M/S. Psr Elecon PVT.LTD., Bhubaneswar v. The Chief Commissioner Of CGST And Central Excise, Bhubaneswar - Orissa High Court, 18 Sept 2026

Judgment

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.26417 of 2026 CNR No. ODHC010623932026 M/s. PSR Elecon Pvt. Ltd.

….

Petitioner

Mr. Sriman Arpit Mohanty, Advocate

-Versus-

The Chief Commissioner of CGST and Central Excise and others ….

Opposite Parties

Mr. Bismay Anand Prusty, Senior Standing Counsel

CORAM:

HON’BLE DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN

Order No.

ORDER 18.09.2026 01.

This matter is taken up through hybrid arrangement.

Challenging the Order-in-Original dated 27th September, 2024 (Annexure-2) passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority), CGST and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar Commissionerate, Bhubaneswar in pursuance of the notice to show-cause dated 30th March, 2022 (Annexure-1) issued by the Joint Director, DGGI,

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BbZU, Bhubaneswar for determination of liability pertaining to multiple financial years 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20, the petitioner has approached this Court by way of filing the afore-noted writ petition invoking provisions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

The petitioner, a private limited company assigned with GSTIN 21AAFCP1820P2ZG being registered under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017/the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (Collectively, “the GST Act”), undertakes execution of works contract. The petitioner having disclosed amount of input tax credit availed on the basis of original tax invoices, filed returns in GSTR-3B. A show-cause notice dated 30th March, 2022 purported to be under Section 74 of the GST Act covering multiple financial years 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 was issued by the Joint Director, DGGI, Bhubaneswar Zonal Unit-opposite party no.2 upon receipt of intelligence report showing non-filing of returns in Form GSTR-3B and Form GSTR-1 being admitted in course of enquiry.

3.1. The adjudicating authority-Additional Commissioner, GST and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar Commissionerate proceeded with the process of determination on the basis of intelligence so received and taking note of reply of the

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petitioner to the show cause notice, the authority inter alia came to observe that a time-limit has been prescribed for claiming input tax credit under Section 16(4) read with Section 39 of the GST Act and, accordingly quantified excess and ineligible input tax credit availed by the company, after providing sufficient and reasonable opportunity as required under Section 75(5).

The adjudicating authority upon placing reliance on Jethmal Vrs.

Union of India, (1970) 2 SCC 301 returned finding that despite opportunities including personal hearing being afforded, the petitioner did not avail to address six issues framed. Apart from other grounds, it is the case of the petitioner as emanating from the pleadings that in view of amendment by virtue of the Finance Act, 2024, giving retrospective effect to Section 16(5) of the GST Act, the input tax credit claimed in the returns were duly adjusted.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the show-cause notice is vague and untenable, inasmuch as the adjudication under Section 74 of the GST Act as contemplated covering multiple tax periods more than one financial year is contrary to statutory prescription.

It is also submitted that the notification(s) issued in exercise of power under Section 168A of the GST Act does

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not reflect any circumstance relating to force majeure, that prevented the authority to complete the adjudication process within the time-frame stipulated in the statute.

Learned Senior Standing Counsel raised serious objection to the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and also the maintainability of the writ petition. He submitted that on earlier occasions by way of writ petitions, the petitioner had approached this Court questioning the order-in-original as also the show cause notice. However, having filed applications questioning the adjudication order belatedly, the petitioner sought to withdraw the writ petitions, viz., W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025 and W.P.(C) No.8448 of 2026 which were allowed by order dated 23rd December, 2025 and order dated 14th May, 2026 respectively. He submitted that assailing self-same order of adjudication by way of successive writ petitions is not maintainable and/or entertainable.

Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that since this Court had not decided the earlier writ petitions on merits but only had permitted the petitioner to withdraw the petitions, the withdrawal of the said earlier petitions cannot be treated as a bar to file subsequent writ petition(s).

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Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the Department-opposite parties.

Perused the record.

On perusal of record relating to writ petition, viz., W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025, it is apparent that the petitioner had challenged the ex parte impugned order dated 27th September, 2024 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority) GST and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar (opposite party no.1 therein).

9.1. The prayer of the petitioner in the said writ petition runs thus:

“The petitioner therefore prays that in view of the above facts and circumstances the Petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:

Admit this writ petition, issue notices to the 0pp. Parties to show cause as to why exparte impugned orders under Annexure-2 shall not be quashed; And if the said 0pp.

Parties show no cause and/or show insufficient cause quash/ set aside the exparte impugned order dated 27.9.2024 (Annexure-3) of the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority) COST, Bhubaneswar Opposite Party No-1, whereby an illegal demand against the petitioner under Section 74(9); further demand of ineligible ITC; penalty under Section 122(2)(b) along with

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interest under Section 50(1) and (3) of CGST/OGST Act, 2017 has been raised.

And/Or further direct for refund of sum of Rs.3,49,85,668.00/- (Rupees Three Crores forty nine lakhs eighty five thousand six hundred and sixty eight only) and sum of Rs. 7,66,998.00/- (Rupees Seven lakhs Sixty Six Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Eight only) which has been deducted illegally as recovery against demand without intimation as penalty from the GST Cash ledger of the petitioner.

And/Or pass such other writ(s), direction(s) order (s) that this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the present facts and circumstances of the case in the interests of justice and equity.

And/Or for this act of Kindness the petitioner shall in duty bound ever pray.” This Court vide order dated 23rd December, 2025, disposed of the said writ petition, with the following order:

“W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025/I.A. No.20334 of 2025 1.

The instant Interlocutory Application has been filed by the petitioner seeking withdrawal of the writ petition.

Leave granted.

Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of as withdrawn.

Consequently, the Interlocutory Application stands disposed of.” 9.2. Subsequent thereto, another writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C) No.8448 of 2026 was filed by challenging the

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aforementioned ex parte impugned order dated 27th September, 2024 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority) GST and Central Excise, Bhubaneswar, for grant of following relief(s):

“The petitioner therefore prays that in view of the above facts and circumstances the Petitioner most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to:

Admit this writ petition, issue notices to the 0pp. Parties to show cause as to why exparte impugned orders under Annexure-1 shall not be quashed; And if the said 0pp.

Parties show no cause and/or show insufficient cause quash/ set aside the exparte impugned order dated 27.9.2024 (Annexure-l) of the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority) COST, Bhubaneswar ,- Opposite Party No-1, whereby an illegal demand against the petitioner under Section 74(9); further demand of ineligible ITC; penalty under Section 122(2)(b) along with interest under Section 50(1) and (3) of CGST/OGST Act, 2017 has been raised.

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And/Or pass such other writ(s), direction(s) order (s) that this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper in the present facts and circumstances of the case in the interests of justice and equity.

And/Or for this Act of Kindness the petitioner shall in duty bound ever pray.” The petitioner in course of hearing of said writ petition, having sought for permission to withdraw, this Court disposed of said writ petition with the following order on 14th May, 2026:

“1.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the instant writ petition with liberty to file a better petition. A memo filed to that effect is taken on record.

The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn with the liberty as sought for.” 9.3. The present writ petition is filed for grant of following relief(s):

“Under the above circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be graciously pleased to admit this petition, call for and peruse the relevant records and after hearing the petitioner's Council, be further pleased to;

(i) Issue a Writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the show cause notice dated 30.03.2022 issued by the 0pp. Party No.2 under Annexure-I.

(ii) Issue a Writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned adjudication/ assessment order/Order-in-

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Original bearing No. ADC/BBSR/GST-103/2024, dated 27.09.2024 passed by the 0pp. Party No.3 under Annexure -2.

(iii) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the Notification No.09/2023-Central Tax dated 31.03.2023 under Annexure-4;

(iv) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the Notification dated 15.04.2023 issued by the State Govt.

under Annexure -5;

(v) Issue a writ in the nature of Certiorari filed Mandamus restraining the Opp. Parties, their subordinates, staff from taking any further action towards recovery of demanded tax and penalty as made in the adjudieation/assessment order/ Order-in-Original dated 27.09.2024 under Annexure -2;

(vi) Issue any appropriate writ (s) / direction (s) / order (s) deemed fit in the fact and circumstances of the case.

And for which act of kindness, the petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray.” 9.4. Scrutiny of prayers and nature of relief(s) claimed in all the writ petitions, being W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025, W.P.(C) No.8448 of 2026 and W.P.(C) No.26417 of 2026 (present writ petition), are identical and in essence the said writ petitions were filed assailing the Order-in-Order dated 27.09.2024 passed by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority), Bhubaneswar Commissionerate, Bhubaneswar.

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9.5. This Court, thus, seeks to refer the ratio of laid down in Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and others, (1987) 1 SCR 200, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India taking into account the principles contained in Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, observed as follows:

“The point for consideration is whether a petitioner after withdrawing a writ petition filed by him in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India without the permission to institute a fresh petition can file a fresh writ petition in the High Court under that Article. On this point the decision in Daryao and others Vs. the State of U.P. and others, (1962) 2 SCR 575 is of no assistance. But we are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 of Order XXIII of the Code should be extended in the interest of administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the litigant from indulging in bench- hunting tactics. In any event there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. While the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in a High Court without permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India since such withdrawal does not amount to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be deemed to have been abandoned by the petitioner in respect

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of the cause of action relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such permission. In the instant case the High Court was right in holding that a fresh writ petition was not maintainable before it in respect of the same subject- matter since the earlier writ petition had been withdrawn without permission to file a fresh petition. We, however, make it clear that whatever we have stated in this order may not be considered as being applicable to a writ petition involving the personal liberty of an individual in which the petitioner prays for the issue of a writ in the nature of habeas corpus or seeks to enforce the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution since such a case stands on a different footing altogether. We However leave this question open.” 9.6. In the case of Mahanth Ram Kinkar Das, Discipline of Late Mahanth Ram Sewak Das Vs. State of Bihar and others, 2017 SCC OnLine Pat 3680 (FB), the Hon’ble High Court of Patna observed as follows:

“6.

We have heard learned Counsel for the parties and find that second petition on the same cause of action would normally be not entertained. In Daryao's case (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the invocation of jurisdiction under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.

The Court examined a situation when a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is dismissed not on merits but on account of laches of the party or that the party had an alternative remedy available to it. The Court held that in such circumstances, the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to

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a subsequent petition under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The relevant extract from the judgment reads as under:

‘19. We must now proceed to state our conclusion on the preliminary objection raised by the respondents. We hold that if a writ petition filed by a party under Art. 226 is considered on the merits as a contested matter and is dismissed the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed by appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution. It would not be open to a party to ignore the said judgment and move this Court under Article 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. If the petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 is dismissed not on the merits but because of the laches of the party applying for the writ or because it is held that the party had an alternative remedy available to it, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32 except in cases where and if the facts thus found by the High Court may themselves be relevant even under Article 32. If a writ petition is dismissed in limine and an order is pronounced in that behalf, whether or not the dismissal would constitute a bar would depend upon the nature of the order. If the order is on the merits it would be a bar; if the order shows that the dismissal was for the reason that the petitioner was guilty of laches or that he had an alternative remedy it would

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not be a bar, except in cases which we have already indicated. If the petition is dismissed in limine without passing a speaking order then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata. It is true that, prima facie, dismissal in limine even without passing a speaking order in that behalf may strongly suggest that the Court took the view that there was no substance in the petition at all; but in the absence of a speaking order it would not be easy to decide what factors weighed in the mind of the Court and that makes it difficult and unsafe to hold that such a summary dismissal is a dismissal on merits and as such constitutes a bar of res judicata against a similar petition filed under Article 32. If the petition is dismissed as withdrawn it cannot be a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32, because in such a case there has been no decision on the merits by the Court. We wish to make it clear that the conclusions thus reached by us are confined only to the point of res judicata which has been argued as a preliminary issue in these writ petitions and no other. It is in the light of this decision that we will now proceed to examine the position in the six petitions before us.” 7.

The said observations of the Supreme Court are in the context of dismissal of the writ petition by the High Court on any ground other than on merits and invocation of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. But the situation in the present case is invocation of jurisdiction of High Court again after

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the dismissal of a writ petition by the High Court.

The said judgment referred to by the Counsel for the petitioner does not deal with the question of the invocation of the jurisdiction again of the High Court after withdrawal of the earlier petition.

In B. Prabhakar Rao's case (B. Prabhakar Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1985 Pat 298.), the writ petitions were dismissed in limine by the Supreme Court and thereafter, another petition was filed before the Supreme Court. It was in these circumstances, the Court said that dismissal in limine may inhibit the discretion of the Court but not the jurisdiction. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:

‘23. We may now refer to two arguments which were mentioned in passing but were not pursued. The first was that a writ petition similar to Writ Petitions Nos. 3420-3426/83 etc. had been filed earlier and had been dismissed in limine by a Bench of this Court. We do not see how the dismissal in limine of such a writ petition can possibly bar the present writ petitions. Such a dismissal in limine may inhibit our discretion but not our jurisdiction. So the objection such as it was, was not pursued further. So also the second objection which related to the non-joinder of all affected parties to the litigation. We are quite satisfied that even if some individual affected parties have not been impleaded before us, their interests are identical with those and have been sufficiently and well represented. Further, the relief claimed in Writ

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Petitions Nos. 3420-3426 of 1983 etc. is of a general nature and claimed against the State and no particular relief is claimed against any individual party. We do not think that the mere failure to implead all affected parties is a bar to the maintainability of the present petitions in the special circumstances of these cases where the actions are really between two “warring groups?.’ 9.

This is again in respect of the proceedings initiated before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution wherein another writ petition was filed before the Supreme Court after dismissal of the first writ petition in limine.

10.

Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code was amended vide Central Act No. 104 of 1976 wherein explanation was added to mean that the expression “proceedings” includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. Such explanation was examined by the Supreme Court in a judgment as Puran Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 205 wherein, the Court has observed as under:

‘11. We have not been able to appreciate the anxiety on the part of the different Courts in judgments referred to above to apply the provisions of the Code to writ proceedings on the basis of Section 141 of the Code.

When the Constitution has vested extraordinary power in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 to issue any order, writ or direction and the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which such High Court is exercising

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jurisdiction, the procedure for exercising such power and jurisdiction have to be traced and found in Articles 226 and 227 itself. No useful purpose will be served by limiting the power of the High Court by procedural provisions prescribed in the Code. Of course, on many questions, the provisions and procedures prescribed under the Code can be taken up as guide while exercising the power, for granting relief to persons, who have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. It need not be impressed ‘that different provisions and procedures under the Code are based on well-recognised principles for exercise of discretionary power, and they are reasonable and rational. But at the same time, it cannot be disputed that many procedures prescribed in the said Code are responsible for delaying the delivery of justice and causing delay in securing the remedy available to a person who pursues such remedies. The High Court should be left to adopt its own procedure for granting relief to the persons concerned. The High Court is expected to adopt a procedure which can be held to be not only reasonable but also expeditious.’ 11.

In another judgment reported as Ramesh Chandra Sankla Vs. Vikram Cement, (2008) 14 SCC 58 the Supreme Court was seized of a situation wherein earlier petition under Article 226 was withdrawn. It was held that it will be a matter of public policy that a person should not start a fresh round of litigation and the Court will not

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allow to re- agitate the claim which he himself had already given up earlier. Paragraph 61 reads as under—

‘61. From the above case law, it is clear that it is open to the petitioner to withdraw a petition filed by him.

Normally, a Court of law would not prevent him from withdrawing his petition. But if such withdrawal is without the leave of the Court, it would mean that the petitioner is not interested in prosecuting or continuing the proceedings and he abandons his claim. In such cases, obviously, public policy requires that he should not start a fresh round of litigation and the Court will not allow him to reagitate the claim which he himself had given up earlier.’ 12.

A Division Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as The State of Bihar Vs. Shri Ramesh Prasad, 2014 SCC OnLine Pat 7263 considered the Puran Singh's case (supra) and held that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code cannot per se apply to writ proceedings although certain principles enunciated therein have to be applied in writ proceedings from time to time. It was held that there cannot be any automatic application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of writ petitions or writ appeals. The Court observed as under:

‘Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly lays down that the procedure provided in the said Code is to be followed in regard to suits and are to be made applicable in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction but by its Explanation while the word “proceedings” includes proceeding under Order IX but does not include one under

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Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is thus, evident that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code cannot per se apply to writ proceedings although certain principles enunciated therein have been applied in writ proceedings from time to time. Thus, there cannot be any automatic application of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code in the matter of writ petitions or writ appeals and for the said reason the period of three years prescribed in the residuary Article 137 of the Limitation Act would not also be attracted in proceedings arising out of Article 226 of the Constitution of India including writ appeals. Thus, there cannot be any fixed period so far as substitution of the heirs and legal representatives in a writ petition or writ appeal is concerned. That has also been clearly held by the Supreme Court in Puran Singh's case (supra) holding that there is no question of abatement and it is for the Court to take into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case for the purpose of condoning or not the delay in filing the application for substitution of the legal representatives. That being the legal position, we do not think that it is open to the Courts to prescribe any fixed period for the purpose of filing a substitution petition and for abatement of the writ petition or writ appeal due to non-substitution on that account.’ 13.

In view of the discussion above, we find that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are not per se applicable to the writ proceedings but the principles of the Civil Procedure Code which advance the public policy, which are equitable and just, can be extended to the writ proceedings.

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14.

In Rita Mishra's1, the writ application filed by 15 petitioners was withdrawn on 27th of September, 1985 and soon thereafter i.e., on 30th of September, 1985, another writ application on the same averments was filed. In these circumstances, it was held that the second petition is not maintainable. We do not find that the said decision requires reconsideration. The unconditional withdrawal of the earlier writ petition would bar the second petition on the same cause of action not in terms of Order XXIII, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code but in terms of public policy of not permitting the litigants to come to the Court time and again on the basis of same cause of action.” 9.7. With the aforesaid delineated legal perspective in hand, it is matter of record that the writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025, was withdrawn by the petitioner without seeking liberty to file fresh petition. Minute excursion into the facts of said writ petition it could be ascertained by visiting portal of this Court that said writ petition was filed on 26.09.2025. The assailed Order-in-Original therein was passed on 27.09.2024. The petitioner has alternative remedy to question the limitation as to the passing of the Order-in- Original and other legal grounds. It is requirement under Section 107(1) of the GST Act to file appeal within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person/petitioner.

However,

1 Rita Mishra Vs. Director, Primary Education, Bihar, 1987 SCC OnLine Pat 159 = AIR 1988 Pat 26; approved in State of Bihar Vs. Devendra Sharma, (2020) 15 SCC 466.

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discretion is vested with the Appellate Authority under sub-section (4) thereof to condone the delay on showing sufficient cause which is restricted to further thirty days.

Said sub-section provides as follows:

“The Appellate Authority may, if he is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the aforesaid period of three months or six months, as the case may be, allow it to be presented within a further period of one month.” The petitioner was, thus, required to avail the opportunity to pursue remedy before the appellate authority within the period stipulated under Section 107. Had it been sanguine about its rights and prejudices, in order to circumvent alternative remedy and approach this Court to invoke writ jurisdiction, it would have filed the writ petition within the period/reasonable period as stipulated in Section 107 of the GST Act. In this regard, reference may be had to a co- ordinate Bench decision rendered in Orissa Mineral Development Co. Vs. Commissioner of Sales Tax, AIR 1960 Ori 79 = (1960) 11 STC 12 (Ori), wherein it was observed as follows:

“8. I am inclined to agree with Mr. Misra. It is true that the existence of an alternative remedy may not always be a sufficient ground for this Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 and cases may arise where the

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unconstitutionality or the illegality of the order under challenge is so apparent that notwithstanding the existence of the alternative remedy this Court may interfere under that Article. This principle has been emphasised in a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1958 S.C. 86, U. P. State Vs. Md. Nooh. But at the same time a party should not be permitted to escape the rigorous effects of the law of limitation by applying to this Court under Article 226 after the expiry of the period prescribed by law to get relief from the appropriate revisional or appellate authorities.

If, as a fact, the petitioner received the copy of the Collector's Order prior to the 1st of October, 1957 as alleged by the Sales Tax Department he should have filed a revision petition before the Board of Revenue within sixty days from that date and thus kept the revision petition alive so as to make it pending on the date of coming into force of Sections 9, 10 and 11 of Orissa Act XX of 1957. Such a revision would then have been disposed of by the Board of Revenue and the petitioner would undoubtedly have had a right to ask for a statement of a case to this Court, as provided in Section 24 of the Act. If on the other hand the petitioner's statement to the effect that he received a copy of the Collector's order only on the 4th October, 1957 be taken as correct, then as soon as the Orissa Legislature passed Act XXVI ot 1958 and conferred on him the right to appeal to the Sales Tax Tribunal against the order of the Collector he should have need a regular appeal to the Tribunal. When the Legislature stepped in, at a time when this application was pending in this Court and conferred on the aggrieved party a regular right of appeal before the independent

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Judicial Tribunal, the party should be directed to seek his redress before that Tribunal and should not be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226. The powers of this Court under that Article are limited whereas the powers of the Tribunal as an appellate authority are co-extensive with those of the lower authorities. It can investigate facts and come to its own independent findings.” 9.8. Glossing through the writ petition, it is perceived that the petitioner has not explained the delay in approaching this Court challenging Order-in-Original passed on 27.09.2024 by the Additional Commissioner (Adjudicating Authority), GST & Central Excise, Bhubaneswar Commissionerate by way of filing writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025, on 26.09.2025, conspicuously around one year from the date of impugned order. Nevertheless, there is nothing on record to suggest the ground for which said writ petition was sought to be withdrawn without seeking liberty to file such petition afresh. At paragraph 6 of the instant writ petition only averment is made that “since the Order-in- Original under Annexure-2 is without jurisdiction, without any authority of law, null and void and also, since the petitioner has challenged the validity of the notifications under Annexures-4 and 5, the petitioner has no statutory, effective, efficacious and/or alternative remedy than to pray for kind interference by this Hon’ble Court”. This

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Court having already observed that Section 107 of the GST Act prescribed period to assail the Order-in-Original and the petitioner has not approached this Court by way of writ petition, being W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025, with an inordinate delay of around one year, and no explanation has been proffered in this regard in the instant writ petition, this Court is not inclined to entertain this successive writ petition questioning the self-same impugned Order-in-Original, which was subject-matter of challenge in W.P.(C) No.29985 of 2025 and W.P.(C) No.8448 of 2026. Both the writ petitions are dismissed as withdrawn.

10.

Even this Court is of the considered view that only with a change of ground(s), a subsequent writ petition seeking for the identical relief(s) is not maintainable. In view of the above, the writ petition stands dismissed. Pending interlocutory application(s) is also disposed of.

(Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi)

Judge

(Murahari Sri Raman)

Judge

Laxmikant Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 19-Sep-2026 14:01:57 Signature Not Verified