Somnath Pathak vs. The State Of Jharkhand Through The Chief Secretary

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WPC/272/2019HC JharkhandGSTCNR JHHC01001433201912 May 2026Bench: SRI ANANDA SEN, J.5 pages
AI SummaryDismissed

Facts

The petitioner, Somnath Pathak, entered into road work contracts with the Road Construction Department in Pakur. He was the lowest bidder and paid the required deposit. However, he failed to complete the work within the stipulated time. The department cancelled the contracts after issuing show-cause notices. Subsequent recovery proceedings initiated by the department were dismissed as not maintainable. Suits filed by the respondents for recovery of amounts were also dismissed. Thereafter, certificate cases were filed, and by an order dated 22.11.2018, the Additional Collector-cum-Certificate Officer, Pakur, directed the Executive Engineer to recover specific amounts from the petitioner within one month. These amounts aggregated to Rs. 7,48,51,412/- across four certificate cases. The petitioner filed these writ petitions challenging the recovery orders.

Held

The Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable due to the existence of an effective alternative statutory remedy under Section 60 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914. The Court noted that Section 60 provides for an appeal to the Collector if the order was made by an Assistant Collector or Deputy Collector, or to the Commissioner if made by the Collector. The Court emphasized the well-settled principle that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when a statutory remedy is available, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. The issues raised by the petitioner, such as the delay in work, the responsibility of the parties, and the justification for recovery, involved disputed questions of fact that could not be properly examined in writ jurisdiction when an alternative remedy existed. Citing Supreme Court judgments in Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. v. Employees Union, Union of India v. Shri Kant Sharma, and Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that a writ petition should not be entertained if an effective alternative remedy is available or if the statute itself provides a mechanism for redressal. The Court found no exceptional circumstances in the present case to warrant interference. Therefore, the Court directed the petitioner to file statutory appeals before the concerned authority and stated that the Appellate Authority would consider the time lapsed in pursuing these petitions when deciding any objection of limitation. The Appellate Authority was directed to hear the parties and decide the appeals expeditiously without being influenced by the Court's observations.

Key Issues

1. Whether the writ petitions are maintainable before this Court, given the existence of an effective alternative statutory remedy under Section 60 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914? (Question of law) Petitioner's contentions: The petitioner argued that the delay in work execution was solely due to the negligence and failures of the respondent authorities, citing issues like incomplete land acquisition, delayed approvals, lack of inter-departmental coordination, forest clearance problems, and obstruction by local villagers. He contended that the cancellation of agreements was arbitrary and without proper justification. Furthermore, he asserted that the recovery orders were passed without providing him with any notice, rendering them arbitrary, unlawful, and unsustainable. The petitioner also implicitly argued that the issues raised involved disputed questions of fact that warranted examination by the High Court. Respondents' contentions: The respondents argued that the petitioner's failure to make satisfactory progress was due to his own negligence, including insufficient deployment of technical staff, machinery, and materials, and inadequate work-site facilities, despite repeated instructions. They claimed that most of the required land was made available and there were no significant obstacles, attributing delays primarily to the petitioner. The respondents further contended that the petitioner had failed to exhaust alternative remedies and approached the High Court without justification. They asserted that all actions, including contract termination and recovery, were lawful. They specifically relied on Section 60 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914, arguing that the petitioner could not file writ petitions without first availing the statutory appeal.

Sections Cited

Section 60

AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below

Heard together (4 matters)

W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2019
W.P.(C) No. 271 of 2019
W.P.(C) No. 272 of 2019
W.P.(C) No.273 of 2019

Read from the judgment's own cause title. This page is filed under one of them.

Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
2026:JHHC:14269 -: 1 :- IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(C) No. 283 of 2019 WITH W.P.(C) No. 271 of 2019 WITH W.P.(C) No. 272 of 2019 WITH W.P.(C) No.273 of 2019 ---- Somnath Pathak, aged about 45 years, son of Late Pradyumn Kumar Pathak, resident of Harindanga Bazar, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur (Jharkhand). … … Petitioner [in all cases] Versus 1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Chief Secretary, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi. 2. Principal Secretary, Department of Road Construction, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi (Jharkhand). 3. Engineer-in-Chief, Department of Road Construction, Government of Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S. Jagarnathpur, District Ranchi (Jharkhand). 4. Executive Engineer, Department of Road Construction, Road Division, having its Office at Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur(Jharkhand). 5. Assistant Engineer, Department of Road Construction, Road Sub Division, having its office at Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur (Jharkhand). 6. Superintending Engineer, Department of Road Construction, Road Circle, Dumka, having its office at Dumka, P.O. & P.S. Dumka, District Dumka (Jharkhand). 7. Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, having its office at Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur (Jharkhand). … … Respondents [in all cases] ---- CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J. ---- For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate Mr. Ajay Kumar Sah, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, A.C. to Sr. SC II ----

O R D E R RESERVED ON 08.04.2026

PRONOUNCED ON 12.05.2026

Petitioner, in these writ petitions, has prayed for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction, including a writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing the orders dated 22.11.2018 passed in Certificate Case Nos. 17 of 2018-19, 18 of 2018-19, 19 of 2018-19 and 20 of 2018-19 by the Additional Collector-cum-Certificate Officer, Pakur whereby and whereunder the Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department, Road Division, Pakur has been directed to recover the amounts of Rs.1,20,60,142/-, Rs.2,35,54,148/-, Rs.2,67,63,119/- and Rs.1,24,73,843/- respectively from the petitioner within a 2026:JHHC:14269 period of one month from the date of receipt of the order.

2.

The brief fact of the case is that the petitioner was selected by the Road Construction Department in Pakur for the road work contracts after being selected as the lowest bidder and paid the required deposit. However, the petitioner could not complete the work within time. The authorities issued show-cause notices and cancelled the contracts.Thereafter, the department initiated recovery proceedings, but all such proceedings were dismissed as not maintainable. Thereafter suits being original suit No. 18/2017, 19/2017, 20/2017 and21/2017 were filed for recovery of amounts but the same were also dismissed. Then the certificate cases were filed by the respondents and vide order dated 22.11.2018 the Department has been directed to recover the amounts from the petitioner within a period of one month from the date of receipt of the order. Hence the petitioner has filed these writ petitions.

3.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the delay in execution of the work was entirely due to the failure and negligence of the respondent authorities. As per the petitioner, due to various problems such as incomplete land acquisition, delay in approvals, lack of coordination between departments, forest clearance issues, and continuous obstruction by local villagers, the petitioner could not complete the work within time. He further submits that cancellation of the agreements was arbitrary and without proper justification. He also submits that the final recovery orders passed in 22.11.2018 were issued without giving the petitioner any notice making it wholly arbitrary, unlawful, and unsustainable in law.

4.

Learned counsel for respondents submits thatthe petitioner failed to make satisfactory progress due to his own negligence, including not deploying adequate technical staff, machinery, or materials, and not maintaining necessary work-site facilities, despite repeated instructions, notices, and show-cause letters given to him. He further submits that the majority of land required for the works was made available, and there were no major obstacles. The delays were primarily attributable to the petitioner. He further submits that the petitioner failed to exhaust alternative remedies under law and has approached the court without justification. He also submits that all actions taken by the respondents, including termination of contracts and recovery of dues, were lawful and in accordance with terms and procedures. Learned Counsel for the respondents referred to section 60 of the Bihar & Orissa Public Demands Recovery Act, 1914 (herein after referred to as “the Act, 1914”) and submits that without availing statutory appeal under 2026:JHHC:14269 section 60, the petitioners cannot file these petitions under Article 226 of constitution of India before this Court.

5.

After hearing both the parties and upon perusal of the records, I find that against the impugned orders dated 22.11.2018 passed in Certificate Case by the Additional Collector-cum-Certificate Officer, Pakur, there is an effective alternative remedy of appeal under Section 60 of the Act, 1914.Section 60 of the Act, 1914 reads as under:

“60. Appeal. (1) An appeal from any original order made under this Act shall lie - (a) if the order was made by an Assistant Collector or a Deputy Collector, or by a Certificate Officer not being the Collector - to the Collector; or (b) if the order was made by the Collector - to the Commissioner: Provided that no appeal shall lie from any order setting aside a sale on an application made under Section 28: [Provided further that no appeal against an order passed under Section 10 shall be entertained unless the appellate authority is satisfied that the appellant has paid forty percent of the amount determined under that Section or such amount as the appellant admits to be due from him, whichever is greater.] [Inserted by Bihar Public Demands Recovery (Amendment) Act, 1974 (7 of 1974).] (2) Every such appeal must be presented, in case (a), within fifteen days, or in case (b) within thirty days, from the date of the order. (3) The Collector may, by order, with the previous sanction of the Commissioner, authorise - (i) any Sub-divisional Officer; or (ii) any officer appointed under clause (3) of Section 3 to perform the functions of a Certificate Officer; to exercise the appellate powers of the Collector under sub- section (1). (4) When any officer has been so authorized, the Collector may transfer to him for hearing any appeal referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1), unless the order appealed against was made by such officer. (5) Pending the decision of any appeal, execution may be stayed if the appellate authority so directs, but not otherwise. The issues raised by the petitioner, such as delay in work, responsibility of parties, and justification of recovery, involve disputed questions of fact which cannot be properly examined in writ juri iction if there is alternate remedy available.”

6.

Section 60 of the Act, 1914 mandates that if the order was made by an Assistant Collector or a Deputy Collector, or by a Certificate Officer not being the Collector - to the Collector. It is a well-settled principle that when a statutory remedy is available, the writ juri iction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be entertained, unless exceptional circumstances are made out. In Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. versus Employees Union reported in (2005) 6 SCC 725, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:

2026:JHHC:14269 “7. In a catena of decisions, it has been held that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act, unless exceptional circumstances are made out.”

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India versus Shri Kant Sharma reported in (2015) 6 SCC 773 in paragraph No.36 summarized the principles as under:

“36. The aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court can be summarised as follows: (i) The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features of the Constitution and any legislation including the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail juri iction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.(Refer: L. Chandra Kumar3 and S.N. Mukherjee.) (ii) The juri iction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the Acts and would exercise their juri iction consistent with the provisions of the Act. (Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd.) (iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma.) (iv) The High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma.)”

Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rikhab Chand Jain versus Union of India reported in (2025) 152 GSTR 809 at paragraph 12 has held as under- “12. That apart, the majority view in a previous Constitution Bench in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani reads thus: “14… ., we must express our dissent from the reasoning by which the learned judges of the High Court held that the writ petitioner was absolved from the normal obligation to exhaust his statutory remedies before invoking the juri iction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing himself of the statutory remedy by his own fault in not doing so within the prescribed time, he cannot certainly be permitted to urge that as a ground for the court dealing with his petition under article 226 to exercise its discretion in his favour. Indeed, the second passage extracted from the judgment of the learned C.J. in State of U.P. v. Mohammad Nooh with its reference to the right to appeal being lost ‘through no fault of his own’ emphasizes this aspect of the Rule.”

(emphasis ours) In essence, this court was of the opinion that once a petitioner has due to his own fault disabled himself from availing a statutory remedy, the discretionary remedy under article 226 may not be available.”

2026:JHHC:14269 7. Considering the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the facts of this case, I find that in the present case, no such exceptional circumstance has been made out for the interference by this Court in exercise of its writ juri iction. The issues raised by the petitioner can be more appropriately adjudicated by the Appellate Authority under the statute. Thus, I direct the petitioners to file statutory appeals before the authority concerned. If appeals are filed, the Appellate Authority will consider the time lapsed in pursuing these petitions before this Court in deciding objection of limitation. The Appellate Authority will hear the parties and decide the appeals in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible without being influenced in any manner by the observations made by this Court.

8.

Accordingly, these writ petitions are dismissed with aforesaid liberty. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(Ananda Sen, J.) High Court of Jharkhand, Ranchi Dated, 12th May, 2026 Kumar/Cp-02

Uploaded on 12.05.2026

Reproduced from the public record of the Jharkhand High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.