Alps Polytex Through Mahendrakumar Prabhudas Patel vs. State Of Gujarat

The applicant – original complainant has preferred this application under Section 419 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BNSS’ for short) seeking leave to prefer an appeal against the judgment and order dated 10.06.2026 passed by the learned 6th Additional Sessions Judge, Mehsana (hereinafter be referred to as “the Appellate Court”) in Criminal Appeal No.228 of 2025 whereby the Appellate Court has acquitted the original accused- respondent No.2 herein from the charge under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act (hereinafter be referred to as “NI Act”) by quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 13.03.2025 passed R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 by the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kadi (hereinafter be referred to as the “Trial Court”) in Criminal Case No.228 of 2025. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and wholesale trading of plastic packaging materials. Respondent No.2, in the ordinary course of its business, used to purchase plastic packaging materials from the applicant from time to time. Thus, the applicant and Respondent No.2 had longstanding commercial and business dealings, pursuant to which the applicant regularly supplied goods to Respondent No.2 against invoices raised from time to time.

1 As on 23.03.2023, a sum of Rs.76,77,846.37/- remained due and payable by Respondent No.2 to the applicant towards the price of the goods supplied under the aforesaid business transactions. Consequently, a legally enforceable debt and liability arose and became due and payable by Respondent No.2 to the applicant.

3 After repeated reminders and towards discharge of the aforesaid outstanding liability, Respondent No.2 issued cheque bearing No.000046 for a sum of Rs.63,91,878/- towards substantial discharge of its legally enforceable debt and liability, while assuring the applicant that the balance outstanding amount of Rs.12,85,968.37/- would be paid within a short period. Relying upon the said assurance, the applicant accepted the said cheque and presented it for encashment through its banker on 20.04.2023, within its validity period. However, the cheque was dishonoured and returned unpaid R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 vide Return Memo dated 20.04.2023 with the endorsement “Stop Payment.”

4 Upon receipt of the Return Memo, the applicant, through its advocate, issued a statutory demand notice dated 02.05.2023 under Section 138(b) of the NI Act, calling upon Respondent No.2 to pay the cheque amount within the statutory period. The said notice was duly served upon Respondent No.2 on 04.05.2023. Despite receipt of the statutory notice, Respondent No.2 failed to make payment of the entire cheque amount within the statutory period prescribed under Section 138(c) of the NI Act. Respondent No.2 made only partial payments aggregating to Rs.35,00,000/- into the applicant’s account on different dates, namely Rs.10,00,000/- on 04.05.2023, Rs.10,00,000/- on 26.05.2023, Rs.10,00,000/- on 02.06.2023, and Rs.5,00,000/- on 05.06.2023.

5 Despite service of the statutory demand notice on 04.05.2023, Respondent No.2 failed to pay the entire cheque amount of Rs.63,91,878/- within the statutory period prescribed under Section 138(c)of the NI Act. The payment of Rs.10,00,000/- made on 04.05.2023 was only a part-payment of the amount demanded under the statutory notice, while the remaining payments were made subsequently. Thus, upon expiry of the statutory period, Respondent No.2 had failed to comply with the statutory demand for payment of the cheque amount, thereby giving rise to the cause of action under Section 138 of the NI Act. The applicant thereafter instituted Criminal Case No.2087 of 2023 before the Trial Court. R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026

6 After hearing both sides and appreciating the evidence on record, the Trial Court vide Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2025, ordered the respondent No.2 to undergo one year simple imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act.

7 Being aggrieved by the Judgment and Order of conviction dated 13.03.2025, Respondent No.2 preferred Criminal Appeal No.228 of 2025 before the Appellate Court.

It appears from the records that to prove the case, the complainant has examined the following witness before the Appellate Court:- P.W. No. Name of Witnesses Exhibit 1 Deposition of complainant Mahendrakumar Prabhudas Patel 04

1 In addition to this, the complainant has also produced the following documentary evidence:- Sr. No. Details of documents Exhibit 1 Authorization Letter / Power of Attorney 11 2 Disputed Cheque 12 3 Cheque Return Memo 13 4 Registered Post A.D. Slip 14 5 Office Copy of Notice 15 6 Acknowledgment Slip 16,17 7 GST Registration Certificate 18 8 Partnership Change Document / Deed 19 R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 9 GSTR-1 20 10 Complainant’s Bank Account Statement 21,22 11 Extract of E-Way Bill 23 12 Extract of Accused’s Account 24 13 GST Challan 31 14 Ledger Account of Maruti Company 32 15 Extract of E-Way Bill 33 16 Audit Report 34 17 Income Tax Return 35 18 Interest Calculation Ledger 36

2 The evidence Produced on Behalf of the accused: Oral Evidence PW. No. Particulars Exhibit

3 After closure of the evidence, the statements of the accused under section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 has been recorded wherein he denied of having committed any offence and has stated that he is innocent.

4 After hearing both the sides and after evaluating the R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 evidence placed on record, by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2026, the Appellate Court, reversed the findings of the Trial Court and acquitted Respondent No.2.

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned Judgment and Order of Acquittal dated 10.06.2026 passed by the Appellate Court, the Applicant intends to prefer an appeal against the said Judgment and Order. Accordingly, by way of the present application, the Applicant seeks leave to prefer an appeal against the impugned Judgment and Order of Acquittal.

Heard Mr.Rudram Trivedi, learned counsel for the applicant – original complainant and Ms.Jirga Jhaveri, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent – State of Gujarat at length.

Mr.Trivedi, learned counsel appearing for the applicant – original complainant has submitted the same facts which are narrated in the memo of application and has also submitted that the prosecution has examined witnesses and produced documentary evidence, despite this fact, the Appellate Court has not considered the same in its true and proper perspective in passing the judgment and order of acquittal. Mr. Trivedi, learned counsel, while referring to the entire oral as well as documentary evidence, has assailed the impugned judgment and order and submitted that the Appellate Court has not taken into consideration the evidence connecting the accused to the alleged offence in its proper perspective and even the prosecution has been able to prove the charges levelled against the accused. While referring to the evidence R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 of the witnesses and the material collected against the accused, Mr. Trivedi, learned counsel has submitted that the prosecution has established the case against the accused by examining the witnesses, who have supported the case of the prosecution, however, the Appellate Court has discarded and disbelieved the evidence of these witnesses. He has submitted that the witnesses have fully supported the case of the prosecution, however, the Appellate Court has not appreciated the same and passed the judgment and order of acquittal which is illegal and unjust. He has submitted that it is settled legal position that the evidence of a single witness is sufficient for conviction if the same is reliable and trustworthy and in the present case, though the evidence of all the witnesses are reliable and trustworthy, without any cogent reason, the Appellate Court has disbelieved and discarded the evidence of the witnesses.

1 According to Mr. Trivedi, learned Counsel appearing for the Applicant, the Appellate Court has erred in law and on facts in interfering with the well-reasoned judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court. It is submitted that the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court were based on proper appreciation and evaluation of the oral as well as documentary evidence on record, and there was no justifiable ground for the Appellate Court to reverse the said findings and record an order of acquittal in favour of the Respondent/Accused. He has prayed to allow the present application seeking leave to prefer an appeal against the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026

On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Appellate Court, the questions arise for determination are as under:- (1) whether the Appellate Court is justified in passing the judgment and order of acquittal. (2) whether the Appellate Court has rightly appreciated the evidence led by the prosecution in recording the reasons. (3) whether there is any illegality, irregularity or any perversity in the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

In view of the above-stated submissions and upon perusal of the impugned judgment and order of acquittal, as well as the evidence recorded by the Appellate Court, it is appropriate to first examine the facts of the case. The Applicant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and wholesale trading of plastic packaging materials. Respondent No.2 had longstanding business dealings with the Applicant and regularly purchased goods against invoices raised from time to time. As on 23.03.2023, an amount of Rs.76,77,846.37/- was due and payable by Respondent No.2 towards the goods supplied by the Applicant, thereby giving rise to a legally enforceable debt and liability. Towards part discharge of the said liability, Respondent No.2 issued Cheque No.000046 for Rs.63,91,878/-, assuring the Applicant that the balance amount would be paid shortly. The Applicant presented the cheque through its banker; however, the same was dishonoured and returned unpaid vide Return Memo dated 20.04.2023 with the endorsement “Stop Payment”. R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 Thereafter, the Applicant issued a statutory demand notice dated 02.05.2023 under Section 138(b) of the NI Act, which was duly served upon Respondent No.2 on 04.05.2023. Despite receipt thereof, Respondent No.2 failed to pay the entire cheque amount within the statutory period and made only partial payments aggregating to Rs.35,00,000/- on different dates. As the entire cheque amount remained unpaid upon expiry of the statutory period prescribed under Section 138(c) of the NI Act, the cause of action arose in favour of the Applicant, pursuant to which the Applicant instituted Criminal Case No.2087 of 2023 before the Trial Court. Upon appreciation of the evidence on record, the Trial Court, vide Judgment and Order dated 13.03.2025, convicted Respondent No.2 for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act and sentenced him to undergo one year’s simple imprisonment.

Being aggrieved and dissatisfied by the said Judgment and Order of conviction, Respondent No.2 preferred Criminal Appeal No.228 of 2025 before the learned Appellate Court.

After hearing both the sides and after evaluating the evidence placed on record, by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 10.06.2026, the Appellate Court, reversed the findings of the Trial Court and acquitted Respondent No.2. 10. Now, it appears from the record that, prior to the institution of the complaint, the Respondent-Accused had already paid a total amount of Rs.35,00,000/- towards the outstanding dues of Rs.76,77,846.37/-. Thus, the amount of R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 Rs.41,77,846.37/- remained outstanding. However, the cheque in question for Rs.63,91,878/- was issued towards the outstanding liability and was subsequently dishonoured with the endorsement “Stop Payment”.

Though the aforesaid fact was within the knowledge of the Applicant–Original Complainant, the Trial Court, without properly appreciating or considering the said material fact, passed the impugned Judgment and Order, whereby the Respondent was convicted and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. The Trial Court further directed the Respondent to pay the remaining amount of the cheque along with interest thereon.

It appears from the record that the Appellate Court while recording the reasons in paragraph Nos. 10.2 to 10.3, observed that from the cheque amount of Rs.63,91,878/- the amount of Rs.35,00,000/- is already received by the complainant and the complainant has also admitted in his cross examination that this amount was received by the complainant.

It further appears from the record that the amount mentioned in the cheque at Exhibit-12 was Rs.63,91,878/-. After receipt of the statutory demand notice, the accused paid Rs.35,00,000/- to the complainant. Therefore, after deducting the said amount from the cheque amount of Rs.63,91,878/-, the outstanding legally recoverable amount would be Rs.28,91,878/-, and the complaint ought to have been filed only for the said amount of Rs.28,91,878/-. R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026

Despite the aforesaid position, the complainant, contrary to the contents of the statutory notice, stated that an amount of Rs.41,77,846/- was outstanding and instituted the complaint for recovery of the said amount. Such amount cannot be said to be a legally enforceable debt or liability. Therefore, the ingredients of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act are not satisfied.

It is an admitted fact that, against the total dues of Rs. 76,77,846.37/-, the Applicant had already received an amount of Rs. 35,00,000/-, which was also specifically mentioned in his legal notice as well as in the complaint. Despite having received the said amount, the Applicant presented the cheque for an amount of Rs. 63,91,878/-. This clearly suggests that the Applicant intended to misuse the cheque, which was in his custody. It is, therefore, clearly established that the complainant failed to establish the basic ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. Furthermore, the Applicant was required to establish that the Respondent/Accused was legally liable to pay the amount for which the cheque was issued. However, the Applicant failed to prove that the Respondent was liable to discharge any legally enforceable debt or liability corresponding to the amount mentioned in the cheque.

At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the provision of Sections 138 of the NI Act, which read as under:- “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.—Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for [a term which may be extended to two years’], or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless— (a) thecheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice; in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, [within thirty days] of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt of other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.”

It is worthwhile to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex “Heard note:- Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (XXVI of 1881) Sec. 118(a),Secs. 138 & 139- Presumption that the cheque was issued for discharge of "any debt or other liability" -Burden of proof in the matter on the accused to rebut the presumption is of "preponderance of probability" - Inference therefor can be drawn from the circumstances -On facts found that defence of accused was probable -Held, High Court had wrongly reversed the acquittal.

According to the appellant, Smt. Sathyabhama owned a property R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 bearing old Survey No. 1363/3-1-1 measuring an area of 47 cents. She had executed two Sale Deeds, one in favour of Mr. Ramchandran Nair and another in favour of Thankamony conveying to them 20 cents and 27 cents respectively. The Sale Deeds were allegedly executed in favour of the aforementioned persons as a security in lieu of some amount paid in her favour. However, when the Thankamony and Ramchandran Nair demanded the money back from the wife of the respondent, the appellant was approached for purchase of the said property for a consideration of Rs. 5 lakhs. On 05.09.1997, the said Thankmony executed a Deed for Sale in favour of the appellant wherefor she had withdrawn a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs from bank. The said amount was paid to Sathyabhama which in turn was paid to Thankamony and Ramchandran Nair. However, as there was a dispute in regard to the exact area of the property and measurement therefor had not been taken, she had given a cheque to Sathyabhama in the name of her husband as demanded by Sathyabhama on an understanding that the consideration shall be reduced if the area found in the Sale Deed is found short. As upon measurement, the area of the property conveyed in his favour was found to be short by 4 cents, the appellant paid a sum of Rs. 20,000/- to the respondent on 27.11.1997. Allegedly, however the respondent had asked for a sum of Rs. 10,000/- more from the appellant, but a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was only given to him on 18.12.1997 towards full and final settlement thereof and in that view of the matter no further amount was due from her.

On the said finding, the learned Trial Judge recorded a judgment of acquittal. On an appeal preferred by the respondent herein thereagainst, the High Court, however, reversed the said finding, opining that the appellant had not been able to discharge the burden of proof laid down under Sections 138 and 139 of the Act, which read as under : "138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 unless (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier. (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid, and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, "debt or other liability" means a legally enforceable debt or other liability." "139. Presumption in favour of holder.It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, or any debt or other liability."

This Court clearly laid down the law that standard of proof in discharge of the burden in terms of Section 139 of the Act being of preponderance of a probability, the inference therefor can be drawn not only from the materials brought on record but also from the reference to the circumstances upon which the accused relies upon. Categorically stating that the burden of proof on accused is not as high as that of the prosecution, it was held; "

Presumption drawn under a statute has only an evidentiary value. Presumptions are raised in terms of the Evidence Act. Presumption drawn in respect of one fact may be an evidence even for the purpose of drawing presumption under another."

It was further observed that ; "

If for the purpose of a civil litigation, the defendant may not adduce any evidence to discharge the initial burden placed on him, a "fortiori" even an accused need not enter into the witness box and examine other witnesses in support of his defence. He, it will bear repetition to state, need not disprove the prosecution case in its entirety as has been held by the High Court.

A presumption is a legal or factual assumption drawn R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 from the existence of certain facts."

It is also appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Even as per the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Babubhai (supra), the accused has been successful in bringing on record a probable defence, which has ultimately resulted in the shifting of the burden upon the complainant by putting questions regarding legal dues in the cross-examination.

On perusal of the record of the appeal, it transpires that the respondent-accused has established his innocence before the Appellate Court and that, after due appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence and other material placed on record, the Appellate Court has rightly passed the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. The findings recorded by the Appellate Court are just, proper and in accordance with the settled principles of law and, therefore, no interference is warranted by this Court.

It is well settled by catena of decisions that the First Appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of their innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the Appellate Court.

Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the Appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the Appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 out whether the accused are connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.

At this stage, it is appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “33.1 Criminal jurisprudence emphasises on the fundamental essence of liberty and presumption of innocence unless proven guilty. This presumption gets emboldened by virtue of concurrent findings of acquittal. Therefore, this court must be extra-cautious while dealing with a challenge against acquittal as the said presumption gets reinforced by virtue of a well-reasoned favourable outcome. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution side becomes more burdensome pursuant to the said double presumption.

3 Where two views are possible, then this Court would not ordinarily interfere and reverse the concurrent findings of acquittal. However, where the situation is such that the only

4 To adjudge whether the concurrent findings of acquittal are ‘perverse’ it is to be seen whether there has been failure of justice. This Court in Babu v. State of Kerala clarified the ambit of the term ‘perversity’ as: “20…...if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/admissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is ‘against the weight of evidence’, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality.”

6 Furthermore, such interference is necessitated to safeguard interests of justice when the acquittal is based on some irrelevant grounds or fallacies in re- appreciation of any fundamental evidentiary material or a manifest error of law or in cases of non- adherence to the principles of natural justice or the decision is manifestly unjust or where an acquittal which is fundamentally based on an exaggerated adherence to the principle of granting benefit of doubt to the accused, is liable to be set aside. Say in R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 cases where the court severed the connection 12 (2023) 10 SCC 148. between accused and criminality committed by him upon a cursory examination of evidences. [Vide State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh and Others and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar]

Upon perusal of the aforementioned principles and applying them to the facts and circumstances of the present matter, it is evident that there is no perversity and lack of evidence in the case of the respondent- accused. The concurrent findings have backing of detailed appraisal of evidences and facts, therefore, do not warrant interference in light of above enlisted principles. In a similar set of facts as in the present case, involving criminal liability arising out of dishonour of cheque, this Court in M/s Rajco Steel Enterprises v. Kavita Saraff dejected from reversing the concurrent findings of acquittal of the accused therein and underscored the principle of non-interference, unless such findings are perverse or bereft of evidentiary corroboration or lacks question of law.”

It is appropriate to refer the decision of the Hon’ble Apex wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as under:- “12. We are dealing with a case where the First Appellate Court exercising its juri iction under Section 374(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, ongoing through the analysis of evidence, acquitted the accused/respondent no.

It is also appropriate to have a glance of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basalingappa vs. R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026 Vs. State of Karnataka, reported in AIR 2024 SC 2252 = (2024) 8 SCC 149, the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the similar issue, more particularly, in paragraph Nos. 37 to 40. Hence, I am in complete agreement with the findings recorded by the Appellate Court.

It is also worthwhile to refer to the recent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh vs. State of Karnataka, reported in [2024] 9 SCC 169, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held and observed in paras-20 and 21 as under:- “20. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the against a judgment of acquittal. The principles read thus:

Considering the entire evidence on record, it clearly appears that there is no credible evidence to connect the present accused with the alleged crime and the evidence on record is not so convincing to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused have committed the alleged crime. Therefore, the accused cannot be convicted on the evidence on record. R/CR.MA/18251/2026 ORDER DATED: 07/08/2026

On perusal of the impugned judgment and order, it clearly transpires that the Appellate Court has not committed any error of fact and law in appreciating the evidence on record and in acquitting the accused from the charges levelled against him. Even on re-appreciation of the evidence, it clearly transpires that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charge levelled against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of the Appellate Court is sustainable and the present application for leave to appeal is liable to be dismissed.

In view of the above, the present application seeking leave to prefer an appeal is devoid of merits and it deserves to be dismissed. Resultantly, it is dismissed and leave is refused. The impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the Appellate Court is hereby confirmed. Bail bond stands cancelled. Record and proceedings be sent back to the concerned Court forthwith. ORDER IN F/CRIMINAL APPEAL N0.34358 OF 2026. Since the application seeking leave to appeal has been dismissed/refused, the present Criminal Appeal, which is at the filing stage, does not survive and is accordingly dismissed. (HEMANT M. PRACHCHHAK,J) SURESH SOLANKI Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. urt of Gujarat on 12/08/2026 17:45:46