Jay Steel Rolling And Engineering Works vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURI ICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 2337 OF 2023

Jay Steel Rolling and Engineering Works Through its Sole Proprietor Mr. Amit Lokendra Jain Having its registered office at, factory Plot No. B-4, Wagle Industrial Estate, Thane (West), Thane-400 604

...Petitioner(s) Versus Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation (A Government of Maharashtra Undertaking), through The Collector & Regional Officer, MIDC, Thane Region-1, Office Complex Building, 1st Floor, near Wagle Estate Octroi Check naka, Thane-400 604. ...Respondent(s) _________________________________________________________________ Mr. Mutahhar Khan a/w Mr. Medhavin Bhatt a/w Ms. Manashvi Shah i/b M/s MV Law Partners, Advocates for the Petitioner. Adv. V.R. Raje, AGP for the Respondent-State Adv. Shyamali Gadre i/b Little and Company, for Respondent-MIDC. _________________________________________________________________ CORAM: AARTI SATHE, J. RESERVED ON: 23rd SEPTEMBER, 2026 PRONOUNCED ON:- 01st OCTOBER, 2026 JUDGMENT (Per : Aarti Sathe, J.):-

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC Judgment and Order dt. 06/02/2020 passed by Ld. Principal District Judge, Thane in Regular Civil AppealNo. 19 of 2020 U/s. 7 of the Bombay Govt. Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955. (b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to quash and set aside the Eviction Notice dt 19th March, 2019 U/s. 4(2) and subsequent Eviction Order dt. 11th December, 2019 U/s. 4 of the Bombay Govt. Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, issued by the Respondent MIDC, with respect to the Suit premises; (c) Pending the hearing and final Disposal of the present Writ Petition, the effect, operation and implementation of the impugned Judgment and Order dt. 06/02/2020 passed by Ld. Principal District Judge, Thane in Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2020 and impugned Eviction Order dt. 11th December, 2019 issued under Section 4 of the Bombay Govt. Premises (Eviction) Act, 1955, may kindly be stayed; (d) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present WritPetition the Respondent MIDC may be directed to remove the seal rom the entire Suit premises and allow the Petitioner to enter and occupy the Suit promises ; (e) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the present Writ Petition the Respondent their Officers, agents and any other person claiming through or under them or any person. on their behalf be restrained by an Order of injunction form creating third party interest in the Suit Premises; (f) Interim and ad interim order in terms of prayer clause (c), (d) and (e) may be passed;

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC Court was pleased to dismiss the Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2020, and thereby confirmed the eviction notice dated 19th March 2019 and subsequent eviction order dated 11th December 2019. It is in these circumstances that the Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC to Shri. Amit Lokender Jain, who is the sole proprietor of the Petitioner. vi. On 10th December 2013, Shri. Lokender Bhagwan Jain died and was survived by his wife and children. On 20th February 2014, Shri. Amit Lokender Jain filed a probate petition before this Court in respect of the Will of Shri Lokender Bhagwan Jain, and the said petition is currently pending. vii. On 24th March 2014, the Petitioner applied to the Respondent-MIDC seeking transfer of the said premises in his name, and no action has been taken on the said application. Thereafter, on 20th December 2016, the Respondent-MIDC issued a demand notice of even date, alleging unauthorized subletting by the Petitioner and raising a demand of Rs. 1,51,79,700/- payable by the Petitioner within a period of 15 days of the said notice, failing which, the Respondent-MIDC would terminate the Agreement to Lease. viii. On 31st July 2017, Petitioner addressed a request letter to the Respondent- MIDC seeking withdrawal of the termination process and re-assessment of the alleged subletting charges/list of sub-tenants. On 19th July 2017, Respondent- MIDC issued a notice of even date, purporting to terminate the Agreement to Lease dated 25th November 1961 and directing the Petitioner to hand over vacant possession of the said premises, failing which, the Respondent-MIDC threatened to take forceful possession. In the year 2017 itself, Petitioner filed Writ Petition No. 9771 of 2017 before this Court, challenging the demand notice dated 20th December 2016 and the termination notice dated 19th July 2017. ix. It is the Petitioner’s contention that the Respondent-MIDC claims to have first resumed possession of the said premises sometime in the 2017, which Tiwari

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC resumption is disputed by the Petitioner. By an order dated 16th November 2017 passed by a Division Bench of this Court, Writ Petition No. 9771 of 2017 was heard and it was recorded in the said order that the Respondent-MIDC had made a statement that possession of the suit premises was already taken by them on 2nd August 2017 and a panchnama to that effect was already drawn. The said Petition is currently pending adjudication and disposal before this Court. x. On 19th March 2019, the Respondent-MIDC issued the impugned eviction notice under Section 4(2) of the Act alleging a breach of Clause 3(j) of the Agreement to Lease dated 25th November 1961(unauthorized subletting) and failure to enter into a lease deed subsequent to the transfer of the said premises. xi. On 26th March 2019, Petitioner replied to the impugned eviction notice, denying the allegations set out therein and raising a specific dispute in respect of the computation of subletting charges, and further requesting the Respondent- MIDC to await the outcome of the pending Writ Petition No. 9771 of 2017. The receipt of the aforesaid letter in the office of Respondent-MIDC is disputed by Respondent-MIDC. xii. On 27th March 2019 the Petitioner brought to the attention of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 9771 of 2017 the impugned eviction notice, and it is the Petitioner’s contention that the Respondent-MIDC had at such time submitted that the Petitioner stood dispossessed of the said premises and that unauthorized persons had reoccupied the same. xiii. On 11th December 2019, the Respondent-MIDC issued the impugned eviction order under Section 4 of the Act, directing the Petitioner to vacate the said Tiwari

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC premises within one month. The impugned eviction order was received by the Petitioner on 16th December 2019. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the Petitioner preferred Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2020 under Section 7 of the Act before the Trial Court along with an application below Exhibit-5 for stay/injunction. xiv. On 14th January 2020, Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2020 was listed before the Trial Court, and it is the Petitioner’s contention that just prior to the hearing of Exhibit-5 application, the Respondent-MIDC officials visited the said premises at about 4:00 p.m. and sealed the same, and pursuant thereto drew a panchnama. The Trial Court, thereafter, allowed the Exhibit-5 application filed by the Petitioner and directed that the status quo be maintained. It is the Petitioner’s contention that the Respondent-MIDC filed a pursis falsely claiming that possession of the said premises was taken and the Petitioner stood evicted. It is further the Petitioner’s contention that the Petitioner personally inspected the said premises and found the same open, establishing that the Respondent-MIDC was not in possession of the aforesaid premises. After hearing both the parties, the Trial Court passed the impugned judgment and order and dismissed Regular Civil Appeal No. 19 of 2020 with costs. It is being aggrieved by the aforesaid order that the Petitioner has filed the present Petition.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC reply dated 26th March 2019, which bore the acknowledgment of the Respondent- MIDC, and the same was not considered prior to passing the impugned eviction order. He submitted that the impugned eviction order has been passed without affording a personal hearing to the Petitioner, and it makes no reference to the Respondent-MIDC offering any hearing to the Petitioner.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC as to how the subletting was proved, as far as the Petitioner was concerned. He also submitted that the contention of the Respondent-MIDC that as the Petitioner had not executed a lease deed subsequent to the transfer of the said premises, the Petitioner was not a lessee and instead only a licensee, and hence Respondent- MIDC was not required to adhere to any due process to seek the Petitioner’s eviction and was contractually entitled to resume possession at its will is an incorrect contention, inasmuch as the impugned eviction notice and the impugned eviction order did not proceed on that basis, and the Trial Court in the impugned judgment and order has also not considered the same. He submitted that since the Respondent-MIDC itself had invoked the provisions of the Act, it would not lie in the mouth of the Respondent-MIDC to now contend that they were not bound by the due process of law to evict the Petitioner, and that the Petitioner was merely a licensee.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC resumption of the said premises.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC particularly in view of the fact that the Petitioner had not filed any response to the impugned eviction notice, and had not appeared before the competent authority in response to the aforesaid notice.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC Petition ought to be dismissed. She also sought to place reliance on the decision of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chandra Goel6 to contend that under the supervisory juri iction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not act as a Court of first appeal to re-appreciate or re-weigh the evidence or facts upon which determination of challenge is based. She submitted that in terms of the aforesaid decision, the High Court cannot substitute its own decision on facts and conclusion of that of the subordinate Court or Tribunal, and considering that the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court was a well-reasoned order, no interference was required under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by this Court.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC sustain the order. She submitted that the Supreme Court has held that where a quasi-judicial order is passed on several grounds, the order is not invalidated if the authority was justified on the basis of another existing and relevant ground, which independently would have led to the same conclusion. She submitted that in the facts of the present case the impugned eviction notice was issued on the ground that the Petitioner had unauthorizedly sublet the said premises, and though the impugned eviction order was passed on other additional grounds, the ground of subletting also formed part of the impugned eviction order. In view thereof, she submitted that the present Petition deserves to be dismissed.

ANALYSIS & FINDINGS

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC interference. The following discussion will aid the conclusion that I have reached at.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC dated 11th December 2019 does not take into consideration the aforesaid reply is an argument which deserves to be rejected.

therefore of the view that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Tiwari

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC Court has correctly upheld the impugned eviction notice and impugned eviction order and has proceeded on a correct basis to hold that the Respondent-MIDC had issued a notice to the Petitioner way back in the year 2016 making specific allegations of subletting, and at that time the Petitioner had chosen not to deny the said fact, and further that the Petitioner had chosen to not reply to the impugned eviction notice dated 19th March, 2019 .I am further of the view that the Trial Court by way of impugned judgment and order has rightly applied the provisions of Section 4 of the Act to evict the Petitioner, inasmuch as all the conditions which are to be followed by the competent authority prior to evicting a person have been followed in the present case. The provisions of Section 4 of the Act are reproduced below: -

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC shall vacate them within one month of the date of the service of the notice. (2) Before an order under sub-section (1) is made against any person the competent authority shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. The notice shall— (a) specify the ground on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made; and (b) require all persons concerned, that is to say, all persons who are, or may be, in occupation of, or claim interest in, the Government premises, to show cause, if any, against the proposed order, on or before such date as is specified in the notice. If such person makes an application to the competent authority for extension of the period specified in the notice, the competent authority may grant the same on such terms as to payment and recovery of the amount claimed in the notice, as deems fit. Any written statement put in by any person and documents produced in pursuance of the notice shall be filed with the record of the case and such person shall be entitled to appear before the officer proceeding in this connection by advocate, attorney or pleader. The notice to be served under this sub-section shall be served by having it affixed on the outer door or on some conspicuous part of the premises, and in such manner as may be prescribed; and thereupon the notice shall be deemed to have been duly given to all persons concerned. (3) If any person refuses or fails to comply with an order made under sub-section (1), the competent authority may evict that person from, and take possession of, the premises and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. (4) The 1 [competent authority] may, after giving fourteen clear days’ notice to the person from whom possession of the Government premises has been taken under sub-section (3) and after publishing such notice in the Official Gazette and in at least one newspaper having circulation in the locality, remove or cause to be removed or dispose of by public auction any property remaining on such premises. Such notice shall be served in the manner provided for service of notice under sub-section (1). (5) Where the property is sold under sub-section (4), the sale proceeds shall, after deducting the expenses of sale, be paid to such person or persons as may appear to the 2 [competent authority] to be entitled to the same : Provided that where the competent authority is unable to decide as to the person or persons to whom the balance of the amount is payable or as to the apportionment of the same, he shall refer such dispute to a civil court of competent juri iction, and the decision of the court thereon shall be final. (6) If a person who has been ordered to vacate any Government premises for the reasons specified in sub-clause (i) or (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (1) within one month of the date of service of the notice or such longer time as the competent authority may allow, pays to the said competent authority the rent in Tiwari

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC arrears or carries out or otherwise complies with the terms contravened by him to the satisfaction of the said competent authority, as the case may be, the said competent authority shall in lieu of evicting such person under sub-section (3), cancel its order made under sub-section (1) and thereupon such person shall hold the premises on the same terms on which he held them immediately before such notice was served on him. Explanation :— For the purposes of this section and section 5, the expression “unauthorised occupation” in relation to any person authorised to occupy any Government premises, includes the continuance in occupation by him or by any person claiming through or under him of the premises after the authority under which he was allowed to occupy the premises has been duly determined. (emphasis supplied)

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC same was not pleaded before the Trial Court prior to the passing of the impugned judgment and order, only goes on to show that the Petitioner had chosen not to reply to the impugned eviction notice. It is in these circumstances that the Trial Court has, by way of the impugned judgment and order, rightly come to the conclusion that in the absence of a reply to the impugned eviction notice to place facts on record which contradict or falsify the contentions of the Respondent- MIDC by the Petitioner, the eviction proceedings were rightly upheld by the impugned judgment and order. I am, therefore, of the view that the impugned judgment and order passed by the Trial Court is not a perverse or arbitrary order which requires any interference by this Court. In fact, the impugned judgment and order has been passed on a proper appreciation of the facts and has also considered the impugned eviction order and the impugned eviction notice and the charges against the Petitioner. It is also an undisputed fact that the possession of the said premises is with the Respondent-MIDC, and hence the eviction proceedings in that sense do not prejudice the Petitioner as of today.

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in the present Petition the impugned eviction notice setting out the allegations against the Petitioner was issued to the Petitioner, and an opportunity was given to the Petitioner to show cause against the allegations set out therein, which the Petitioner chose not to avail of. In fact as held aforesaid, the Petitioner before the Trial Court did not seriously contend the issue regarding non-adherence of principles of natural justice and did not even bring to the attention of the Trial Court that a reply dated 26th March, 2019 was sought to be placed on record by the Petitioner in response to the impugned eviction notice dated 19th March 2019. Therefore, it is clear that in the facts of the present case, there was no denial of opportunity to the Petitioner, but the Petitioner had chosen not to avail of the same, and hence the Petitioner could not cry foul on that ground now. The reliance of learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner on the case of Associate Switch Gears and Projects Ltd. v. State of U.P. (supra) would also not be apposite to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as in the said case, the revenue authorities had detained the goods on a different ground from that mentioned in the show cause notice, and the appellate authority had imposed penalty on a different ground, i.e., the e-way bill had expired though the same was accompanied with the goods. In the aforesaid case the show cause notice was issued on the ground that the vehicle was traveling to a destination which was not mentioned in the invoice. Thus, there was a complete change by the Revenue in respect of the final order while detaining the goods and the allegations as made in the show cause notice. However, in the facts of the present case, the same is not the position, inasmuch as the impugned eviction notice and the impugned eviction Tiwari

901-WP-2337-2023 JD (1).DOC order were both based on the allegation of illegal subletting by the Petitioner. It cannot therefore be accepted that the eviction order had traveled beyond the allegations made in the impugned eviction notice. I am therefore of the view that the impugned judgment and order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting any interference.