M/S Steel Kart vs. State Of Haryana And Another

Facts

The petitioner, M/s. Steel Kart, filed a writ petition challenging an order passed under Section 73 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The petitioner contended that the order creating a demand of ₹24,59,211/- was not conveyed to them and was not uploaded on the regular portal, leading to their lack of knowledge about it. Consequently, they could not file an appeal within the prescribed period. The petitioner argued that they came to know about the order only recently and had already paid the pre-deposit for the hearing of the appeal. They submitted that the delay in filing the appeal ought to be condoned.

Held

The Court allowed the writ petition. It held that the provision for filing an appeal within thirty days under Section 107 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, with a further condonation of delay up to thirty days, is essentially a directory provision. The Court reasoned that while it has been held that the provision is not mandatory, in cases where the period of condonation has been mentioned, the Court would not be prevented from condoning such delay. Furthermore, the Court found that in circumstances where the concerned party is prevented from filing an appeal beyond their power or control, the appellate authority can condone the delay. Specifically, in this case, since the order itself was not brought to the knowledge of the petitioner, the period prescribed under Section 35(1) of the Act has to be read from the date of knowledge and not solely from the date of passing of the order. The Court directed the appellate authority to consider the appeal of the petitioner on merits without going into the question of delay/limitation.

Key Issues

1. Whether the period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the Haryana Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, should be calculated from the date of passing of the order or from the date of its knowledge by the petitioner, especially when the order was not properly communicated. Petitioner's arguments: The petitioner contended that Section 35(1) of the Act, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, implies that the period for filing an appeal should commence from the date of knowledge of the order, not merely from the date of its passing. They argued that the provision for condoning delay is directory, and in circumstances where the petitioner is prevented from filing an appeal due to reasons beyond their control, the appellate authority has the power to condone such delay. The petitioner emphasized that the order was not brought to their knowledge promptly. Revenue's arguments: The judgment records no specific arguments from the revenue or state respondents.