks to invite this Court to re-appreciate the material on record and arrive at a different conclusion as to whether the existing accommodation on the first floor was sufficiently suitable for the Respondent’s son. Such an exercise, particularly in the absence of any perversity or manifest RC.REV. 178/2022

The learned ARC has, therefore, considered the precise objection now sought to be urged by the Petitioners and has returned a reasoned finding upon the same. No juri ictional error, perversity, material irregularity or manifest illegality is discernible in the approach adopted by the learned ARC so as to warrant interference in the present proceedings.

In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no merit in the challenge raised by the Petitioners on the aspect of bona fide requirement. The Impugned Judgement does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference in exercise of the limited revisional juri iction of this Court under Section 25-B(8) of the DRC Act.

Thus, even upon the limited examination undertaken hereinabove, this Court finds no merit in the challenge to the finding of bona fide requirement returned by the learned ARC.

The aforesaid examination, however, does not alter the primary

In view of the principles delineated herein before, application thereof to the facts of the present case and the foregoing discussion thereupon, the present Revision Petition is dismissed as having RC.REV. 178/2022

It is made clear that the observations made hereinabove, on the merits of the present Petition, are only for the sake of completeness and shall not be construed as the basis for the disposal of the present Petition.

The present Petition, along with all pending Application(s), if any, stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.

There shall be no Order as to the Costs.