M/S. Navjeevan Construction, Through Its Partner, Namely, Satish Prasad Singh vs. Union Of INDIA, Thr. The Pr. Commissioner, Central Goods And Service Tax And Central Excise, Ranchi

Facts

The petitioner, M/s. Navjeevan Construction, challenged an order in original dated 31.10.2025, passed by the Principal Commissioner, Central Goods and Services Tax and Central Excise. The primary ground for the challenge was the alleged unreasonable delay in the issuance of this order. The respondents are the Union of India and the Principal Commissioner. The judgment does not specify the tax period or the amount in dispute. The procedural history indicates that the petitioner approached the High Court by way of a writ petition instead of availing the statutory remedy of appeal.

Held

The Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because a statutory appeal under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994, was available to the petitioner. The Court reasoned that the ground of delayed adjudication, raised by the petitioner, could and should be raised before the Appellate Authority. The Court directed that if the petitioner files an appeal within two weeks, the Appellate Authority should decide the appeal on its merits without considering the issue of limitation, acknowledging that the petitioner was bona fide pursuing the matter before the High Court. All contentions on merits for both parties were left open. No specific finding was given on the merits of the delay or the order in original.

Key Issues

1. Whether the High Court should entertain a writ petition challenging an order in original when a statutory appeal is available under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994? Petitioner's Contention: The petitioner argued that the order in original was issued after an unreasonable delay, implying that this procedural infirmity warranted High Court intervention through a writ petition. Revenue's Contention: The respondents, through their counsel, implicitly argued that the writ petition was not maintainable as a statutory appeal under Section 86 of the Finance Act, 1994, was available to the petitioner. The judgment does not record any specific arguments from the respondents regarding the delay itself, focusing instead on the availability of the appellate remedy.