Sukhdev Singh And Ors vs. National Highway Authority Of INDIA And Anr

Held

The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable due to the existence of an alternative and efficacious statutory remedy. The Court referred to Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, which allows parties dissatisfied with the compensation determined by the competent authority to seek determination by an Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government. The Court reasoned that the determination of market value, especially when it involves classifying land as commercial versus 'Gair Mumkin' and considering factors like municipal limits, house tax, and GST, constitutes disputed questions of fact. Such factual disputes are best resolved by the statutory Arbitrator, who can examine evidence like sale exemplars. The Court cited precedents, including its own decision in CWP No.2879 of 2018 ('Harwinder Singh and others Vs. Union of India and others') and the Supreme Court's judgment in 'United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon and others', emphasizing that writ courts exercise self-imposed restraint and generally do not entertain petitions when an effective alternative remedy is available. The Court noted that the Arbitrator's award can also be challenged, preventing contradictory orders. Therefore, the writ petition was disposed of with liberty to the landowners to approach the Arbitrator.

Facts

The petitioners, Sukhdev Singh and others, filed a writ petition challenging an award dated September 13, 2019, concerning the acquisition of land in Bareta Mandi under the National Highways Act, 1956. The petitioners' grievance was that their land, which they claimed was commercial property with shops, was wrongly classified as 'Gair Mumkin' (uncultivable/undeveloped). This classification resulted in compensation being assessed at ₹2,000 per square yard, whereas they argued commercial land should be compensated at ₹22,100 per square yard. They submitted documents like photographs of shops, house tax bills, electricity bills, and GST numbers to support their claim of commercial land use. The petitioners contended that a lack of Change of Land Use (CLU) by authorities prevented them from receiving the higher market value. They also acknowledged that Section 3G(5) of the 1956 Act did not directly allow challenging the land classification in this manner.

Key Issues

1. Whether the High Court, in its writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, should entertain a challenge to the classification of land for compensation purposes when an alternative statutory remedy exists? (Question of law and mixed fact/law, concerning Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956). Petitioner's arguments: The petitioners argued that their land was commercial, supported by various documents, and the incorrect classification led to inadequate compensation. They sought the benefit of higher market value. Revenue/State's arguments: The respondents, through the Court's reasoning, highlighted that Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, provides for a remedy before an Arbitrator if the compensation determined by the competent authority is not acceptable. The Court noted that the petitioners themselves acknowledged that Section 3G(5) did not directly allow challenging the classification of land to claim it as commercial. The Court emphasized that determining the market value based on evidence like sale exemplars and the nature of the land (municipal limits, house tax, GST) involves disputed questions of fact, making the writ jurisdiction inappropriate.