Jeevarathna Anand vs. The State Of Karnataka
Original PDF →Facts
The petitioners, Jeevarathna Anand and Kannavara Onkarappa, sought to quash an FIR registered in Crime No. 299 of 2023 for offences under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 469, 470, and 471 of the IPC. The FIR was filed by the second respondent, N.S. Anandappa, alleging that the petitioners fraudulently obtained signatures of his parents and prevented him from performing his father's last rites. The dispute stems from a property originally owned by N. Nagappa, father of the complainant and the petitioners' family. The complainant had previously filed a partition suit and a second appeal, both of which were dismissed. Subsequently, N. Nagappa executed a gift deed and a Will, bequeathing properties. The complainant later issued a legal notice and then filed the complaint, which led to the registration of the FIR. A co-ordinate bench had granted an interim stay on the investigation.
Held
The Court allowed the criminal petition and quashed the FIR. The Court held that the dispute was essentially civil in nature, involving property inheritance and the validity of a gift deed and Will. It reasoned that criminal law cannot be set into motion for issues that are purely civil, as doing so would amount to an abuse of the process of law and result in a miscarriage of justice. The Court relied on several Supreme Court judgments, including Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, which emphasize that High Courts should exercise their inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings that are essentially civil in nature and have been given a cloak of a criminal offence. The Court clarified that its observations were for the purpose of considering the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and would not bind any other proceedings between the parties.
Key Issues
1. Whether the FIR registered for offences under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 469, 470, and 471 of the IPC, based on allegations of fraudulent procurement of signatures and denial of inheritance, is an abuse of the process of law, considering the dispute is essentially civil in nature? The petitioners argued that a purely civil dispute, arising from property inheritance and family settlements, has been given a criminal colour by the complainant, who failed to secure his share through civil proceedings. They contended that the parents bequeathed properties to them as the complainant did not care for them. They also pointed out that a previous complaint by the complainant on the same grounds was closed as civil in nature. The second respondent (complainant) argued that the allegations against the petitioners were clear and that the court should not interdict the investigation at the prima facie stage, asserting that a civil remedy does not preclude criminal proceedings.
Sections Cited
Section 482 of Cr.P.C., Sections 120B, 406, 420, 469, 470, 471 of IPC
AI-generated summary — verify with the full judgment below
Cause title — parties, addresses and appearances
CAV ORDER
The petitioners/accused 1 and 2 are knocking at the doors of this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.299 of 2023 registered for offences punishable under Sections 120B, 406, 420, 469, 470 and 471 of the IPC and pending before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Smt. R. Thara, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2. 3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
One N.Nagappa had two sons – N.S. Anandappa/2nd respondent and N.T.Ramesh and 3 three daughters. N.Nagappa, father of the complainant had purchased a property i.e., Site No.141, 13th Main Road, 3rd Block, Jayanagar, Bengaluru measuring 43’x59’ and constructed ground and first floors. The 2nd respondent,
4 son of N.Nagappa institutes a suit for partition and separate possession in O.S.No.6811 of 1990 against his parents and four other siblings. The said suit comes to be dismissed on 28-11-2001 on the ground that respondent No.2 failed to prove that he has 1/3rd share in the property and the property was a joint family property. The 2nd respondent/complainant prefers regular second appeal before this Court in R.F.A.No.312 of 2002 which comes to be dismissed on 24-06-2006. 4. The father/N.Nagappa executes a gift deed in favour of his wife Smt. Pavithramma and delivered possession of the ground floor of the property on 12-08-2011. A Will is then executed by N.Nagappa and Smt. Pavithramma bequeathing all the immovable and movable properties in favour of three children viz., Thejeshwari, Nagalakshmi and N.T.Ramesh. Thejeshwari and N.Nagappa die in the years 2015 and 2017 respectively. After a long drawn proceedings, the mother/Smt. Pavithramma dies. Khata of first floor of the property was transferred in the name of the daughter of the 1st petitioner. It is then the 2nd respondent/complainant causes a legal notice on the other siblings
5 to part with his share both immovable and movable properties which were either gifted or subject matter of Will. He later registers the impugned complaint against these petitioners on the score that they fraudulently obtained signatures of his parents when they were alive and he was not allowed to perform the last rites of his father and hence it was an organized plan against the complainant. The complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.299 of 2023. The registration of crime is what has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court granted an interim order of stay of further investigation on 14-12-2023. The same is in subsistence even today.
The learned senior counsel representing the petitioners would vehemently contend that a pure civil dispute is sought to be given a colour of crime by the family member of the petitioners, all on the score that he did not get a share in the property. He would contend that the complainant never took care of his parents. Therefore, the parents of the complainant had bequeathed all the self-acquired properties in favour of the petitioners. If the complainant wanted a share, it was open to him to institute civil
6 proceedings. He could not do so for the reason that he has lost all civil cases filed against members of the family. Therefore, he registers the impugned complaint. It is his submission that on 02-11-2023 itself the complainant sought to register a complaint against these petitioners and the petitioners were called to the Police Station to tender explanation and the complaint was closed holding that it is purely civil in nature. Ten days thereafter comes the 2nd complaint that is the impugned complaint.
The learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent would vehemently refute the submissions to contend that the allegations against these petitioners are writ large. The matter is at the stage of investigation and this Court should not interdict investigation when there is prima facie crime established. The learned counsel would submit that the remedy available to file a civil case would not mean that criminal law cannot be set into motion. She seeks dismissal of the petition.
7
I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
The afore-narrated facts are all a matter of record. A complaint comes to be registered on 12-11-2023. Since the entire issue has generated from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. It reads as follows: “ಾಂಕ:12/11/2023
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*****
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ಇಂ ತಮZ 1ƒಾaI ¸À»/-“
10 The backdrop of the complaint is necessary to be noticed. The relationship of persons in the family is as noticed hereinabove. A Will dated 07-02-2014 comes to be executed. In the Will observations about the present complainant are necessary to be noticed, as they assume certain significance. It reads as follows: “…. ….. ….
We hereby bequeath any movable or immovable property or any amount which we may receive from any individual / any Department, shall be distributed to our three children by our Executor.
During our life time if we withdraw any amount, the beneficiaries shall be contended with whatever available without disputing this Will of ours.
The nominees of our accounts shall not be entitled to draw any amount from our accounts on our demise. Only the Executor has the power to draw all the balance in our account or Fixed Deposit and distribute to our three children according to their service done to us honestly with love and affection. In case the separated and deserted son Dr. N.S. Anandappa and eldest daughter Mrs. Indiraswamy also take part in rendering service by looking after all our needs like medical etc., as our other children by appreciation of services of these two, the Executor Mr. Eshwarappa Naik has got discretion to allot any share or not to allot any share in our movable and immovable properties. None of our children shall have any say against the distribution made by our Executor.
We shall not alter or change or cancel this Will of ours without the written consent from our Advocate and Executor Mr. Eshwarappa Naik.
11 SCHEDULE
Out of the Four Allotments made in favour of N.Nagappa by CITB and became the owner of site measuring East to West 60 ft. and North to South 75 ft. consisting of Ground Floor Main Building bearing Old No.141, New No. 13/1-3, PID No.60-131- 13/1-3 constructed on site bearing No.141, 27th Cross, 13th Main, 3rd Block East, Jayanagar, Bangalore – 560 011 measuring East to West 43 ft. North to South 59 ft. with a building consisting of Ground Floor with open space and First Floor on the Ground Floor. Out of which Mrs. Pavithramma is the owner of Ground Floor and open space as per the registered Gift Deed dated 12th August 2011 and Mr. Nagappa is the owner of the First Floor on the property of Mrs. Pavithramma bounded on –
East by: Property of Mrs. Indira Swamy bearing No.141/13/1-2. West by: Property bearing No.2327. North by: Building bearing No.141/13/1-4 of Mr. N.T. Ramesh & Mrs. Nagalakshmi Shankar. South by: 27th Cross Road.
Details of Bank Accounts standing in the name of First of us.
Savings Bank Account No.1096010007592/Fixed Deposits with VijayaBank, Jayanagar Branch, Bangalore.
Savings Bank Account No.54019502613/Fixed Deposits with State Bank of Mysore, Jayanagar Brach, Bangalore.
Savings Bank Account No.1315155000039209 with Karur Vysya Bank, Jayanagar Branch, Bangalore.
Any other Bank account/Fixed Deposits which may be opened/Deposited during our life time.
Cash left by us at the time of our death.”
N.Nagappa dies. Properties devolve into the hands of Smt. Pavithramma, the mother. The mother executes a Will. Certain clauses of the Will are required to be noticed. They read as follows:
12
“…. …. ….
WHEREAS Mrs. Tejeshwari Onkarappa W/o Dr. K.Onkarappa our youngest daughter was taking very good care of my husband Mr. N.Nagappa and myself. Neither another daughter Mrs. Nagalakshmi Shankar nor son Mr. N.T.Ramesh have not taken care of us. Even the funeral rituals of my husband N.Nagappa were carried out by my son-in-law Dr. K.Onkarappa.
WHEREAS my daughter Mrs. Tejeshwari Onkarappa who was the only person taking care of all our needs died on 3rd October, 2015 and my husband N.Nagappa died on 4th January 2017. WHEREAS after the demise of my daughter Tejeshwari Onkarappa, her husband Dr. K. Onkarappa and his daughter Mrs. Jeevarathna Anand have been supporting me by attending to all my needs. Though my grand-daughter Mrs. Jeevarathna Anand stays far away from my residence, constantly in touch with me and take me to her house often wherein I stay for few days with my great grand children Kumari. Ruthvika Anand B.G. and Kumari Boomika Annand B.G. (i.e., daughters of my grand daughter Mrs. Jeevarathna Anand)…..”
Why the properties are bequeathed to other family members and not to the complainant is clearly indicated. Smt. Pavithramma dies in the year 2022. Then comes the first complaint of misappropriation by the present complainant. The Police are said to have summoned these petitioners and rendered an endorsement terming the complaint to be a non-cognizable one. Thereafter the present complaint emerges.
13
The 2nd respondent/complainant had instituted a suit in O.S.No.6811 of 1990 seeking 1/3rd share in the property. That comes to be dismissed on 28-11-2001. R.F.A.No.312 of 2002 is preferred by the complainant. That also comes to be dismissed on 24-06-2006, which has become final. The efforts of the 2nd respondent/complainant to secure the property have failed and now he projects that the gift initially and the Will later of Nagappa and Smt. Pavithramma are forged and, therefore, the crime is sought to be registered. In the considered view of this Court there cannot be a better illustration of an issue which is purely civil in nature being rendered a colour of crime and criminal law being set into motion. If further investigation is permitted in the case at hand, it would run foul of several judgments of the Apex Court. The Apex Court in the case of DEEPAK GABA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH1 has held as follows: “….
….
….
The private complaint filed by Respondent 2 complainant had invoked Sections 405, 420, 471 and 120- BIPC. However, by the order dated 19-7-2018, summons were directed to be issued only under Section 406IPC, and not under Sections 420, 471 or 120-BIPC. We have quoted the operative and reasoning portion of the summoning order,
1 (2023) 3 SCC 423
14 that records in brief the assertions in the complaint, to hold that Respondent 2 complainant had shown that “a forged demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p had been raised by JIPL, which demand is not due in terms of the statements made by Shubhankar P. Tomar and Sakshi Tilak Chand”. The order states that Respondent 2 complainant had filed photocopy of “one” email as per Documents 1 to 34, but the narration and the contents of the email is not adverted to and elucidated. ….
….
….
For Section 405IPC to be attracted, the following have to be established:
(a) the accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;
(b) the accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and (c) such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.
Thus, criminal breach of trust would, inter alia, mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is entrusted with or otherwise has dominion. Such an act must not only be done dishonestly, but also in violation of any direction of law or any contract express or implied relating to carrying out the trust. [Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 646]
However, in the instant case, materials on record fail to satisfy the ingredients of Section 405IPC. The complaint does not directly refer to the ingredients of Section 405IPC and does not state how and in what manner, on facts, the requirements are satisfied. Pre-summoning
15 evidence is also lacking and suffers on this account. On these aspects, the summoning order is equally quiet, albeit, it states that “a forged demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p had been raised by JIPL, which demand is not due in terms of statements by Shubhankar P. Tomar and Sakshi Tilak Chand”. A mere wrong demand or claim would not meet the conditions specified by Section 405IPC in the absence of evidence to establish entrustment, dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal, which action should be in violation of any direction of law, or legal contract touching the discharge of trust. Hence, even if Respondent 2 complainant is of the opinion that the monetary demand or claim is incorrect and not payable, given the failure to prove the requirements of Section 405IPC, an offence under the same section is not constituted. In the absence of factual allegations which satisfy the ingredients of the offence under Section 405IPC, a mere dispute on monetary demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p, does not attract criminal prosecution under Section 406IPC.
In order to apply Section 420IPC, namely, cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, the ingredients of Section 415IPC have to be satisfied. To constitute an offence of cheating under Section 415IPC, a person should be induced, either fraudulently or dishonestly, to deliver any property to any person, or consent that any person shall retain any property. The second class of acts set forth in the section is the intentional inducement of doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do, if she were not so deceived. Thus, the sine qua non of Section 415IPC is “fraudulence”, “dishonesty”, or “intentional inducement”, and the absence of these elements would debase the offence of cheating. [Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2011) 1 SCC 74 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1201]
Explaining the contours, this Court in Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929. This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification, which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail and help to Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully concur with the
16 clarification as well as the ratio explaining Sections 415, 464, etc. IPC.] , observed that for the offence of cheating, there should not only be cheating, but as a consequence of such cheating, the accused should also have dishonestly adduced the person deceived to deliver any property to a person; or to make, alter, or destroy, wholly or in part, a valuable security, or anything signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security.
In the present case, the ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 420 read with Section 415IPC are absent. The pre-summoning evidence does not disclose and establish the essential ingredients of Section 415IPC. There is no assertion, much less legal evidence, to submit that JIPL had engaged in dishonesty, fraud, or intentional inducement to deliver a property. It is not the case of Respondent 2 complainant that JIPL had tried to deceive them, either by making a false or misleading representation, or by any other action or omission; nor is it their case that JIPL had offered any fraudulent or dishonest inducement to deliver a property. As such, given that the ingredients of Section 415IPC are not satisfied, the offence under Section 420IPC is not made out.
Section 471IPC [“471. Using as genuine a forged document or electronic record.—Whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record which he knows or has reason to believe to be a forged document or electronic record, shall be punished in the same manner as if he had forged such document or electronic record.”] is also not attracted. This Section is applicable when a person fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine any document or electronic record, which he knows or has reasons to believe to be a forged document or electronic record. This Court in Mohd. Ibrahim [Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 929. This Court, in this case, has cautioned that the ratio should not be misunderstood, to record the clarification, which in the present case, in our opinion, is not of any avail and help to Respondent 2 complainant. We respectfully concur with the clarification as well as the ratio explaining Sections 415, 464, etc. IPC.] , has elucidated that the condition precedent of an offence under Section 471IPC is
17 forgery by making a false document or false electronic record or part thereof. Further, to constitute the offence under Section 471IPC, it has to be proven that the document was “forged” in terms of Section 470 [“470. Forged document.—A false document [or electronic record] made wholly or in part by forgery is designated “a forged document or electronic record”.”] , and “false” in terms of Section 464IPC [ “464. Making a false document.—A person is said to make a false document or false electronic record— First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently—(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;(c) affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity of the electronic signature,with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a document, electronic record or *[electronic signature] was made, signed, sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or affixed; or* Substituted for “digital signature” by Act 10 of 2009, Section 51(e) (w.e.f. 27-10-2009)Secondly.—Who without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with electronic signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be living or dead at the time of such alteration; orThirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal, execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his electronic signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration.”] .
Section 470 lays down that a document is “forged” if there is:
(i) fraudulent or dishonest use of a document as genuine; and
18 (ii) knowledge or reasonable belief on the part of the person using the document that it is a forged one.
Section 470 defines a “forged document” as a false document made by forgery.
As per Section 464IPC, a person is said to have made a “false document”:
(i) if he has made or executed a document claiming to be someone else or authorised by someone else; (ii) if he has altered or tampered a document; or (iii) if he has obtained a document by practising deception, or from a person not in control of his senses.
Unless the document is false and forged in terms of Sections 464 and 470IPC respectively, the requirement of Section 471IPC would not be met.
In the counter-affidavit filed by Respondent 2 complainant, it is submitted that a few bills were faked/forged, as the goods were not ordered. Reference is made to balance of Rs 79,752 shown on 30-3-2013, which was objected to and thereupon as per the complaint itself the demand/bill was withdrawn. This would not make the bill a forged document or false document, in terms of Sections 470 and 464IPC. The complaint was made in the year 2017, four years after the bill/claim had been withdrawn, reflecting no criminal intent. The bill was not fake or forged, and at best it could be stated that it was wrongly raised. Moreover, the pre-summoning evidence is silent with regard to this bill and mens rea on the part of the accused is not shown and established. Same would be the position with regard to the bill/invoice of Rs 53,215 which was as per the complaint, sent directly to Manav Rachna International at Faridabad. The bill/invoice is not doubted as “forged” or “false” within the meaning of Sections 470 and 464IPC. No doubt, Adhunik Colour Solutions is mentioned as the buyer, and Manav Rachna International as the consignee, albeit the invoice was issued by JIPL. Pre-summoning evidence does not help and make out a case predicated on this bill/invoice. In the counter-affidavit filed before us, it is alleged that since this
19 bill was sent to Faridabad, JIPL had added the GST in the invoice. It is argued that had Respondent 2 complainant supplied the goods, instead of GST, VAT as applicable in Delhi would have been levied, as Respondent 2 complainant was based in Delhi. This argument is rather fanciful and does not impress us to justify summoning for the offence under Section 471IPC. Besides, the assertion is not to be found in the complaint, and cannot be predicated on the pre- summoning evidence.
For completeness, we must record that the appellants have placed on record the dealership agreement dated 11-4-2012, which, inter alia states that JIPL has a discretion to establish direct contractual relationship with specific customers, if JIPL feels they can be served better. Further, in such a situation, the dealer, if JIPL agrees, can act as an intermediary. Assuming the bill/invoice had wrongly recorded Respondent 2 complainant as the buyer, it is not doubted that Manav Rachna International was the consignee. At best, Respondent 2 complainant would not be liable, had Manav Rachna International failed to pay. Non- payment is also not alleged in the complaint or the pre- summoning evidence. Reliance on objections vide emails dated 4-7-2014 and 21-7-2014 are of no avail, as they are for the period prior to 31-7-2014, when the bill/invoice was raised.
It is evident from the pre-summoning evidence led and the assertions made in the criminal complaint that the dispute raised by Respondent 2 complainant primarily pertains to settlement of accounts. The allegations are: (i) goods supplied by JIPL were not as per the requirements and demands of Respondent 2 complainant, (ii) goods supplied were different from the order placed, and (iii) goods lying with, and returned by Respondent 2 complainant have not been accounted for. These assertions, even if assumed to be correct, would not fulfil the requirements of Section 405IPC, or for that
20 matter Sections 420 or 471. The material on record does not reflect and indicate that JIPL indeed had the dishonest/culpable intention for the commission of the alleged offences under the IPC. Unless the ingredients of aforesaid Sections of the IPC are fulfilled, the offence under Section 120-BIPC, for criminal conspiracy, would not be made. In fact, a combined reading of the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence does not disclose any element of criminal conspiracy as per Section 120-AIPC. The complaint discloses a civil dispute and grievance relating to the claim made by JIPL. What is challenged by Respondent 2 complainant is the demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p raised by JIPL as the amount payable till the year ending 2016. This assertion made by JIPL is questioned as incorrect. The demand, even if assumed to be wrong, would not satisfy the ingredients of Section 405, or Sections 420 or 471IPC, so as to justify the summoning order. As noted above, JIPL had filed a criminal case under Section 138 of the NI Act as two cheques for Rs 1,93,776 and Rs 4,99,610 issued by them, on presentation, were dishonoured on account of “insufficient funds”.
We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assertions made in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence led by Respondent 2 complainant fail to establish the conditions and incidence of the penal liability set out under Sections 405, 420 and 471IPC, as the allegations pertain to alleged breach of contractual obligations. Pertinently, this Court, in a number of cases, has noticed attempts made by parties to invoke juri iction of criminal courts, by filing vexatious criminal complaints by camouflaging allegations which were ex facie outrageous or pure civil claims. These attempts are not to be entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. To avoid prolixity, we would only like to refer to the judgment of this Court in Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , as it refers to earlier case laws in copious detail.
21
In Thermax [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , it was pointed out that the court should be watchful of the difference between civil and criminal wrongs, though there can be situations where the allegations may constitute both civil and criminal wrongs. The court must cautiously examine the facts to ascertain whether they only constitute a civil wrong, as the ingredients of criminal wrong are missing. A conscious application of the said aspects is required by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, in the subsequent judgment of USHA CHAKRABORTY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL2, while considering the entire spectrum of law on civil cases being dressed with a colour of crime, has held as follows: “….
….
….
Before adverting to the rival contentions with reference to application under Section 156(3), Cr. P.C. within the parameters, we think it only appropriate to refer to the following decisions of this Court in respect to the scope of exercise of power under Section 482, Cr. P.C.
In Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand1, this Court held:—
“12. While exercising its juri iction under Section 482 of the Code of the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to 2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90
22 secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of the facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.”
In Vesa Holdings Private Limited v. State of Kerala2, it was held that:—
“13. It is true that a given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as also a criminal offence and only because a civil remedy may be available to the complainant that itself cannot be a ground to quash a criminal proceeding. The real test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose the criminal offence of cheating or not. In the present case there is nothing to show that at the very inception there was any intention on behalf of the accused persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for an offence under Section 420 IPC. In our view the complaint does not disclose any criminal offence at all. The criminal proceedings should not be encouraged when it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the court. The superior courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. In our opinion in view of these facts allowing the police investigation to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of the court and the High Court committed an error in refusing to exercise the power under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code to quash the proceedings.”
In Kapil Aggarwal v. Sanjay Sharma3, this Court held that Section 482 is designed to achieve the purpose of ensuring that criminal proceedings are not permitted to generate into weapons of harassment.
…. ….
….
The basic requirements/ingredients to bring home the accusations under the alleged offences are hereunder:—
23
Offence punishable under Section 323, IPC.
(i) causation of hurt by another person; (ii) that he caused such hurt voluntarily; (iii) that such a case is not covered under Section 334, IPC.
Offence of extortion punishable under Section 384, IPC.
(i) intentionally putting a person in fear of injury to himself or another; (ii) dishonestly inducing a person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property, or valuable security.
Offence of criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406, IPC.
(i) Entrustment of the property or any dominion over property with accusation; (ii) The person entrusted dishonestly misappropriating or converting to his own use that property; or dishonestly using or disposing that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust or willfully causing sufferance to any other person so to do. Offence punishable under Section 423, IPC.
The essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 423, IPC is that the sale deed or deed subjecting an immovable property to a charge was contained a false statement relating to the consideration or relating to the persons or whose use or benefit, it was intended to operate. Thus, it is evident that Section 423, IPC deals with twin specific frauds in the matter of execution of deeds or instruments of transfer or charge, idest, (i) false recital as to consideration or false recital as to the name of beneficiary.
24
Offence punishable under Section 467, IPC.
Virtually, the offence under Section 467 is an aggravated form of the offence under Section 466, IPC. The essential ingredients to constitute the offence punishable under this Section are (i) commission of forgery; (ii) that such commission of forgery must be in relation to a document purporting to be (a) a valuable property; or (b) a will; or (c) an authority to adopt a son; or (d) which purports to give authority to any person to make or transfer any valuable security; or (e) the receive the principle, interest or dividends thereon; or (f) to receive or deliver any money, movable property or valuable security, or any document purporting to be an acquittance or receipt acknowledging the payment of money, or (g) an acquittance or receipt for the delivery of any movable property or valuable security.
Offence punishable under Section 468, IPC.
(i) Commission of forgery, (ii) that he did so intending that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of cheating.
Offence punishable under Section 420, IPC.
To constitute the said offence there must be deception i.e., the accused must have deceived someone; that by such deception the accused must induce a person (i) to deliver any property; or (ii) to make, alter, destroy a whole or part of the valuable security or anything which is signed or sealed and which is capable of being converted into a valuable property; or (iii) that the accused must have done so dishonestly. The offence punishable under Section 120B, IPC, to constitute criminal conspiracy, there must be agreement between two or more persons. The agreement should be to do or cause to be done
25 some illegal act, or some act which is not illegal, by illegal means, provided that where the agreement is other than one to commit an offence, the prosecution must further prove; or (iv) that some act besides the agreement was done by or more of the parties in pursuance of it.
Now, the question is whether the allegations in the aforesaid application are sufficient to constitute the alleged offences.
We have already extracted the said application filed by the respondent against the appellants in its entirety. At the outset, it is to be noted that in the affidavit accompanying the application, the respondent has stated thus : - “I have not placed this incident before any Court heretofore”. In the application, obviously, it is stated that he is one of the trustees of Bagla Sundari Memorial Trust at Basunagar Madhyagram and under the said trust there is a high school by name of Rose Bank Educare and he is the Secretary of the said school. The recital in paragraph 2 of the application filed by the respondent would reveal his case that the accused persons kept him in dark and without giving any information by strengthening the said trust deed illegally got the same registered on 12.07.2016 and removed him from the said post. It is in this context that the aforesaid statement in the aforesaid affidavit assumes relevance. It is the case of the appellants that in regard to his removal from the post of Secretary of the school, the respondent had instituted title suit No. 363 of 2015, praying therein for a declaration that he is the Secretary of the school and the said suit is still pending. Despite the institution of the said suit and its pendency before the First Court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Barasat the respondent made such a statement in the affidavit. That apart, what is stated in the application is that he is the Secretary of the school, run by the trust.
The materials on record pertaining to the said pleadings instituted in the Civil Suit, produced in
26 this proceeding would reveal that the respondent was in fact ousted from the membership of the trust. In the counter affidavit filed in this proceeding, the respondent has virtually admitted the pendency of the suit filed against his removal from the post of Secretary and the trusteeship and its pendency. The factum of passing of adverse orders in the interlocutory applications in the said Civil Suit as also the prima facie finding and conclusion arrived at by the Civil Court that the respondent stands removed from the post of Secretary and also from the trusteeship are also not disputed therein. Then, the question is why would the respondent conceal those relevant aspects? The indisputable and undisputed facts (admitted in the counter-affidavit by the respondent) would reveal the existence of the civil dispute on removal of the respondent from the post of Secretary of the school as also from the trusteeship. Obviously, it can only be taken that since the removal from the office of the Secretary and the trusteeship was the causative incident, he concealed the pendency of the civil suit to cover up the civil nature of the dispute.
By non-disclosure the respondent has, in troth, concealed the existence of a pending civil suit between him and the appellants herein before a competent civil court which obviously is the causative incident for the respondent's allegation of perpetration of the aforesaid offences against the appellants. We will deal with it further and also its impact a little later. There cannot be any doubt with respect to the position that in order to cause registration of an F.I.R. and consequential investigation based on the same the petition filed under Section 156(3), Cr.P.C., must satisfy the essential ingredients to attract the alleged offences. In other words, if such allegations in the petition are vague and are not specific with respect to the alleged offences it cannot lead to an order for registration of an F.I.R. and investigation on the accusation of commission of the offences alleged. As noticed hereinbefore, the respondent alleged commission of offences under Sections 323, 384, 406, 423, 467, 468, 420 and 120B, IPC against the appellants. A bare perusal of the said allegation and the ingredients to attract them, as
27 adverted to hereinbefore would reveal that the allegations are vague and they did not carry the essential ingredients to constitute the alleged offences. There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint that the appellants herein had caused hurt on the respondent so also, they did not reveal a case that the appellants had intentionally put the respondent in fear of injury either to himself or another or by putting him under such fear or injury, dishonestly induced him to deliver any property or valuable security. The same is the position with respect to the alleged offences punishable under Sections 406, 423, 467, 468, 420 and 120 B, IPC. The ingredients to attract the alleged offence referred to hereinbefore and the nature of the allegations contained in the application filed by the respondent would undoubtedly make it clear that the respondent had failed to make specific allegation against the appellants herein in respect of the aforesaid offences. The factual position thus would reveal that the genesis as also the purpose of criminal proceedings are nothing but the aforesaid incident and further that the dispute involved is essentially of civil nature. The appellants and the respondents have given a cloak of criminal offence in the issue. In such circumstance when the respondent had already resorted to the available civil remedy and it is pending, going by the decision in Paramjit Batra (supra), the High Court would have quashed the criminal proceedings to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court but for the concealment.
In the aforesaid circumstances, coupled with the fact that in respect of the issue involved, which is of civil nature, the respondent had already approached the juri ictional civil court by instituting a civil suit and it is pending, there can be no doubt with respect to the fact that the attempt on the part of the respondent is to use the criminal proceedings as weapon of harassment against the appellants. The indisputable facts that the respondent has filed the pending title suit in the year 2015, he got no case that he obtained an interim relief against his removal from the office of Secretary of the School Managing Committee as also the trusteeship, that he filed the stated application for an order for investigation only in April, 2017 together with absence of a case that
28 despite such removal he got a right to get informed of the affairs of the school and also the trust, would only support the said conclusion. For all these reasons, we are of the considered view that this case invites invocation of the power under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the FIR registered based on the direction of the Magistrate Court in the afore-stated application and all further proceeding in pursuance thereof. Also, we have no hesitation to hold that permitting continuance of the criminal proceedings against the appellants in the aforesaid circumstances would result in abuse of the process of Court and also in miscarriage of justice.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the law laid down in all the aforesaid cases, the Apex Court in the case of NARESH KUMAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA3 has held as follows: “….
….
….
Under these circumstances, we are of the considered view that this is a case where the inherent powers should have been exercised by the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are there to stop the abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice.
In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that although the inherent powers of a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a civil nature. This is what was held:
3 2024 SCC OnLine SC 268
29 “12. While exercising its juri iction under Section 482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal offence are present or not has to be judged by the High Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact, adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process of the court.” (emphasis supplied)
Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra), this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC 626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90, relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed, by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.
30
In the case at hand, the dispute between the parties was not only essentially of a civil nature but in this case the dispute itself stood settled later as we have already discussed above. We see no criminal element here and consequently the case here is nothing but an abuse of the process. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated 02.12.2020. The criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 113 of 2017 will hereby stand quashed.”
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, in the afore-quoted judgments, considers all the issues that are projected in the case at hand and holds that issues that are civil in nature and are rendered a colour of crime should be nipped in the bud, when it comes before the Court in exercise of juri iction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, it becomes a too well settled principle of law that criminal law cannot be permitted to set into motion on the issues which are purely civil in nature. Wherefore, permitting further investigation would become an abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
31
For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
O R D E R
(i) Criminal petition is allowed.
(ii) FIR in Crime No.299 of 2023 registered at Thilaknagar Police Station and pending before the III Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru stands quashed.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the case at hand are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and the same would not bind or influence any proceedings pending between the parties. (M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE
Bkp CT:MJ
Reproduced from the public record of the Karnataka High Court. Verify against the court's own copy before relying on it. Income tax judgments are on bharattax.net.