Nischint Multiservice PVT.LTD., Bhubaneswar vs. State Of Odisha
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Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
2026
1. By means of this application, the Petitioner, a private limited company engaged in providing diet services, has called in question the action of the Opposite Parties in treating Opposite Party No.4- M/s. Utkal Suppliers as a technically qualified bidder in the Request for Proposal issued vide Notice No.3130 dated 02.06.2026 for outsourcing of diet services (Dry, Liquid and Cooked) for indoor patients of S.V.P.P.G.I.P., Cuttack.
Mr. Rath, learned counsel for the Petitioner argues that the Petitioner’s challenge in this petition is founded on the eligibility condition contained in the RFP, contending that Opposite Party No.4 is a proprietorship concern and does not fall within the categories of entities contemplated under the eligibility criteria. He further contends that, despite having raised an objection before the authorities, Opposite Party No.4 was treated as technically qualified
without its grievance being considered, thereby rendering the process arbitrary, lacking in transparency and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is also contended that the technical evaluation marks were not furnished to the Petitioner despite its request for the same.
Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the Opposite Parties submits that the tender process has been undertaken by the competent authority in accordance with the terms and conditions of the RFP. It is submitted that the technical bids of all the three participating bidders were opened in the presence of their respective representatives on 24.06.2026 and, thereafter, the PowerPoint presentations were conducted on 25.06.2026. No objection was raised by the representatives of the bidders at either stage. It is further submitted that the Petitioner’s representations dated 07.07.2026 and 08.07.2026 were received only thereafter and were duly taken note of, with the matter being forwarded for consideration in the ongoing tender process. As regards the technical evaluation marks, it is submitted that the same were not disclosed since the tender process had not yet culminated. Learned counsel, therefore, submits that no arbitrariness or procedural impropriety is made out so as to warrant interference by this Court in exercise of its writ juri iction.
We have considered the submission of learned counsel for the Petitioner that Opposite Party No.4, being admittedly a proprietorship concern, did not fall within the categories of entities specified under Clause 2.2 of the RFP and, therefore, could not have been treated as an eligible bidder. Clause 2.2 of the RFP provides that the bidder must be registered as a Company, Firm, Society, Trust, SHG or SHG
Federation and possess the requisite registration certificate under the relevant Act or Rules.
The aforesaid stipulation, however, cannot be read in isolation from the other provisions and formats forming part of the very same RFP. Format-T3, prescribed to be furnished as part of the technical proposal, requires the bidder to indicate the “Type of the Firm” and, significantly, expressly provides separate options for “Private Ltd.”, “Partnership”, “Public Ltd.”, “Proprietorship”, “Society” and “Others”. The same format further requires disclosure of the registration particulars and GST registration of the bidder. Thus, the RFP itself cannot be said to have been framed in complete ignorance of proprietorship concerns. On the contrary, the prescribed format expressly contemplates a bidder identifying itself as a proprietorship concern.
In such circumstances, the mere description of Opposite Party No.4 as a proprietorship concern, by itself, cannot be treated as sufficient to conclude that its technical bid was liable to be rejected at the threshold. The tender document has to be construed as a whole and the various clauses and formats forming part thereof are required to be read harmoniously. The Tender Committee, which was entrusted with the evaluation of the bids, has treated Opposite Party No.4 as responsive at the technical stage. In the absence of any material demonstrating that such interpretation of the tender document is manifestly contrary to its terms or actuated by mala fides, we are not persuaded to substitute our interpretation for that of the authority entrusted with the evaluation of the bids.
Even otherwise, the contention of the Petitioner that the Tender Committee has relaxed an essential condition of the RFP in favour of Opposite Party No.4 does not find support from the materials placed on record. As noticed above, the prescribed Format- T3 itself expressly recognises “Proprietorship” as one of the possible constitutions of a bidder. The case, therefore, cannot be characterised as one where an entity falling wholly outside the contemplation of the tender document was subsequently permitted to participate by relaxing an eligibility condition. Rather, the Tender Committee has construed the tender document in a manner consistent with the format prescribed by the Tender Inviting Authority itself.
We also find significance in the manner in which the technical evaluation was conducted. The technical bids were opened on 24.06.2026 in the presence of the representatives of the participating bidders and all three bidders, including Opposite Party No.4, were found technically qualified. Thereafter, with the consent of the representatives, the PowerPoint presentations were conducted on 25.06.2026. The proceedings of the Tender Committee for both dates were signed by its members and subsequently forwarded to the Director, Medical Education and Training, Odisha. The record further discloses that no objection was raised by the representatives of the bidders at either stage.
It is, therefore, not a case where the Petitioner has demonstrated any departure from the prescribed procedure or any selective relaxation extended to Opposite Party No.4 after the commencement of the evaluation. The Petitioner seeks to draw such an inference solely from the fact that Opposite Party No.4 is a proprietorship concern. That circumstance, in view of the express reference to “Proprietorship” in Format-T3, is insufficient to establish that the Tender Committee acted contrary to the RFP. The Court, exercising judicial review over a tender process, is not called upon to decide which of two possible interpretations of the tender document is preferable, particularly when the interpretation adopted by the Tendering Authority is one which is reasonably available on a reading of the document as a whole.
We may also notice that Clause 5.1 of the RFP contemplates a two-stage technical evaluation. In the first stage, the technical proposal is examined with reference to the eligibility criteria, and only those proposals found responsive proceed to the detailed technical evaluation for award of marks. The bidder securing the highest total marks in the technical evaluation is thereafter to be awarded the contract. Thus, the declaration of Opposite Party No.4 as technically qualified did not, by itself, confer upon it any vested right to the award of the contract. The process was still underway when the Petitioner approached the authorities.
In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission that the authorities have relaxed an essential condition of the tender in favour of Opposite Party No.
The challenge, founded solely on its status as a proprietorship concern, therefore, does not warrant interference.
We next consider the Petitioner’s grievance that its representations questioning the eligibility of Opposite Party No.4 were not considered. The technical bids had already been opened on 24.06.2026 and the PowerPoint presentations were conducted on 25.06.2026, whereas the Petitioner’s representations were submitted only on 07.07.2026 and 08.07.2026. The record further shows that the said representations were received by the authorities and were forwarded for consideration in the ongoing tender process.
The grievance regarding non-disclosure of technical marks is equally without substance. The authority disclosed the names of the technically qualified bidders but withheld the marks on the ground that the tender process was still in progress. Since the RFP contemplated further technical evaluation and selection on the basis of the marks ultimately secured, such non-disclosure at that stage cannot, by itself, be construed as arbitrariness or lack of transparency.
We, therefore, find no procedural unfairness in the manner in which the Petitioner’s representations were dealt with and no ground Supply & Transport Undertaking (BEST) and Others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 671, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has reiterated that a writ Court should ordinarily refrain from substituting its decision for that of the Tendering Authority unless something gross or palpable is shown. The relevant paragraphs are reproduced as below:
“52. Ordinarily, a writ court should refrain itself from imposing its decision over the decision of the employer as to whether or not to accept the bid of a tenderer unless something very gross or palpable is pointed out. The court ordinarily should not interfere in matters relating to tender or contract. To set at naught the entire tender process at the stage when the contract is well underway, would not be in public interest. Initiating a fresh tender process at this stage may consume lot of time and also loss to the public exchequer to the tune of crores of rupees. The financial burden/implications on the public exchequer that the State may have to meet with if the Court directs issue of a fresh tender notice, should be one of the guiding factors that the Court should keep in mind. This is evident from a three- Judge Bench decision of this Court in Association of Registration Plates v. Union of India and Others, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 679. 53. The law relating to award of contract by the State and public sector corporations was reviewed in Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd., reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 and it was held that the award of a contract, whether by a private party or by a State, is essentially a commercial transaction. It can choose its own method to arrive at a decision and it is free to grant any relaxation for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It was further held that the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the court must exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should interfere.
As observed by this Court in Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa and Others, reported in (2007) 14 SCC 517, that while invoking power of judicial review in matters as to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind that evaluations of tenders and awarding of contracts are essentially commercial functions and principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance in such matters. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not interfere by exercising powers of judicial review even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. Power of judicial review will not be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes.”
Tested on the aforesaid parameters, we find no such infirmity in the present case. The Petitioner has essentially invited this Court to reappreciate the interpretation of the tender conditions adopted by the Tender Committee and to substitute its own view for that of the authority entrusted with the evaluation of the bids. We find no justification to do so, particularly when the RFP itself contains a reference to “Proprietorship” in Format-T3 and the record does not disclose any mala fide, arbitrariness or palpable illegality in the decision-making process. The Petitioner’s disagreement with the interpretation adopted by the Tender Committee, therefore, cannot furnish a ground for interference in exercise of our writ juri iction.
In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in the writ petition. The challenge to the technical qualification of Opposite Party No.4 and the consequential challenge to the tender process are, accordingly, rejected. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
(Harish Tandon) Chief Justice
(Chittaranjan Dash) Judge
Bijay/Sarbani
Reproduced from the public record of the Orissa High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.