Dr. Pachipala Namratha @ Athaluri Namratha vs. The Union Of INDIA

The instant writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner seeking the following reliefls, viz., ..lo issue a wril, order or direction, more payticularll' 7-he writ of certiorori, lo call for records and sel asitle the arrest of the pelilioner dated l2'h February. 2026 ul the hands of the respondent No.2 by declaring the arrasr of the petilioner to be arbitrary and wholly non-est, illegal, unconr'tilulional, morc particularly in violation of Scction l9 of the Prevention o.[ Money LaunderingAct. 20(.)2. rLnd in violation of Articles ll, 2l and 22 of the Ct'nstiturion of India, and thereby quosh the entire proceedtngs rclating thereto including the aruest order dated l2h Februrtry, 2026 pa.ssed by respondent No.2 and all subsequenl agai st lhe petil ioner he re in. Further, quash and set aside the orders dated l)'t' l:ebruary 2026 and all furthcr orders of remond, passed by, the Spacial Sessions Judgc.t'or Prevention of Money l.aundering ,4 cr, Nampallv, Hyderabad. Direct Jbrthwith release of the petitioner fron custody as her further incarcerotion would be anathema to lay, and gravely delrimental to the cause ofiustice,. Issue this ony other writ(s) order(s), or direction(.s), that the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumslances ol the case in the interest ofpelitioner.' 2 3 4

The lacts ol the case are that the petitioner is a medical practitioner (fertility speciatist) presently lodged at Chanchalguda Central Jail. The matter is stated to have originated from a complaint Iodged by one Sonia at Gopalapuram Police Station on 25.07.2025, leading to registration of FIR No. 147 of 2025 under Section 6l(2),316, 318, 335, 336 and 340 ofthe Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (for short 'BNS') and the petitioner was arrested by the police personnel on 27.01 .2025 with remand to judicial custody. Thereafter, the said Police Station is stated to have registered multiple FIRs on similar cause of action nanrely FIR Nos. 150 to 157 of 2025, and all such FIRs were later transferred to CCS Police Station and renumbered as FIR Nos'94 to 102 ol 2025 with additional invoked provisions including the provisions of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act,202l (for short the 'Act of 2021') and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection ol Children) Act, 2015 (for short the 'JJ Act').

Based on the aforesaid predicate FIRs, respondent No.2 is stated to have recorded an ECIR bearing No.ECIR/HYZO|46/2025, dated 08.09.2025, on certain scheduled offences. Pursuant thereto, the f

The petitioner states that while in custody. summons dated 24.10.2025 were issued and the statement was recorded on the same day under coercion and without effective access to legal assistance. Subsequently, the petitioner was summoned again on 06.02.2026 to appear on 11.02.2026 and was called again on 12.02.2026, on which date the petitioner was arrested under Section 19 of the PI\{LA. According to the petitioner, the arrest and remand are illegal and unconstitutional due to non-compliance with the statutory safeguards envisaged under Section 19 of thc PMLA. .#

Learned Senior Counset for the petitioner contended that the power of anest under Section 19 of the PMLA is not an investigative toot but an exceptional power conditioned upon thq authorized OIficer lorming an independent and bona fide 'reasons to believe'on the basis of ,material in possession' that is capable ol translating into admissible evidence, that the arrestee is guilty of the offence of money laundering. Mere suspicion, unverified allegations or a mechanical reproduction of the grounds of arrest cannot satisff this statutory thrcshold rather, the ,rcasons to believe, must disclose a rational nexus between specific rnaterial and the alleged proceeds of crime and the petitioner's conscious involvement in money laundering activity' [n the absence oi such tangible, corroborated material showing a scheduled offence generating proceeds of crime and a demonstrable laundering process attributable to the petitioner, any arrest purportedty to unearth facts or aid investigation is contrary to law and vitiated as an arbitrary and colourable exercise of power, offending the safeguards built into Section 19 of the PMLA and the constitutional guarantee under Article 22(l)' In support of his argument, the leamed Senior Counsel relied on paragraph Nos'3 l ' 32 f

On the nccessitt to satisJj the prcconditk;ns mentit,ned in Section l9(l) ofthe PMl, Act, u,,e hav quoted lron the judgrne nt of this Court in Padon Narain ,.lgganval [(.'nion of tndia v l>adam Norain Aggarwal, (2008) I I ,SC(-' JOj (2009 I SCC (Cr,) t J and atso refcrred lo qnd quotcd [rom the Canaditn judgment in Gffird [G ifford v Kelson. (1913) 5 t ttlan. R l20J Existence and validity of the "reesons to belieye" goes lo the root of the power to orrcst. The .rubjective opinion of tlrc arresting oificer must be founded and based upon fair and objcctive consideration of lhe material, as available with them on the date o.f arrest. On thc rcading ol the "reasons to believe tltc courl ntusl form the "secondaty opinion" on the validitl, of the exerci.te undcrtaken lor compliancc of Section l9( l) of the Pl,lL Act u,hcn the arrcst las made The ,'reasons to believe,, thot the person is guilty of an of[cnce under the pML Act should be fbunded on the materiul in thc.lorm o.[ documents and oral statemenls. ' 1ZOzS7 Z Supreme Court Cases 248

DoE has drawn our oltention lo the use of the expression "material in possession" in Seclion l9(l) of the PML Act instead of "evidence in possession". Though etymologically correct, this orgltnent overlooks lhe requirement lhat the designale.d olfcer should and nust. based on the material, reach and form an opinion thal the arrestee is guilty of the offence under the PML Acl Guill can only be esroblisheel on admissible evidence to be led before the court, and cannot be based on inadnissible evidence. While there is an elemenl of hypothesis, as oral evidence has nol been led and the documenls are lo be proven. the decision lo arresl should be rational' lair and as per lav'. Power ltt arresl under Seclion l9(l) is nol for the purpose of invesligalion. ./lrresl can and should vvait' and the power in terms 01' Section t9(l) o.f the PMLAct can be exercised only when the material vilh lhe tle.';ignuted fficcr cnables them to -[orm an opinion' bv recording reasons in wriling that lhe orrestee is guilty. " '... Reliance is also placed by the learned Senior Counsel for the "

In this regard, we may note that, though the appellants did not alLege colourable exercise of power or mala fdes or malice on the part of ED officials, they did ossert in categorical terms :hqt lheir orresls were u \tanlon ahuse o.f pot'e r authorih'und prccess by ['D which would tunlamounl to lhe same thing. On thal subject, we no)' ruJer lo the obserualions of this Court in State of Punjab v Gurdial ' QOzq\ I Supreme Court Cases 576 ( t

The question, then, is what is mala fdes in the iutisprudence of potver? Lcgal molice is gibheri.sh unless juristic ciarity keeps it separate ;t'rom the populttr concepl of personal vice' Pithily put' bad faith which invalidotes lhe exercise of power sonetimes called colourablc exercise ttr fraud on power ond oftentimes overlaps motives, passions and satisloctions is lhe allainment ofends beyond lhe sanctitmcd purpose\ of pott'ar b)' 'simulation or ltrclension oif gaininl; n lcgitimote goal. tf tha use of the pov'er is fo' the fu$lment of a legilimale obiect the actttolion or calolysalion bv malice is not legicidal.7he action is bad vhere the lrue objecl is lo reach on end di.fferent from the one for v'hich the pox'er is entrusted, goaded by extraneous considerotions, good or hod. but irrclevant to the enlruslmenl. When thc custodion of pover is inJluenced in ils exercise by consit)cralions outside lhose for prontolion of whith llrc power is vested thc courl calls it a colourable exercise and is uruleceived by illusion. ln a brood. blurred sense' Benionin Disraeli was not off the mark evcn in lat' t htn ha stuutl I rcltcut that all lower i'\ a lrusl lhol \ft arc accountublc for ils exert'isa -- thal. .[tom the people, and for thc people, oll springs' and all musl exisl' F ruud on power voids the order if it is nol exercised bona fde for thc cnd designed' Fraud in lhis context is nol equal lo moral lurpitude and embraces all cases in vthich the action impugned is to effect some ol'iecl which is beyond the purpose ond inlent of the power, whether this be malice- laden or even benign. tf the purpose is coruupl the rc-tullanl acl is bad. lf considcrations, foreign to lhe scope of the power o' exlroneous lo

Leamed Senior counsel ror the petitioner. further contended that respondent No.2 acted in a wholly mechanical manner and the arrest stands vitiated at its inception, inasmuch as the so-called 'grounds of arrest'and the'reasons to believe'are not founded or any demonstrable, cogent, admissible materiar and instead, are a bare verbatim replication of the statutory phraseology. It was submitted that rhe relevant paragraph supplied to the petitioner is conspicuously non_specific, does not disclose what material, what transaction, what role. what proceeds ol crime or what nexus is attributed personally to the petitioner and therefore fails the statutory safeguard which requires an .rresting officer to form and record a genuine ,reason to believe, based on material in possession and thereafier to inlorm personalized grounds that necessitated arrest. The relevant paragraph is producecl hereunder:

Therefore, based on the matarial available on retord. including FIRs, material seized during scurch operution, statentents recorded under Section 50 of the PMLA, bank statenenls, property rccords and other material collected during investigdtion, I have reoson to believe that you have been directly & actually involved iu the vorious processes & activitie.s conneclcd with proceeds qt crime t,iz.,

Further, he submitted that Section l9 of the pMLA is not an empty formality, since the provision uses the expression ,may arrest'. The Officer must not only record reasons but must also disclose concrete grounds showing why arrest was necessary in the lacts of the petitioner,s case which is general omnibus assertions merged with narration of facts, without any discemible and separate grounds tailored to the petitioner are impermissible. In support of his argument, the leamed Senior Counsel relied on the case of Pankaj Bansal (supra) to submit that the grounds of arrest must be fuLnished in writing to the arrestee belore production for remand. The paragraph Nos. 17 and 19 of the said judgment are reproduced hereunder:

At lhis stage. it rvould be apposite to consider lhe case law that does have relevance to these appeals and the issues under considerotion. ln lljay Madanlal Choudhary [Wjay Madanlsl Choudhary v. Union o/ India, (2023) l2 SCC I : 2022 SCC Online SC 929 : (2022) l0 Scale 5771 , a thrce-Judge Bench of this Court observed lhat Section 65 PillLA predicutes thar thc provisions of the Code of Criminal Pxscedurc, 1973, shall apply insofar as they ore not r(

This Court had occasion lo again consider lhc provisions of PMLA in V. Scnrhil Balaji v. Stare [V Senthil Batoji v. Srate, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) lJ , antl more parricularly' Section l9 thereof lt was noled lhal the authoriscd oficer is tt liberq' lo arresl the person concernecl once he fnds a rcason ro beLievc thdt he is guilty of an offence punishablc under thc 2002 Act but he nust olso perform lhc mandalory duty of recording reasons lt was pointed oul lhat lhis exercise has ro be followed hy the information ol the grounds of his arresl being servetl on the arreslee lt was ufiirmed thal il is the bounden duty of lhe authorisecl officer to record lhe reasons for his beliel that a Person is guilty and needs to be atested and il was observed lhat this safeguard is meant to Jacilitate an elemenl of fairness and accountab ilitY- "

Similarly, he placed reliance on paragraph No'209 of the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) to emphasize that the statutory design of Section 19 contains inbuilt safeguards of faimess, objectiviry and accountability, recording of reasons in writing based on material, communication of grounds of anest I

It was therefore submitted that whereas in the present case the 'reasons to believe'and the 'grounds ofarrest' are identically the same, it unmistakably reflects non-application of nlind and demonstrates either absence of real 'reasons to believe' or absence of lawful, specific 'grounds ofarrest'. Such duplication strikes at the root of Section l9 the compliance and renders the arrest illegat. The leamed Senior Counsel also relied on Pradir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Dethi){ to highlight the clear jurisprudential distinction between general 'reasons lor arrest' and the 'grounds of arrest' which must contain the basic facts in possession of the investigating agency that necessitated arrest and enable the arestee to oppose custodial remand and seek bail. Applying the same principle, it was submitted that 'reasons to believe'can never o lz'z+1 e Supreme Court Cases 254 .T

Further, the leamed Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner has been gravely prejudiced because of the mechanical .i --xdi

Learned Senior Counsel lor the petitioner contended that the remand was equally unsustainable since the Special Court, as required in law, ought to have applied judiciat mind and lormed a 'secondary opinion' on the validity of the reasons to believe and the Iegality of the arrest before authorizing custody. However, the remand order did not reflect any such judiciat scrutiny or finding, showing that the remand was mechanical and consequently the continued detention of the petitioner is illegal. In support of his argument' the leamed senior counsel relied on the case of Arvind Kej riwal (supra), wherein in paragraph Nos.14, 74,78 arrd 82, it hetd as under:

Pankaj Bansal [Panknj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576. (2024) 3 SCC (CrD a50l reiterotes V Senthil Balaji IV Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 5l . (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) ll to hold that the Mogistrale/court has the duty to ensure lhol the conditions in Section t9(l) o[ the PMt, Att ore tlul.v satisJied und , thot the arrest is valid and lawful. This is in lieu of the mandate ttnder Section 167 of the Code. If the court fails to discharge its du4, in right earnesl and with proper perspeclive, ll'e rL'mand order would lail on the ground thal lhe court cannot validate an unltl.r,ful arrest mat]e unclar StLtiry t9(l). The Court rclietl on Madhu Limaye, ln re [Madhu Limaye, ln re, (1969) I SCC 2921 , which held that it is necessary Ior lhe State tc ?stablish thot. ol lhe slage of remand, while directing detention n custody, lhe Magislrate has applied their mind to all rclevant tndtter.\. If the arrest itse( is unconst ilutional viz. Article 22(l) o.f the Constitulion, lhe remand would not curc the conslitutional infirmities allached Io such arresl. The principle stands expanded, as rhe violarion of Section l9(1) of the PML Act u,,ll equally vitiale the orrest.

It ha-s been strenuously urged on behalf of Arvinct Kejriwal thot lhc arresl u,ould lalter on the ground lhat lhe " reosons to believe" do nol mention and record reasons for :'n(cessiq, b arrcsl". The lerm "necessity to arresl" is not me,,lioned in Secrion l9(l) of the PML Act. However, this expressiot. has been givan judicial recognition in Arnesh Kumar v. Stale of Bihor [Arnesh Kumar v, Srate of Bihar, (2014) 8 S(:(: 273 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 4491 , which lays down that "nt'ccssit1, to arrest" musl be considered by an officer before arresting a pe rson. This Court observed thot the oficer must osk him.sclf the que.\lions - Why arresl?; ls it really necessary to arrcst2 : Whal purpose would it serve?; ond, Hrhat object would it achi,:ve?

Thus, lime and again, courts have emphasised thahthe power lo arresl musl be exercisecl cautiously to prevent .-.seyere ..d

Therefore, the issue which arises for consideralion is whelher the court while examining the validity ofarrest in terms of Section l9(l) of the PML Act will also go into and examine lhe necessity and need to arrest. ln other words, is lhe mere satisfaclion of the formal parameters lo atesl sufrcient? Or is the satisfaction of necessity and need lo arresl, beyond mere formol parameters, requircd? We would concede that such review might be conJlated with stipulations in Section 4l of the Code which lays dotvn certain conditions for the police to orresl wilhout warrant: (i) Section al(l)(b)(ii)(a) - preventing a person Ji'om co m m i tti ng furt he r offe nce. (ii) Section 4l(1)(b)(iil@ - proper irnestigation of the offence- (iii) Section l1(1)(b)(i0@ - preventing a person from disappearing or tampering with evidence in any manner (iv) Section 4l(1)@(ii)(d) - preventing the person from making any inducement or threat or promise to any person acquainled with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing suchfacts to the courl or police. Q) Section a1(l)(b)(ii)(e) - to ensure presence o/ the person in lhe court, whenever required, which without arrcsting cannot be ensured. )

When this uspecl t|u.s pointed oul to Mr' AR I'' Sundaresan' the Additional Solicitor General pointed out thal criminai lau' can be set into motion b)'any person Thal is a generol principle ol cr:iminal law' No one can dispute il, and we cerlainly are not going to do it lJ any criminal acl tokes place' it is certainly open lo any individual to bring il to lhe notice of police or appropriale aulhorities who are entilled to Page 25 ot66 register a complaint on these ospects. A perusal of the papers show lhat no complaint had been lodged with respect to any of the aforesaid Tlleged criminal oclivilies. The ED is not a suryr cop lo invesligale anything and everylhing which comes to its nolice. There should be a "criminul aclivity" rlhich ottracts thc rhedule ti PML,q. ord on account of such crininal activily, there should hove been "proceeds of crime ". It is only then the juri iction of ED commences. The terminus a quoJor the ED to commence its duties and exercise its powers is lhe exislence of a predicate olfence. Once there exisls a predicate offence, and the ED starts investigation under the PMLA, and file a conplaint, then il becomes o slond alone olfence. As long as there is no predicale offence, ED cannot plead thal since no one sel up the criminal law into molion, il will rely on thal doctrine and commence proceedings under the PMLA.

It is too well scttled lhat wherc an act has to be donc in a particular ltqt, il trtLrsl be dona in lhat v'oy and in no olher way. The PMLA demunds the existence ofa predicate offence. Il/hen there is no predicote offence, initiation of proceedings under PMLA is a non starter lf lhe argumenls of the Additional Solicilor General is accepled, then the ED on registration of an ECIR can conduc! a roving cnquiry with respecl to olher aspecls also. Thal is not the posilion of law. To put il pithily, no predicate offence, no action by ED.

A careful perusal o/ Secrion 66(2) of PMLA points out that if during the course of invesligation, lhe ED comes acrcss violations of olher proyisions of lav', then it cannol assume lhe role o/ investigating those ollences also. It is lo inlorm the appropriale agency, which is empowcred by low to investigote into thal offence. lf that Agency, on I i

The legislarive intcnt which can be gathered frorn the defrnilion of "scheduled offence " under clause (y) of sub-section (1.) of Section 2 PMLA is that every crine which nruy generate proce?ds of crime need not be a scheduled offence. Therefore, only cerlain speci,fic olfences have been included in the Schedule. Thus, iJ the subnissions of the learned Additional Solicitor General are acccpled, the Schedule will l I '1zOZl1 lS Supreme Court Cases 91

Reliance was also placed on Pankaj Bansal (supra) wherein in paragraph Nos.22 and 23 wherein it was held as under, viz., "

Madhu Limaye, In re fMadhu Limaye, In re, (1969) I SCC 292] was a three-Judge Bench decision of this Court wlwein it was observed that it tlould be necessary for the State to establish that, at the slage of remand, the Magistrate directed detention in jail custody after applying his mind to all relevant mauers and if the arrest suffered on the ground of violalion of Article 22(l)of the Constitution, the order of remand would not cure the constitutionol inrtrmities allaching lo such arrest. 23. l4ewed in lhis context, the remand order doted l5-6-2023 passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, reflecls tolal failure on his part in dischatging hi.r dug, as per the expected standard. The learned Judge did not even record a -finding lhat he perused the grounds of aruesl to ascertoin whether ED had recorded reasons to believe that the appellants were guilty of an offence under the 2002 Act ond lhal there was pmper compliance with the mandate of Section l9 PMLA. He merely stoted that. keeping in view lhe seriousness of the offences and the stage of the investigation, he was convinced that custodiol inteffogation of the ac<.used persons was required in the present case and rcmanded them to the custody of ED! The sentence - "h is further (sic) thor all the necessary mandates of law have been complied with" follors - "Il is the case of lhe prosecution...-" and appears to be a continuati()n thereof, as indicated by the word "further", and is not a recording hy the learned Judge of his own satisfaction to that elfect. " "

Arrest brings humiliation, curtails freedom and casls scars forever Lawmakers know it so also the police. There is a battle behteen lhe lmvmakers and the police and it seems thal the police hos not learnl its lesson . lhe lesson inplicit and embodied in CrPC. It has nol come out oI ils colonial image despile six decades of Independence, il is lorgely considered as a tool of harassment, oppression and surely not considered a friend of public. The need for caliion in exercising the draslic power of orrest has been emphasised time and again by lhe courls but has not yielded desired result. Power to arrest greatly contributes lo ils arrogance so also the failure of the Magislracy lo check it. Not only this, the power of arresl is one oJ the lucralive sources of police corruption. The altitude lo orrest rtr and then proceed wilh the resl is despicable. Il has become a handy tool to the police offcers who lack sensitivily or ocl with oblique motive'

Lastty, the leamed Senior Counsel lor the petitioner contended that the ED has wholty lailed to discharge the initial and loundational burden of proof that casts upon it under the PMLA, inasmuch as the very core requirement which are namely identification, quantification and linkage of the alteged proceeds ol crime to a specified criminal activity relatable to a scheduled / predicate offence has not been established even u {ZOt+) a Sy.Oreme Court Cases 273

On the contrary the learned Senior Standing Counsel for ED contended that the investigation has unearthed a sustained and organized pattemofseriousmisconductbythepetitionerreflectedinmultiple complaints pending since 20 t4 before the Telangana State Medical Councit alleging fraudulent surrogacy practices and child traflicking' In \ \ one such complaint in the year 2016, it was alleged that a childless couple was induced to undergo surrogacy on the assurance of receiving their biological child but a subsequent DNA test as undertaken during a foreign passport application process revealed that the child handed over was not biologically related to them, leading to suspension ol petitioner's medical license lor five years in 20 16. He further subrnitted that despite such suspension she continued surrogacy operations through her establishments, particularly lvTs.Universal Srusthi Irertility Research Centre (earlier Shrusthi Test Tube Baby Center), \'isakhapatnam, as conoborated by birth records obtained from the Registrar ol Births and Deaths, Visakhapatnam showing numerous deliveries during the period of suspension and by financial anatysis of bank accounls and Income Tax returns indicating substantial receipts thereby evidencing continued medical practice without a valid license. He also relied upon FIR No.299 of 2020 and the charge sheet filed before the II Additionat CMM, Visakhapatnam to submit that the criminal conspiracy involved arranging a surrogate delivery by Jalumuri Sundaramma and deceitfully projecting the childless couple (Santanu Roy and Amrita Sarkar) as expecrant ( __ ,!

The learned Standing Counsel for ED contended that the arrest dated 12.02.2026 and the consequent remand order ol the Special Court passed on the same day are in substance and the present writ petition is only an attempt to bypass the statutory regime under the PMLA particutarly the stringent conditions governing release on bail under Section 45. tt was contended that the arrest was effected strictly in conformity with Section l9 of the PMLA where the authorized Offrcer on the basis of material in possession formed 'reasons to believe'that the petitioner is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA and such reasons were reduced into writing, and the grounds ol arrest were duly -,.. I r

We notv lurn to lhe facts of the present case. At the outsel \!e mtrsl record lhat DoE has produced the "reosons to believe" to invoke Sectktn l9(l) of the PML Act. We hove examined the contents thereof ond lhe contenls of the "grounds of arrc.st" .furnishcd lo An'ind Kajrtrral upon his arrcst. Ihcy ore identical.

Reliance was also placed on the decision rendered by the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Arvind Walia v' Enforcement DirectorateT wherein it was hetd that similarity in the 'reasons to believe' and 'grounds of arrest' primarily reflects similarity of facts recorded and such simitarity does not prove absence of application of mind or violation of any prescribed procedure, particularly in view ofthe \ t 7 ICRWP Nos.8667 of 2025 (O&M) and 8750 of 2025 (O&M)]

Leamed Senior Standing Counsel for ED contended that non- cooperation cannot justiry arresr under Section l9 by submitting that the petitioner is proceeding on a lalse premise. lt was submitted that the remand application does not treat non-cooperation as the sole basis for anest / remand, rather it records multiple grounds including the necessity to prevent tampering with evidence, influencing witnesses and dissipation of proceeds of crime apart from the broader material connecting the petitioner with money laundering and proceeds of crime. He further contended that even otherwise where the alrest is founded not merely on an allegation of non-cooperation but on the subjective is an alleged procedural lapse regarding non-cooperation the anest does not become illegal where the grounds of arrest also refer to other legally relevant necessities such as preventing destruction of evidence, influencing witnesses and tracing proceeds of crime and that such issues insolar as they require assessment of adequacy, are more appropriately addressed by the Trial Court in bail proceedings rather than in writ u cRMpNo.25o6 ot 2o25 -12o25 ccHC 520791 \

It has becn urged on behalf of the petitioner rhar the custodial action tdken againsr him is itlcgal, inasntuch as thcre u,as neither necessit), nor exigencv warranting.such coercive oction. h is perlinenl lo mention hcrc that the petilioner wa.s neither servcd with summons under Section 50 o/ thc PMl..l nor rcquirctl to qpp(,ur in relotion to the alleged o/fcnce before the ED. rhcrcfore. the allegations of non_ cooryration re incorrect mentnned in the document of ground o/ arrest bul the arrcst in the pre.scnt cdse wos not founded solely on the ground of non-cooperation but in thc grcund of orresl t.here, are other grounds which justifie.s the custodial action, therelore. only on the basis of vrong tnention in the ground of arrest i.c. the non- cooperation of the accused in inyestigotion y,ould nol b1 itself amounl lo illegality bccause lhe arrest of the present petitioner l,os nol Jbunded solelv on ground o.[ noncooperotion but on rhe subjective satislaction of the lnvcstigating O//icer bosed on matcr,a! vhich was avuilable vith the ED. Thercy'rrc. thi.s procetlural lap.sc als<t does not amount to illcgalin whereas it umounts lo irregularity. The Apex Court has held that nerc non-cooperotion lo summons undcr Section 5qPMLA is not sulrtcient to constitute a ground .fbr arrest under Section 19 of the PMLA. tn Pankaj Bansal (suprc), the court emphasized thal the ED must show tangible material ontl lhe decision lo arrest must confirm to the safeguards and strictures o/ Section l9 of lhe Act.

As regatds the non-cooperution and nechanical arrc,;t, this Court finds that the i.tsue involves dispured factual questions tltat cannot be conclusively determined in exercise of wril juri iclion. The (]rounds ofArrest, though brief, refc r to the necessity of prcventing destruclion ofevidence, influencing of wilnesses ond tracing ofproceeds of crime lVhether such reosons are adequate or not, is o matter of assessmenl by the trial court.

The gruund raised by the petitioner in this petition are proced lapses/irregularities which does not amounl to illegality. Leorned counsel for lhe respondenl in pard 70 of his wrilten submission has slaletl lhal lhe pelilioner deserves to be rclegated lo lhe remedy of regular bait which requires lhe pelilioner lo satisfy lhe mandalory lwin condilions of bait under Seclion 45 o[ PMLA lo seek releose from cuslody. agree vtilh the conlenlion raised by the learned counsel for lhe respondent that lhe grounds raised in this pelilion ore procetlural lapses irreguLorilies nol omounling to illegality and these are rhe grounds of bail. In Iight of the foregoing discussion, this Court fnr)s no gntund to interfere with lhe inl)esligation or lhe arrest effected by the Investigaring Agency. Accordingly the petition stands dismissed.

Further, learned Senior Standing Counsel for ED contended that the petitioner's attempt to assail the anest on the basis of alleged non- supply / non-furnishing of all relied-upon documents at the time of remand is misconceived both on facts and in law. It is submitted that the petitioner acknowledged that she has received glounds of arrest and that she has informed her son Dheeraj Krishna. This cannot be refuted as the I t

In Amarendra Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, this Court elaborated on the di.ferent .facets of .iudicial review rcgarding

Error in decision-making process can vitiate a j udgment/dec ision ef a statulory aulhority. In terns of Section l9(l) o/ the P ML Act, a decision-making eruor can lead to the arrcst and tlcprivalion of liber4, of lhe orrestee. Though not akin to pre\,cntive detention cases. bul given lhe nature of the order cntailing orresl -- it requiras care/ul scrutiny and consideration. Yet, al lhe same lime, the courts should nol go inlo lhe correclness ol the opinion formed or s ulficiency of lhe malerial on which il is based, albeit da vital ground or.[act is not considered or lhe ground or reuson is.found lo he non-exi.slenl, the order ofdetention mayfail. "

Lastly, the learned Standing Counsel contended that the petitioner's challenge suffer from suppression, selective quotation and disputed questions of lacts make it unsuitable for determination in exercise of extraordinary juri iction under Article 226.It was submitted that the petition proceeds on a piecemeal reading of the remand order, 'reasons to believe'and other papers, while omitting the overall narrative and the sequence of investigative steps undertaken prior to arrest. It was also contended that the petitioner has, on the one hand acknowledged receipt of the grounds of arrest and the fact ol intimating a family member, yet on the other hand advanced a plea of non-intimation to relatives. Similarly, the petitioner asserts absence ol material while simultaneously relying on extracts of the provisional attachment order and investigation record, which itself evidences pre-arrest searches, seizures and Section 50 statements. The respondent submitted that once the adjudication requires the Court to test the truthfulness of competing versions, such as what was shown to the remand Court, what exactly was furnished and whether any alleged lapse caused prejudice, those issues become disputed factual matters requ iring evidef^ appreciation, for which the appropriate forum is the Special Court / bail Court. Therelore, the instant writ petition is an exercise in merits masked as a procedural challenge and ought to be dismissed on the threshold ground of maintainability. In support of his argument the learned standing counsel relied on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Radhika Agarwal vs. Union of Indiae wherein in paragraph Nos.9, t0, I 2 and I I it has been held as under:

However, when lhe legality of such an arre-st matle under the Special Acts like PMLA, UAPA, Forcign Exchange, Cusrt'ms Act, GST Acl.\, etc. is challenged, the Court should be cxlrcncly loalh in exercising its power ofjudicial review. In such cases, the exercise of the power should be confned only lo see vhether the slotulory und conslitutional sa.feguards are properly complied t,ith or not, nanely lo oscerlain whether lhe officer u'us an aulhorizcd o-[ficer under the Act. whelher the reason to bellevc lhal lhe person \a:; guilyt of1l1g offence under the Act, was based on the "moterial" in posssstirn o1 lhe authorized. ofrcer or not, and u'hether the arreslec v as inforrned about the grounds of arrcst ds soon as mq' be after tfu atesl :uos nade. Suffciency or adequacy oJ material on the basi.s o.f which the belief is formed by the officea or the coruectness of rhc fitcts on the basis of which such belief is formed Io arresl the person. could not be a matter of judicial review. ' 12ozs; tr'tsc 222

Il is pertinenl to note that the Special Acts are enacted lo achieve specifc purposes and objectit'es. The potver of judicial review in coses of arresl under such Speciul Acts should be exercised very cauliously and in rare circumstonces lo bulance individual liberty with lhe inlerest of juslicc and d the societv al large. Any liberal approach in conslruing lhe slringant provisions of the Special Acts may frustrate the very purpose and objective of the Acts. Il hardly needs lo be slated lhal lhe oflences under lhe PMLA or the Cusloms Act or FERA are lhe oflences of very serious nalure sflecling lhe finoncial s)slems and in turn the sovereignty and i tegril.v oI the nalion- The provisions contained in the said Acts therefore musl he construed in the manner which would enhance the obiectives of the Acts, and nol fruslrote the same. Frcquenl or casual ntetference of lhe courts in the functioning of the authorized officirs u'lto have been specially conferred with the powers to combol lhe seriotts crintes, may embolden lhe unscrupulous elements lo cotnmit such crimes and mct.y not do juslice lo the victims, who in such cases would ht' the sociei, al lorge and the nation itself. I{ith the odvancement in kchnologt. the vcn' nature oJ crrnes has beusme more and morc intricate and complicated. Hence, minor procedural lapse on the po of aulhorized offtcers may nol be seen with magnifying glass b.y the courls in exercise of lhe powerc of judicial revien, which may ultimately end up granling undue advanlage or benefit lo lhe person accused of very serious oflences undet lhe speciol Acls. Such offences are a.gainst the society and against lhe nation al large, and cannot be compared L,ith the o inary offcnces comrni ed against an individual, nor the accused in such cases be compared wilh lhe accused of ordinar_y crimes.

Though, the powar ofjudicial review keeps a checl and balance on the functioning of the public authorities and is exerc,std for belter and more elficienl and informed exercise of lheir pou'crs, such power has to be exercised very cauliously keeping in mind that such exercise of po\eer of .iudicial review may not lead to judicial r.tveruaach, undermining the powers of the statutory aulhorities. Tb sum up, the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless there is manifest afiilratiness or gross violation or non-compliance ol the slalulory safeguards provided under the Special acts, req uired to be I I t

In a case where the mandate of Section 167 of the CrPC' 1973 and Section t9 ol the PMLA, 2002 are rotally ignored by u cryptic order a wril of Habeas Corpus nul he entertained' pruvided o challenge is specifcally mucle' Htnatcr' an orcler passcd by u Magistrate giving reasons.for a remund"can only be lesled in lhe manner provided under lhe statute an(l nol by invoking Article 226 oJ the Constitution of India, 1950. There is a difference" between u delention becoming illegal for nol follov'ing the stotuloD' mandatc and wrong or inadequate reasons provided in o judicial order While in lhe former case a writ of Habeas Corpus may be entertained' in the latler lhe only remedy svailable is to seek a reliel statutorily given' ln other words, a" challenge to an order of remand on meril has to be made in tune wilh the stalule while noncompliottcc of a prLttision mu.r' enlille o party lo invoke lhe extraordinary juri iction' In an arresl under Seclion tg of the PMLA, 2002 n wril would lie only when u person is nol produced before the Court as" nrundaled under sub' section (3), since it becomes a iudicial cuslod! lhereafler and the concerned Court would be in a beller posilion lo consider due comPliance- " 'o 2ozg scc onl .'\ r held as under:

In terms of the law declared by the Hon,ble Suprente Courr, rhc subjective opinion of the Arresting Offrcer must be founded and based upon fair and objective consideration of lhe matericl as is available tith him on the dale of arrest. The scope of judicial rcvie.tv doe.s not otnounl to a mini-triol or a meril review. The exercise is confined to ascerlain whether the 'reasons lo believe' are based uoon mdteriol a'hich eslablish thal the afieslee is 'euiltv' of an offence under lhe PM Acl.The exercise ,J lo ensure lhal DoE has acted in accordance b'ith the law. The Courts scrutinize the voliditv of tlrc arre.st in exercise of power ofjudicial rcview and if adequate and due care i-s taken by DoE to ensure that lhe "reasons fo believe,, .,;ustify the orrest in lerms ol Section l9(l) of the ML Act, the exerc,se of Jnu,er of judicial review would not be o cause of concern. Hon,ble Supreme Court has further held that undcr Section l9(l) of the pM Act, ir is the de-signated/authorized officer who record in writing, lheir ,,reasons lo helieve that tlrc arreslee is "guilry" of an offence under lhe lrML Act. Thw, the arresl is ba.sed on the opinion of such Offcet vthich opinion is open to judicial review, howcver, not merit reviet, Section 19fl) of thc ML Act does not permit oftesl only to conrluct investigotion. Conditions ofSection l9(l) have to be safisrted. It is the b<tunden duty of the authorized olficer lo record the reasons for his betief that a " cwP No i 3600 of 2025 v.)

Comtng back to the ]acts oJ the present case. this Court is oJ the considered viey' lhot the 'reasons to believe, which have been reduced into wriling by lhe Arresting Oficer not only point oul to the involvement of lhe petitioner in the predicale offence, but also the involvemenl of the petitioner while dealing with the Prcceeds of Crime.The Aruesling Officea in detail, has dealt in the 'reasons to believe' as to why, according lo him, the arresl was necessary. Not only this, c perusal of the 'rcasons to believe' demonstrsles thal afler elaborating the reasons, the Arresting Officer also stated in Pora-XVI thereof that the petitioner had conmitted the offence of money laundering and is connected with lhe Pruceeds oJ Crime derived/obtoined .from the criminal activily relaled lo scheduled olfence and in acquisition of the said Proceeds of Crime. Thttugh the word "guilty" has not been specifically used, but, when it sland.s mentioned in the raasons to believe thal lhe Arresling Officer ha-s teosons lo believe under Section 19(l) of the PM Act that Vikas Bansal has committed the offence of money laundering and is connected wilh the Proceeds of Crime derived/obtained from the criminal activity related to scheduled ofence and in acquisition of the -raid Proceeds of Crime, this was indeed, recording down his satisfaction lhal as per him, the petitioner was guilty oJ ollence punishable under the PM Act.

Besides this, il is further apparent from lhe 'reasons lo believe' that soid reasons were based on the material with the Arrcsring Officer u'rhich stood elaborately deall vith in the'reasons lo bclieve. I

Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and on perusal of records, the question ol law which arises for consideration are:- a) Whether the instant writ petition challenging the arrest dated 12.02.2026 and the consequential remand order is maintainable in exercise of juri iction under Article 2261227 of the Constitution of Indi4 when an elficacious statutory remedy of bail under Section 45 of the PMLA and other remedies under the PMLA / BNSS are available and the challenge tunls substantially on disputed facts? b) Whether, on the materiat placed, the arrest is vitiated for alleged non-compliance of Section 19( I ) of the PN{LA' including the requirement of'reasons to believe' based on material in possession and communication of grounds of arrest? and Pagc 55 ol66 c) Whether the remand order is liable to be set aside as mechanical, lor alleged failure of the Special Court to form a 'secondary opinion' as contemplated by law.

We find that the petitioner invoked the extraordinary juri iction of this Court to nullify an arrest under Section l9 ol the PMLA and the consequent remand at a stage when investigation is stated to be in progress. While we are conscious that personal liberty is a prized constitutional value, it is equally bound to recognize that the PMLA is enacted to combat laundering of proceeds generated from serious criminality and that the statute adopts a distinct architecture of investigation, attachment, adjudication and prosecution. Therefore, this Court cannot convert a writ petition challenging arrest into a surrogate bail hearing or a mini-trial on the correctness of the investigative narrative as judicial review is directed to legality, juri ictional facts and faimess of procedure and not an appellate reassessment of the material and the petitioner's submissions, howsoever carefully framed as procedural infirmities in substance seek a merit evaluation of the 'reasons to believe' the money trail and the scheduling of predicate t L

Further, the petitioner seeks lo invalidate an arrest and remand in an ongoing PMLA investigation. The PMLA is a special statute with a dedicated Special Court and a calibrated scheme for custody and release including the stringent bail conditions under Secrion 45 and writ juri iction being discretionary it is not to be invoked to short-circuit statutory remedies, particularly where adjudicatio:r would require appreciation of disputed facts regarding the investigative record, the rernand diary and the contemporaneous compliance steps at the time of arrest. At this stage the Court's scrutiny is confined to the legality of the decision-making process and the existence ofj uri ictional facts and not the sufficiency or correctness of the evidence. The petitioner has an efficacious avenue before the Special Courl to seek regular bail and to urge all permissible defences. Therefore, the writ court cannot be invited to do indirectly what the statutory scheme requires to be tested before the Special Court. Further, the relief sought for setting aside anest and remand which inevitably impacts the ongoing investigation and Page 57 of66 interdiction at this stage is wananted only when illegality is manifest, juri iction IS clearly absent or constitutional safeguards are demonstrably breached, which threshold is not met here

Section 19 of the PMLA requires authorized Officer must have 'material in possession' and must record in writing 'reasons to believe' that the person is guilty of an offence punishable under the PMLA before arrest, and the petitioner's premise that such 'reasons to believe' must read like admissible, trial-prool evidence setting out complete particulars ofeach alleged money laundering transaction is not the statutory design, as Section 19 demands the existence of relevant material and a rational nexus between that material and the belief recorded, not a pre-trial adjudication of guilt. According to the respondent's submission predicate FIRs, searches and seizures, bank trails, Section 50 statements and enquiries with statutory bodies constitutes 'material in possession' capable of forming the statutory belief while questions of proof, admissibility and probative weight are for trial. Therefore, we reject the contention that mere similarity between the 'reasons to believe' and the 'grounds of arrest' by itself establishes non-application of mind because

Further, the expression 'material in possession'at the stage of anest cannot be confined only to material alread.v tested by cross- examination or finally adjudicated. At the arrest stage the Court only examines whether there is some objective material and a rational link between that material and the belief recorded and not rvhether each item is sufficient to prove guilt. An arrest is not rendercd illegal merely because the investigation is still in progress. The arrest is not unlawful rlerely because investigation is continuing and once malerial indicative

It is a well settled law that the existence ofa schedule offence and the presence of proceeds of crime are foundational juri ictional preconditions for action under the PMLA and accordingly the agency cannot invoke the Act on mere assumption. conjecture or suspicion. The petitioner's prayer would require this Bench, at this nascent stage, to record a conclusive finding that the predicate offences do not fall within the scheduled offence or that no proceeds oI crime exist, issues which inevitabty. entail disputed questions of fact and law arising from the . -/

On the petitioner's own averments, as reflected in the respondent,s contentions and having regard to the contemporaneous record placed =a l'}age 6l of 66 including the petitioner's signature on the arrest order and the documents evidencing intimation / communication, we are not satisfied that any clear or established infraction ol Article 22( I ) of the Constitution or Section l9 of the PMLA is made out. [n any event, the questions of what precisely was served, what material was placed before the remand Court and whether intimation was in fact and effectively communicated to the petitioner's son are matters involving disputed facts. A writ Court is not the appropriate forum to undertake an evidentiary exercise such as examining call recordings, emails or oral versions to resolve these controversies. These issues may, il so advised, be agitated before the Special Court by way of appropriate applications. The petitioner's contention that the arrest stands vitiated merely because all the relied upon documents were not supplied at the time ol remand cannot be accepted. The constitutional mandate is that the arrestee must be communicated with the grounds of arrest and the remand stage is not intended to operate as a full-fledged discovery or disclosure process. If any grievance persists regarding access to records thereafter, the same is to be pursued before the competent Court by adopting the appropriate \ \ procedure avaitable in law' In offence having a transnational and economic character the investigative record may legitimately comprise sensitive teads, third-pa(y inputs and evolving financial analysis The legal requirement is that the anestee be informed of the grounds of arrest so as not to be kept in the dark; it does not oblige the authorities to fumish the entire investigation file at the threshold' 3'

We also finds that, at that stage of remand the Court is only required to prima Jacie satisfy itself that the arrest has been effected in compliance with the statutory safeguards and is not manif'estly illegal on its face. lt is neither expected nor obliged at that stage to deliver an elaborate. reasoned order or to undertake a detailed scrutiny of the sufficiency of each item of investigative material' In the absence of a clear juri ictional error apparent on the face of the remand record itself' we would not interfere with the order o[ remand in writ juri iction' particularly when the retief sought woul4 in substance' amount to a re- examinationofissuesofcustodyandbailundertheguiseofwrit. 38. 'the petitioner's plea ol'mechanical remand' cannot be accepted merely because the remand order is brief' Remand orders are often t_

Moreover, we find that the allegation relate to an organized cxploitation of vulnerable persons, further manipulation and cheating

Socicty bears the cost when medical systems are alleged to be used to comrnodity children and to erode the integrity of birth records and family identiry. 'Ihe justice system must therefore ensure that investigations into such alleged conduct are not obstructed without clear itlegality. The pctitioner's license was previously suspended on serious allegations, yet the alleged conducr is stated to have conrinued. This strengthens the need lor lawful investigation to proceed unhindered, subject to safeguards. A child's identity is not merely a biologicat fact but it is also a social truth lived each day within a family, in school, in the community and in official records. If the allegation is lhat a child was handed over under false assurances and false documentation, the injuri is not limited to a single transaction but it can fracture trust within the f'amily and exposc the child to lifelong questions about belonging

The emotional harm in such cases is often silent and cumulative Parents who believed they were taking their biological child home may live with recurring grief and helplessness upon leaming otherwise. The child may face distress on leaming that the foundational narrative ol birth was altered. [n a society where lineage and identity are frequently treated as markers of social standing, such revelations can expose a child to stigma and a family to social judgement. These are precisely the kinds of allegations which require careful, unobstructed investigation within the bounds of law

This Bench is also conscious of the wider societal and emotional dimensions that accompany allegations of illegal surrogacy/child traflicking and manipulation of parenthood. In many cases couples who are medically unable to conceive approach fertility centres with deep vulnerability and [egitimate hope, investing substantial emotiona[, physicat and financial resources in a process that they believe is lawful, ethical and medicatly regulated. Medical institutions, particularly fertiliqr I

For alt the above reasons, the writ petition is dismissed, leaving it open for the petitioner to pursue remedies available to her belore the Special Court. The question of law framed in paragraph No'30 of this order stands answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

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